representative government-第63部分

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like　India　everything　depends　on　the　personal　qualities　and　capacities　of　the　agents　of　government。　This　truth　is　the　cardinal　principle　of　Indian　administration。　The　day　when　it　comes　to　be　thought　that　the　appointment　of　persons　to　situations　of　trust　from　motives　of　convenience；　already　so　criminal　in　England；　can　be　practised　with　impunity　in　India；　will　be　the　beginning　of　the　decline　and　fall　of　our　empire　there。　Even　with　a　sincere　intention　of　preferring　the　best　candidate；　it　will　not　do　to　rely　on　chance　for　supplying　fit　persons。　The　system　must　be　calculated　to　form　them。　It　has　done　this　hitherto；　and　because　it　has　done　so；　our　rule　in　India　has　lasted；　and　been　one　of　constant；　if　not　very　rapid；　improvement　in　prosperity　and　good　administration。　As　much　bitterness　is　now　manifested　against　this　system；　and　as　much　eagerness　displayed　to　overthrow　it；　as　if　educating　and　training　the　officers　of　government　for　their　work　were　a　thing　utterly　unreasonable　and　indefensible；　an　unjustifiable　interference　with　the　rights　of　ignorance　and　inexperience。　There　is　a　tacit　conspiracy　between　those　who　would　like　to　job　in　first…rate　Indian　offices　for　their　connections　here；　and　those　who；　being　already　in　India；　claim　to　be　promoted　from　the　indigo　factory　or　the　attorney's　office；　to　administer　justice　or　fix　the　payments　due　to　government　from　millions　of　people。　The　〃monopoly〃　of　the　Civil　Service；　so　much　inveighed　against；　is　like　the　monopoly　of　judicial　offices　by　the　bar；　and　its　abolition　would　be　like　opening　the　bench　in　Westminster　Hall　to　the　first　comer　whose　friends　certify　that　he　has　now　and　then　looked　into　Blackstone。　Were　the　course　ever　adopted　of　sending　men　from　this　country；　or　encouraging　them　in　going　out；　to　get　themselves　put　into　high　appointments　without　having　learnt　their　business　by　passing　through　the　lower　ones；　the　most　important　offices　would　be　thrown　to　Scotch　cousins　and　adventurers；　connected　by　no　professional　feeling　with　the　country　or　the　work；　held　to　no　previous　knowledge；　and　eager　only　to　make　money　rapidly　and　return　home。　　　The　safety　of　the　country　is；　that　those　by　whom　it　is　administered　be　sent　out　in　youth；　as　candidates　only；　to　begin　at　the　bottom　of　the　ladder；　and　ascend　higher　or　not；　as；　after　a　proper　interval；　they　are　proved　qualified。　The　defect　of　the　East　India　Company's　system　was；　that　though　the　best　men　were　carefully　sought　out　for　the　most　important　posts；　yet　if　an　officer　remained　in　the　service；　promotion；　though　it　might　be　delayed；　came　at　last　in　some　shape　or　other；　to　the　least　as　well　as　to　the　most　competent。　Even　the　inferior　in　qualifications；　among　such　a　corps　of　functionaries；　consisted；　it　must　be　remembered；　of　men　who　had　been　brought　up　to　their　duties；　and　had　fulfilled　them　for　many　years；　at　lowest　without　disgrace；　under　the　eye　and　authority　of　a　superior。　But　though　this　diminished　the　evil；　it　was　nevertheless　considerable。　A　man　who　never　becomes　fit　for　more　than　an　assistant's　duty　should　remain　an　assistant　all　his　life；　and　his　juniors　should　be　promoted　over　him。　With　this　exception；　I　am　not　aware　of　any　real　defect　in　the　old　system　of　Indian　appointments。　It　had　already　received　the　greatest　other　improvement　it　was　susceptible　of；　the　choice　of　the　original　candidates　by　competitive　examination：　which；　besides　the　advantage　of　recruiting　from　a　higher　grade　of　industry　and　capacity；　has　the　recommendation；　that　under　it；　unless　by　accident；　there　are　no　personal　ties　between　the　candidates　for　offices　and　those　who　have　a　voice　in　conferring　them。　　　It　is　in　no　way　unjust　that　public　officers　thus　selected　and　trained　should　be　exclusively　eligible　to　offices　which　require　specially　Indian　knowledge　and　experience。　If　any　door　to　the　higher　appointments；　without　passing　through　the　lower；　be　opened　even　for　occasional　use；　there　will　be　such　incessant　knocking　at　it　by　persons　of　influence　that　it　will　be　impossible　ever　to　keep　it　closed。　The　only　excepted　appointment　should　be　the　highest　one　of　all。　The　Viceroy　of　British　India　should　be　a　person　selected　from　all　Englishmen　for　his　great　general　capacity　for　government。　If　he　have　this；　he　will　be　able　to　distinguish　in　others；　and　turn　to　his　own　use；　that　special　knowledge　and　judgment　in　local　affairs　which　he　has　not　himself　had　the　opportunity　of　acquiring。　There　are　good　reasons　why　（saving　exceptional　cases）　the　Viceroy　should　not　be　a　member　of　the　regular　service。　All　services　have；　more　or　less；　their　class　prejudices；　from　which　the　supreme　ruler　ought　to　be　exempt。　