vill3-第28部分

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on　or　by　survivals　of　a　former　condition。　Or　again；　we　may　start　from　the　whole　and　inquire　whether　the　equality　the　elements　of　which　we　detect　is　equality　in　ownership　or　equality　in　service。　Let　us　take　up　the　first　thread　of　the　inquiry。　　　　　How　can　we　account　for　the　occurrence　of　regular　'shareholding'　among　the　freeholders？　Two　possibilities　have　to　be　considered：　the　free　character　of　the　tenements　may　be　newly　acquired　and　the　'shareholding'　may　be　a　relic　of　a　servile　past；　or；　on　the　other　hand；　the　freehold　character　of　the　tenements　may　be　coeval　with　the　'shareholding；'　and　in　this　latter　case　we　shall　have　to　admit　the　existence　of　freeholds　which　from　of　old　have　formed　an　element　in　the　village　community。　In　the　first　of　these　cases　again　we　shall　have　to　distinguish　between　two　suppositions：　　Servile　tenements　have　become　free；　this　may　be　due　either　to　some　general　measure　of　enfranchisement；　a　lord　having　preferred　to　take　money　rents　in　lieu　of　the　old　labour　services；　and　these　money　rents　being　the　modern　equivalent　for　those　old　services；　or　else　to　particular　and　occasional　feoffments　made　in　favour　of　those　who；　for　one　reason　or　another；　have　earned　some　benefit　at　the　lord's　hand。　To　put　it　shortly；　we　may　explain　the　phenomenon　either　by　a　process　of　commutation　such　as　that　which　turned　'workland'　into　'molland；'　or　by　special　privileges　which　have　exempted　certain　shares　in　the　land　from　a　general　scheme　of　villainage；　or；　lastly；　by　the　existence　of　freeholds　as　normal　factors　in　the　ancient　village　community。　　　　　Let　us　test　these　various　suppositions　by　the　facts　recorded　in　our　surveys。　At　first　sight　it　may　seem　possible　to　account　for　the　freehold　virgates　by　reference　to　the　process　which　converted　'workland'　into　'molland。'　We　have　seen　above　that　if　a　lord　began　to　demand　money　instead　of　work；　the　result　might；　in　some　cases；　be　the　evolution　of　new　tenures　which　gradually　lost　their　villain　character　and　became　recognised　as　genuine　freeholds。　And　no　doubt　one　considerable　class　of　cases　can　be　explained　by　this　process。　But　a　great　many　instances　seem　to　call　for　some　other　explanation。　To　begin　with；　the　mere　acceptance　of　rent　in　lieu　of　labour　did　not　make　the　tenement　a　freehold；　servile　tenements　were　frequently　put　ad　censum；（70*）　and　it　seems　difficult　to　believe　that　many　lords　allowed　a　commutation　of　labour　for　rent　to　have　the　effect　of　turning　villainage　into　freehold。　Another　difficulty　is　found　on　the　opposite　side。　What　force　kept　the　shares　together　when　they　had　become　free？　Why　did　they　not　accumulate　and　disperse　according　to　the　chances　of　free　development？　It　may　be　thought　that　custom；　and　express　conditions　of　feoffment；　must　have　acted　against　disruption。　I　do　not　deny　the　possibility；　but　I　say　that　it　is　not　easy　to　explain　the　very　widely　diffused　phenomenon　of　free　shareholding　by　a　commutation　which　tended　to　break　up　the　shares　and　to　make　them　useless　for　the　purposes　of　assessment。　Still　I　grant　that　these　considerations；　though　they　should　have　some　weight；　are　not　decisive；　and　I　insist　chiefly　on　the　following　argument。　　　　　The　peculiar　trait　which　distinguishes　'molland'　is　the　transition　from　labour　service　to　money　rent；　and　the　rent　is　undoubtedly　considered　as　an　equivalent　for　the　right　to　labour　services　which　the　lord　abandons。　It　must　be　admitted　that　in　some　cases　the　lord　may　have　taken　less　than　the　real　equivalent　in　order　to　get　such　a　convenient　commodity　as　money；　or　because　for　some　reason　or　another　he　was　in　need　of　current　coin。　Still　I　am　not　afraid　to　say　that；　in　a　general　way；　commutation　supposes　an　exchange　against　an　equivalent。　Indeed　the　demand　for　money　rents　was　considered　rather　as　increasing　than　as　decreasing　the　burden　incumbent　on　the　peasantry。（71*）　Now；　although　it　would　be　preposterous　to　try　and　make　out　in　every　single　case　whether　the　rent　of　the　free　virgate　is　an　adequate　equivalent　for　villain　services　or　not；　there　is　a　very　sufficient　number　of　instances　in　which　a　rough　reckoning　may　be　made　without　fear　of　going　much　astray。（72*）　And　if　we　attempt　such　a　reckoning　we　shall　be　struck　by　the　number　of　cases　in　which　the　rent　of　the　free　virgate　falls　considerably　short　of　what　it　yielded　by　the　virgate　of　the　villain。　We　have　seen　that　in　Ravenston；　Bedfordshire；　the　villain　service　is　valued　at　eight　shillings　per　virgate；　and　that　the　free　assessment　amounts　only　to　four　shillings。　In　Thriplow；　Cambridgeshire；　the　villains　perform　labour　duties　valued　at　9s。　4d。　