representative government-第62部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！

e　or　less　of　the　spirit　should　not　perpetually　break　out。　The　Government；　itself　free　from　this　spirit；　is　never　able　sufficiently　to　keep　it　down　in　the　young　and　raw　even　of　its　own　civil　and　military　officers；　over　whom　it　has　so　much　more　control　than　over　the　independent　residents。　　　As　it　is　with　the　English　in　India；　so；　according　to　trustworthy　testimony；　it　is　with　the　French　in　Algiers；　so　with　the　Americans　in　the　countries　conquered　from　Mexico；　so　it　seems　to　be　with　the　Europeans　in　China；　and　already　even　in　Japan：　there　is　no　necessity　to　recall　how　it　was　with　the　Spaniards　in　South　America。　In　all　these　cases；　the　government　to　which　these　private　adventurers　are　subject　is　better　than　they；　and　does　the　most　it　can　to　protect　the　natives　against　them。　Even　the　Spanish　Government　did　this；　sincerely　and　earnestly；　though　ineffectually；　as　is　known　to　every　reader　of　Mr。　Helps'　instructive　history。　Had　the　Spanish　Government　been　directly　accountable　to　Spanish　opinion　we　may　question　if　it　would　have　made　the　attempt：　for　the　Spaniards；　doubtless；　would　have　taken　part　with　their　Christian　friends　and　relations　rather　than　with　Pagans。　The　settlers；　not　the　natives；　have　the　ear　of　the　public　at　home；　it　is　they　whose　representations　are　likely　to　pass　for　truth；　because　they　alone　have　both　the　means　and　the　motive　to　press　them　perseveringly　upon　the　inattentive　and　uninterested　public　mind。　The　distrustful　criticism　with　which　Englishmen；　more　than　any　other　people；　are　in　the　habit　of　scanning　the　conduct　of　their　country　towards　foreigners；　they　usually　reserve　for　the　proceedings　of　the　public　authorities。　In　all　questions　between　a　government　and　an　individual　the　presumption　in　every　Englishman's　mind　is　that　the　government　is　in　the　wrong。　And　when　the　resident　English　bring　the　batteries　of　English　political　action　to　bear　upon　any　of　the　bulwarks　erected　to　protect　the　natives　against　their　encroachments；　the　executive；　with　their　real　but　faint　velleities　of　something　better；　generally　find　it　safer　to　their　parliamentary　interest；　and　at　any　rate　less　troublesome；　to　give　up　the　disputed　position　than　to　defend　it。　　　What　makes　matters　worse　is　that　when　the　public　mind　is　invoked　（as；　to　its　credit；　the　English　mind　is　extremely　open　to　be）　in　the　name　of　justice　and　philanthropy；　in　behalf　of　the　subject　community　or　race；　there　is　the　same　probability　of　its　missing　the　mark。　For　in　the　subject　community　also　there　are　oppressors　and　oppressed；　powerful　individuals　or　classes；　and　slaves　prostrate　before　them；　and　it　is　the　former；　not　the　latter；　who　have　the　means　of　access　to　the　English　public。　A　tyrant　or　sensualist　who　has　been　deprived　of　the　power　he　had　abused；　and；　instead　of　punishment；　is　supported　in　as　great　wealth　and　splendour　as　he　ever　enjoyed；　a　knot　of　privileged　landholders；　who　demand　that　the　State　should　relinquish　to　them　its　reserved　right　to　a　rent　from　their　lands；　or　who　resent　as　a　wrong　any　attempt　to　protect　the　masses　from　their　extortion；　these　have　no　difficulty　in　procuring　interested　or　sentimental　advocacy　in　the　British　Parliament　and　press。　The　silent　myriads　obtain　none。　　　The　preceding　observations　exemplify　the　operation　of　a　principle…　which　might　be　called　an　obvious　one；　were　it　not　that　scarcely　anybody　seems　to　be　aware　of　it…　that；　while　responsibility　to　the　governed　is　the　greatest　of　all　securities　for　good　government；　responsibility　to　somebody　else　not　only　has　no　such　tendency；　but　is　as　likely　to　produce　evil　as　good。　The　responsibility　of　the　British　rulers　of　India　to　the　British　nation　is　chiefly　useful　because；　when　any　acts　of　the　government　are　called　in　question；　it　ensures　publicity　and　discussion；　the　utility　of　which　does　not　require　that　the　public　at　large　should　comprehend　the　point　at　issue；　provided　there　are　any　individuals　among　them　who　do；　for；　a　merely　moral　responsibility　not　being　responsibility　to　the　collective　people；　but　to　every　separate　person　among　them　who　forms　a　judgment；　opinions　may　be　weighed　as　well　as　counted；　and　the　approbation　or　disapprobation　of　one　person　well　versed　in　the　subject　may　outweigh　that　of　thousands　who　know　nothing　about　it　at　all。　It　is　doubtless　a　useful　restraint　upon　the　immediate　rulers　that　they　can　be　put　upon　their　defence；　and　that　one　or　two　of　the　jury　will　form　an　opinion　worth　having　about　their　conduct；　though　that　of　the　remainder　will　probably　be　several　degrees　worse　than　none。　Such　as　it　is；　this　is　the　amount　of　benefit　to　India；　from　the　control　exercised　over　the　Indian　government　by　the　British　Parliament　and　people。　　　