Neither　are　men；　however　able　and　experienced；　who　have　passed　their　lives　in　Asia；　so　likely　to　possess　the　most　advanced　European　ideas　in　general　statesmanship；　which　the　chief　ruler　should　carry　out　with　him；　and　blend　with　the　results　of　Indian　experience。　Again；　being　of　a　different　class；　and　especially　if　chosen　by　a　different　authority；　he　will　seldom　have　any　personal　partialities　to　warp　his　appointments　to　office。　This　great　security　for　honest　bestowal　of　patronage　existed　in　rare　perfection　under　the　mixed　government　of　the　Crown　and　the　East　India　Company。　The　supreme　dispensers　of　office；　the　Governor…General　and　Governors；　were　appointed；　in　fact　though　not　formally；　by　the　Crown；　that　is；　by　the　general　Government；　not　by　the　intermediate　body；　and　a　great　officer　of　the　Crown　probably　had　not　a　single　personal　or　political　connection　in　the　local　service：　while　the　delegated　body；　most　of　whom　had　themselves　served　in　the　country；　had　and　were　likely　to　have　such　connections。　　　This　guarantee　for　impartiality　would　be　much　impaired　if　the　civil　servants　of　Government；　even　though　sent　out　in　boyhood　as　mere　candidates　for　employment；　should　come　to　be　furnished；　in　any　considerable　proportion；　by　the　class　of　society　which　supplies　Viceroys　and　Governors。　Even　the　initiatory　competitive　examination　would　then　be　an　insufficient　security。　It　would　exclude　mere　ignorance　and　incapacity；　it　would　compel　youths　of　family　to　start　in　the　race　with　the　same　amount　of　instruction　and　ability　as　other　people；　the　stupidest　son　could　not　be　put　into　the　Indian　service　as　he　can　be　into　the　church；　but　there　would　be　nothing　to　prevent　undue　preference　afterwards。　No　longer　all　equally　unknown　and　unheard　of　by　the　arbiter　of　their　lot；　a　portion　of　the　service　would　be　personally；　and　a　still　greater　number　politically；　in　close　relation　with　him。　Members　of　certain　families；　and　of　the　higher　classes　and　influential　connections　generally；　would　rise　more　rapidly　than　their　competitors；　and　be　often　kept　in　situations　for　which　they　were　unfit；　or　placed　in　those　for　which　others　were　fitter。　The　same　influences　would　be　brought　into　play　which　affect　promotions　in　the　army：　and　those　alone；　if　such　miracles　of　simplicity　there　be；　who　believe　that　these　are　impartial；　would　expect　impartiality　in　those　of　India。　This　evil　is；　I　fear；　irremediable　by　any　general　measures　which　can　be　taken　under　the　present　system。　No　such　will　afford　a　degree　of　security　comparable　to　that　which　once　flowed　spontaneously　from　the　so…called　double　government。　　　What　is　accounted　so　great　an　advantage　in　the　case　of　the　English　system　of　government　at　home　has　been　its　misfortune　in　India…　that　it　grew　up　of　itself；　not　from　preconceived　design；　but　by　successive　expedients；　and　by　the　adaptation　of　machinery　originally　created　for　a　different　purpose。　As　the　country　on　which　its　maintenance　depended　was　not　the　one　out　of　whose　necessities　it　grew；　its　practical　benefits　did　not　come　home　to　the　mind　of　that　country；　and　it　would　have　required　theoretic　recommendations　to　render　it　acceptable。　Unfortunately；　these　were　exactly　what　it　seemed　to　be　destitute　of：　and　undoubtedly　the　common　theories　of　government　did　not　furnish　it　with　such；　framed　as　those　theories　have　been　for　states　of　circumstances　differing　in　all　the　most　important　features　from　the　case　concerned。　But　in　government；　as　in　other　departments　of　human　agency；　almost　all　principles　which　have　been　durable　were　first　suggested　by　observation　of　some　particular　case　in　which　the　general　laws　of　nature　acted　in　some　new　or　previously　unnoticed　combination　of　circumstances。　The　institutions　of　Great　Britain；　and　those　of　the　United　States；　have　the　distinction　of　suggesting　most　of　the　theories　of　government　which；　through　good　and　evil　fortune；　are　now；　in　the　course　of　generations；　reawakening　political　life　in　the　nations　of　Europe。　It　has　been　the　destiny　of　the　government　of　the　East　India　Company　to　suggest　the　true　theory　of　the　government　of　a　semibarbarous　dependency　by　a　civilised　country；　and　after　having　done　this；　to　perish。　It　would　be　a　singular　fortune　if；　at　the　end　of　two　or　three　more　generations；　this　speculative　result　should　be　the　only　remaining　fruit　of　our　ascendancy　in　India；　if　posterity　should　say　of　us；　that　having　stumbled　accidentally　upon　better　arrangements　than　our　wisdom　would　ever　have　devised；　the　first　use　we　made　of　our　awakened　reason　was　to　destroy　them；　and　allow　the　good　which　had　been　in　course　of　being　realised　to　fall　through　and　be　lost；　from　ignorance　of　the　principles　on　which　it　depended。　D