per　bovate；　the　freeholders　are　assessed　variously；　but　there　is　a　certain　number　among　them　which　forms；　as　it　were；　the　stock　of　that　class；　and　their　average　rent　is　5s。　6d。　per　bovate。（73*）　In　Tyringham；　Buckinghamshire；　the　villain　holding　is　computed　at　six　acres　and　one　rood；　and　its　service　at　five　shillings；　the　free　virgates　have　a　like　number　of　acres　and　pay　various　rents；　but　almost　without　exception　less　than　the　villains。（74*）　In　Croxton；　Cambridgeshire；　there　are　customers　with　twenty　acres；　and　others　with　ten　acres；　the　first　have　to　pay　ten　shillings　and　to　assist　at　four　boonworks。　The　free　holders　are　possessed　of　plots　of　irregular　size；　and　their　rent　is　also　irregular；　but　on　the　average　much　lower　than　that　of　the　customers。（75*）　Let　it　be　noted　that　the　customary　tenants　have　commuted　their　labour　services　into　money　payments；　and。　in　fact；　they　are　to　be　considered　as　molmen　in　the　first　stage　of　development。　Still；　their　payments　are　computed　on　a　different　scale　from　those　of　the　free。　　　　　In　Brandone；　Warwickshire；　the　typical　villain；　William　Bateman；　pays　for　his　virgate　5s。　3d。；　and　sends　one　man　to　work　twice　a　week　from　the　29th　of　June　until　the　ist　of　August；　and　thence　onward　his　man　has　to　work　two　days　one　week　and　three　days　the　next。　The　free　half…virgate　merely　pays　five　shillings；　and　does　suit　to　the　manorial　court。　This　last　point　makes　no　difference；　because　the　villain　had　to　attend　the　manorial　court　quite　as　regularly　as　the　freeholder；　and　indeed　more　regularly　；　because　he　was　obliged　to　serve　on　inquests。（76*）　In　Bathekynton；　Warwickshire；　the　difference　in　favour　of　the　free　is　also　noticeable；　but　not　so　great。（77*）　And　these　are　by　no　means　exceptional　cases。　Nothing　is　more　common　than　to　find　free　tenements　held　by　trifling　services；　and　whatever　we　may　think　of　single　cases；　it　would　be　absurd　to　explain　such　arrangements　in　the　aggregate　as　the　results　of　a　bargain　between　lord　and　serfs。　It　is　evident；　therefore；　that　a　reference　to　'molland；'　to　a　commutation　of　labour　into　rent；　does　not　suit　these　cases。（78*）　　　　　Can　we　explain　these　cases　of　'free　shareholding'　by　feoffments　made　to　favoured　persons？　We　have　seen　that　the　lord　used　to　recompense　his　servants　by　grants　of　land　and　that　he　favoured　the　spread　of　cultivation　by　exacting　but　a　light　rent　from　newly　reclaimed　land。　Such　transactions　would　undoubtedly　produce　free　tenements　held　on　very　advantageous　terms；　but　still　they　seem　incapable　of　solving　our　problem。　Tenements　created　by　way　of　beneficial　feoffment　are　in　general　easily　recognised。　The　holdings　of　servants　and　other　people　endowed　by　favour　are　always　few　and　interspersed　among　the　plots　of　the　regular　occupiers　of　the　land；　be　they　free　or　serfs。　The　'essarted'　fields　are　sometimes　numerous；　but　usually　cut　up　into　small　strips　and　as　it　were　engrafted　on　the　original　stock　of　tenements。　Altogether　privileged　land　mostly　appears　divided　into　irregular　plots　and　reckoned　by　acres　and　not　by　shares。　And　what　we　have　to　account　for　is　a　vast　number　of　instances　in　which　what　seem　to　be　some　of　the　principal　and　original　shares　in　the　land　are　held　freely　and　by　comparatively　light　services。　I　do　not　think　that　we　can　get　rid　of　a　very　considerable　residue　of　cases　without　resorting　to　the　last　of　the　suppositions　mentioned　above。　We　must　admit　that　some　of　the　freeholders　in　the　Hundred　Rolls　are　possessed　of　shares　in　the　fields　not　because　they　have　emerged　from　serfdom；　but　because　they　were　from　the　first　members　of　a　village　community　over　which　the　lord's　power　spread。　it　would　be　very　hard　to　draw　absolute　distinctions　in　special　cases；　because　the　terminology　of　our　records　does　not　take　into　account　the　history　of　tenure　and　only　indicates　net　results。　But　a　comparison　of　facts　en　bloc　points　to　at　least　three　distinct　sources　of　the　freehold　virgates。　Some　may　be　due　to　commutation；　others　to　beneficial　feoffments；　but　there　are　yet　others　which　seem　to　be　ancient　and　primitive。　The　traits　which　mark　these　last　are　'shareholding'　and　light　rents。　The　light　rents　do　not　look　like　the　result　of　commutation；　the　'shareholding'　points　to　some　other　cause　than　favours　bestowed　by　the　lord。　　　　　We　shall　come　to　the　same　conclusion　if　we　follow　the　other　line　of　our　inquiry。　It　may　be　asked；　whether　the　community　into　which　the　share　is　made　to　fit　should　be　thought　of　primarily　as　a　community　in　ownership　or　a　community　in　assessment；　whether　the　shares　are　constructed　for　the　purpose　of　satisfying　equal　claims　or　for　the　purpose　of　imposing　equal　duties？　The　question　is　a　wide　one；　much　wider　than　the　subject　immediately　in　hand；　but　it　is　connected　with　that　subject　an