introduction to the metaphysic of morals-第6部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


　　The　simplicity　of　this　law；　in　comparison　with　the　great　and

manifold　consequences　which　may　be　drawn　from　it；　as　well　as　its

commanding　authority　and　supremacy　without　the　accompaniment　of　any

visible　motive　or　sanction；　must　certainly　at　first　appear　very

surprising。　And　we　may　well　wonder　at　the　power　of　our　reason　to

determine　the　activity　of　the　will　by　the　mere　idea　of　the

qualification　of　a　maxim　for　the　universality　of　a　practical　law；

especially　when　we　are　taught　thereby　that　this　practical　moral　law

first　reveals　a　property　of　the　will　which　the　speculative　reason

would　never　have　come　upon　either　by　principles　a　priori；　or　from

any　experience　whatever；　and　even　if　it　had　ascertained　the　fact；　it

could　never　have　theoretically　established　its　possibility。　This

practical　law；　however；　not　only　discovers　the　fact　of　that　property

of　the　will；　which　is　freedom；　but　irrefutably　establishes　it。　Hence

it　will　be　less　surprising　to　find　that　the　moral　laws　are

undemonstrable；　and　yet　apodeictic；　like　the　mathematical

postulates；　and　that　they；　at　the　same　time；　open　up　before　us　a　whole

field　of　practical　knowledge；　from　which　reason；　on　its　theoretical

side；　must　find　itself　entirely　excluded　with　its　speculative　idea

of　freedom　and　all　such　ideas　of　the　supersensible　generally。

　　The　conformity　of　an　action　to　the　law　of　duty　constitutes　its

legality；　the　conformity　of　the　maxim　of　the　action　with　the　law

constitutes　its　morality。　A　maxim　is　thus　a　subjective　principle　of

action；　which　the　individual　makes　a　rule　for　himself　as　to　how　in

fact　he　will　act。

　　On　the　other　hand；　the　principle　of　duty　is　what　reason

absolutely；　and　therefore　objectively　and　universally；　lays　down　in

the　form　of　a　command　to　the　individual；　as　to　how　he　ought　to　act。

　　The　supreme　principle　of　the　science　of　morals　accordingly　is

this：　〃Act　according　to　a　maxim　which　can　likewise　be　valid　as　a

universal　law。〃　Every　maxim　which　is　not　qualified　according　to　this

condition　is　contrary　to　Morality。

　　Laws　arise　from　the　will；　viewed　generally　as　practical　reason；

maxims　spring　from　the　activity　of　the　will　in　the　process　of

choice。　The　latter　in　man　is　what　constitutes　free…will。　The　will

which　refers　to　nothing　else　than　mere　law　can　neither　be　called

free　nor　not　free；　because　it　does　not　relate　to　actions

immediately；　but　to　the　giving　of　a　law　for　the　maxim　of　actions；　it

is　therefore　the　practical　reason　itself。　Hence　as　a　faculty；　it　is

absolutely　necessary　in　itself；　and　is　not　subject　to　any　external

necessitation。　It　is；　therefore；　only　the　act　of　choice　in　the

voluntary　process　that　can　be　called　free。

　　The　freedom　of　the　act　of　will；　however；　is　not　to　be　defined　as　a

liberty　of　indifference　（libertas　indifferentae）；　that；　is；　as　a

capacity　of　choosing　to　act　for　or　against　the　law。　The　voluntary

process；　indeed；　viewed　as　a　phenomenal　appearance；　gives　many

examples　of　this　choosing　in　experience；　and　some　have　accordingly

so　defined　the　free…will。　For　freedom；　as　it　is　first　made　knowable　by

the　moral　law；　is　known　only　as　a　negative　property　in　us；　as

constituted　by　the　fact　of　not　being　necessitated　to　act　by　sensible

principles　of　determination。　Regarded　as　a　noumenal　reality；

however；　in　reference　to　man　as　a　pure　rational　intelligence；　the

act　of　the　will　cannot　be　at　all　theoretically　exhibited；　nor　can　it

therefore　be　explained　how　this　power　can　act　necessitatingly　in

relation　to　the　sensible　activity　in　the　process　of　choice；　or

consequently　in　what　the　positive　quality　of　freedom　consists。　Only

thus　much　we　can　see　into　and　comprehend；　that　although　man；　as　a

being　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　exhibits…　as　experience