It　is　not　by　attempting　to　rule　directly　a　country　like　India；　but　by　giving　it　good　rulers；　that　the　English　people　can　do　their　duty　to　that　country；　and　they　can　scarcely　give　it　a　worse　one　than　an　English　Cabinet　Minister；　who　is　thinking　of　English；　not　Indian　politics；　who　seldom　remains　long　enough　in　office　to　acquire　an　intelligent　interest　in　so　complicated　a　subject；　upon　whom　the　factitious　public　opinion　got　up　in　Parliament；　consisting　of　two　or　three　fluent　speakers；　acts　with　as　much　force　as　if　it　were　genuine；　while　he　is　under　none　of　the　influences　of　training　and　position　which　would　lead　or　qualify　him　to　form　an　honest　opinion　of　his　own。　A　free　country　which　attempts　to　govern　a　distant　dependency；　inhabited　by　a　dissimilar　people；　by　means　of　a　branch　of　its　own　executive；　will　almost　inevitably　fail。　The　only　mode　which　has　any　chance　of　tolerable　success　is　to　govern　through　a　delegated　body　of　a　comparatively　permanent　character；　allowing　only　a　right　of　inspection；　and　a　negative　voice；　to　the　changeable　Administration　of　the　State。　Such　a　body　did　exist　in　the　case　of　India；　and　I　fear　that　both　India　and　England　will　pay　a　severe　penalty　for　the　shortsighted　policy　by　which　this　intermediate　instrument　of　government　was　done　away　with。　　　It　is　of　no　avail　to　say　that　such　a　delegated　body　cannot　have　all　the　requisites　of　good　government；　above　all；　cannot　have　that　complete　and　ever…operative　identity　of　interest　with　the　governed　which　it　is　so　difficult　to　obtain　even　where　the　people　to　be　ruled　are　in　some　degree　qualified　to　look　after　their　own　affairs。　Real　good　government　is　not　compatible　with　the　conditions　of　the　case。　There　is　but　a　choice　of　imperfections。　The　problem　is；　so　to　construct　the　governing　body　that；　under　the　difficulties　of　the　position；　it　shall　have　as　much　interest　as　possible　in　good　government；　and　as　little　in　bad。　Now　these　conditions　are　best　found　in　an　intermediate　body。　A　delegated　administration　has　always　this　advantage　over　a　direct　one；　that　it　has；　at　all　events；　no　duty　to　perform　except　to　the　governed。　It　has　no　interests　to　consider　except　theirs。　Its　own　power　of　deriving　profit　from　misgovernment　may　be　reduced…　in　the　latest　constitution　of　the　East　India　Company　it　was　reduced…　to　a　singularly　small　amount：　and　it　can　be　kept　entirely　clear　of　bias　from　the　individual　or　class　interests　of　any　one　else。　　　When　the　home　government　and　Parliament　are　swayed　by　those　partial　influences　in　the　exercise　of　the　power　reserved　to　them　in　the　last　resort；　the　intermediate　body　is　the　certain　advocate　and　champion　of　the　dependency　before　the　imperial　tribunal。　The　intermediate　body；　moreover；　is；　in　the　natural　course　of　things；　chiefly　composed　of　persons　who　have　acquired　professional　knowledge　of　this　part　of　their　country's　concerns；　who　have　been　trained　to　it　in　the　place　itself；　and　have　made　its　administration　the　main　occupation　of　their　lives。　Furnished　with　these　qualifications；　and　not　being　liable　to　lose　their　office　from　the　accidents　of　home　politics；　they　identify　their　character　and　consideration　with　their　special　trust；　and　have　a　much　more　permanent　interest　in　the　success　of　their　administration；　and　in　the　prosperity　of　the　country　which　they　administer；　than　a　member　of　a　Cabinet　under　a　representative　constitution　can　possibly　have　in　the　good　government　of　any　country　except　the　one　which　he　serves。　So　far　as　the　choice　of　those　who　carry　on　the　management　on　the　spot　devolves　upon　this　body；　the　appointments　are　kept　out　of　the　vortex　of　party　and　parliamentary　jobbing；　and　freed　from　the　influence　of　those　motives　to　the　abuse　of　patronage；　for　the　reward　of　adherents；　or　to　buy　off　those　who　would　otherwise　be　opponents；　which　are　always　stronger；　with　statesmen　of　average　honesty；　than　a　conscientious　sense　of　the　duty　of　appointing　the　fittest　man。　To　put　this　one　class　of　appointments　as　far　as　possible　out　of　harm's　way　is　of　more　consequence　than　the　worst　which　can　happen　to　all　other　offices　in　the　state；　for；　in　every　other　department；　if　the　officer　is　unqualified；　the　general　opinion　of　the　community　directs　him　in　a　certain　degree　what　to　do：　but　in　the　position　of　the　administrators　of　a　dependency　where　the　people　are　not　fit　to　have　the　control　in　their　own　hands；　the　character　of　the　government　entirely　depends　on　the　qualifications；　moral　and　intellectual；　of　the　individual　functionaries。　　　It　cannot　be　too　often　repeated；　that　in　a　country　like　India　everything　depends　on　the　personal　qualities　and　capacities　of　the　agents　of　government。