shows…　a　capacity　of　choosing　not　only　conformably　to　the　law　but　also

contrary　to　it；　his　freedom　as　a　rational　being　belonging　to　the　world

of　intelligence　cannot　be　defined　by　reference　merely　to　sensible

appearances。　For　sensible　phenomena　cannot　make　a　super…sensible

object…　such　as　free…will　is…　intelligible；　nor　can　freedom　ever　be

placed　in　the　mere　fact　that　the　rational　subject　can　make　a　choice　in

conflict　with　his　own　law…giving　reason；　although　experience　may　prove

that　it　happens　often　enough；　notwithstanding　our　inability　to

conceive　how　it　is　possible。　For　it　is　one　thing　to　admit　a

proposition　as　based　on　experience；　and　another　thing　to　make　it　the

defining　principle　and　the　universal　differentiating　mark　of　the　act

of　free…will；　in　its　distinction　from　the　arbitrium　brutum　s。

servum；　because　the　empirical　proposition　does　not　assert　that　any

particular　characteristic　necessarily　belongs　to　the　conception　in

question；　but　this　is　requisite　in　the　process　of　definition。

Freedom　in　relation　to　the　internal　legislation　of　reason　can　alone　be

properly　called　a　power；　the　possibility　of　diverging　from　the　law

thus　given　is　an　incapacity　or　want　of　power。　How　then　can　the

former　be　defined　by　the　latter？　It　could　only　be　by　a　definition

which　would　add　to　the　practical　conception　of　the　free…will；　its

exercise　as　shown　by　experience；　but　this　would　be　a　hybrid　definition

which　would　exhibit　the　conception　in　a　false　light。

　　A　morally　practical　law　is　a　proposition　which　contains　a

categorical　imperative　or　command。　He　who　commands　by　a　law　（imperans）

is　the　lawgiver　or　legislator。　He　is　the　author　of　the　obligation　that

accompanies　the　law；　but　he　is　not　always　the　author　of　the　law

itself。　In　the　latter　case；　the　law　would　be　positive；　contingent；　and

arbitrary。　The　law　which　is　imposed　upon　us　a　priori　and

unconditionally　by　our　own　reason　may　also　be　expressed　as

proceeding　from　the　will　of　a　supreme　lawgiver　or　the　Divine　will。

Such　a　will　as　supreme　can　consequently　have　only　rights　and　not

duties；　and　it　only　indicates　the　idea　of　a　moral　being　whose　will

is　law　for　all；　without　conceiving　of　him　as　the　author　of　that　will。

　　Imputation；　in　the　moral　sense；　is　the　judgement　by　which　anyone

is　declared　to　be　the　author　or　free　cause　of　an　action　which　is

then　regarded　as　his　moral　fact　or　deed；　and　is　subjected　to　law。　When

the　judgement　likewise　lays　down　the　juridical　consequences　of　the

deed；　it　is　judicial　or　valid　（imputatio　judiciaria　s。　valida）；

otherwise　it　would　be　only　adjudicative　or　declaratory　（imputatio

dijudicatoria）。　That　person…　individual　or　collective…　who　is　invested

with　the　right　to　impute　actions　judicially；　is　called　a　judge　or　a

court　（judex　s。　forum）。

　　When　any　one　does；　in　conformity　with　duty；　more　than　he　can　be

compelled　to　do　by　the　law；　it　is　said　to　be　meritorious　（meritum）。

What　is　done　only　in　exact　conformity　with　the　law；　is　what　is　due

（debitum）。　And　when　less　is　done　than　can　be　demanded　to　be　done　by

the　law；　the　result　is　moral　demerit　（demeritum）　or　culpability。

　　The　juridical　effect　or　consequence　of　a　culpable　act　of　demerit

is　punishment　（paena）；　that　of　a　meritorious　act　is　reward　（praemium）；

assuming　that　this　reward　was　promised　in　the　law　and　that　it　formed

the　motive　of　the　action。　The　coincidence　or　exact　conformity　of

conduct　to　what　is　due　has　no　juridical　effect。　Benevolent

remuneration　（remuneratio　s。　repensio　benefica）　has　no　place　in

juridical　relations。

　　The　good　or　bad　consequences　arising　from　the　performance　of　an

obligated　action…　as　also　the　consequences　arising　from　failing　to

perform　a　meritorious　action…　cannot　be　imputed　to　the　agent　（modus

imputation　is　tollens）。　The　good　consequences　of　a　meritorious　action…

as　also　the　bad　consequences　of　a　wrongful　action…　may　be　imputed　to

the　agent　（modus　imputation　is　poneus）。

　　The　degree　of　the　imputability　of　actions　is　to　be　reckoned

according　to　the　magnitude　of　the　hindrances　or　obstacles　which　it　has

been　necessary　for　them　to　overcome。　The　greater　the　natural

hindrances　in　the　sphere　of　sense；　and　the　less　the　moral　hindrance　of

duty；　so　much　the　more　is　a　good　deed　imputed　as　meritorious。　This　may

be　seen　by　considering　such　examples　as　rescuing　a　man　who　is　an

entire　stranger　from　great　distress；　and　at　very　considerable

sacrifice。　Conversely；　the　less　the　natural　hindrance；　and　the　greater

the　hindrance　on　the　ground　of　duty；　so　much　the　more　is　a

transgression　imputable　as　culpable。　Hence　the　state　of　mind　of　the

agent　or　doer　of　a　deed　makes　a　difference　in　imputing　its

consequences；　according　as　he　did　it　in　passion　or　performed　it　with

coolness　and　deliberation。





　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　…THE　END…