bentham-第4部分

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；　for　instance；　to　the　Epicurean　philosophy；　according　to　the　most　complete　view　we　have　of　the　moral　part　of　it；　by　the　most　accomplished　scholar　of　antiquity；　Cicero；　we　ask　any　one　who　has　read　his　philosophical　writings；　the　'De　Finibus'　for　instance；　whether　the　arguments　of　the　Epicureans　do　not；　just　as　much　as　those　of　the　Stoics　or　Platonists；　consist　of　mere　rhetorical　appeals　to　common　notions；　to　eikita　and　simeia　instead　of　tekmiria；　notions　picked　up　as　it　were　casually；　and　when　true　at　all；　never　so　narrowly　looked　into　as　to　ascertain　in　what　sense　and　under　what　limitations　they　are　true。　The　application　of　a　real　inductive　philosophy　to　the　problems　of　ethics；　is　as　unknown　to　the　Epicurean　moralists　as　to　any　of　the　other　schools；　they　never　take　a　question　to　pieces；　and　join　issue　on　a　definite　point。　Bentham　certainly　did　not　learn　his　sifting　and　anatomizing　method　from　them。　　　　　This　method　Bentham　has　finally　installed　in　philosophy；　has　made　it　henceforth　imperative　on　philosophers　of　all　schools。　By　it　he　has　formed　the　intellects　of　many　thinkers；　who　either　never　adopted；　or　have　abandoned；　many　of　his　peculiar　opinions。　He　has　taught　the　method　to　men　of　the　most　opposite　schools　to　his；　he　has　made　them　perceive　that　if　they　do　not　test　their　doctrines　by　the　method　of　detail；　their　adversaries　will。　He　has　thus；　it　is　not　too　much　to　say；　for　the　first　time　introduced　precision　of　thought　into　moral　and　political　philosophy。　Instead　of　taking　up　their　opinions　by　intuition；　or　by　ratiocination　from　premises　adopted　on　a　mere　rough　view；　and　couched　in　language　so　vague　that　it　is　impossible　to　say　exactly　whether　they　are　true　or　false；　philosophers　are　now　forced　to　understand　one　another；　to　break　down　the　generality　of　their　propositions；　and　join　a　precise　issue　in　every　dispute。　This　is　nothing　less　than　a　revolution　in　philosophy。　Its　effect　is　gradually　becoming　evident　in　the　writings　of　English　thinkers　of　every　variety　of　opinion；　and　will　be　felt　more　and　more　in　proportion　as　Bentham's　writings　are　diffused；　and　as　the　number　of　minds　to　whose　formation　they　contribute　is　multiplied。　　　　　It　will　naturally　be　presumed　that　of　the　fruits　of　this　great　philosophical　improvement　some　portion　at　least　will　have　been　reaped　by　its　author。　Armed　with　such　a　potent　instrument；　and　wielding　it　with　such　singleness　of　aim；　cultivating　the　field　of　practical　philosophy　with　such　unwearied　and　such　consistent　use　of　a　method　right　in　itself；　and　not　adopted　by　his　predecessors；　it　cannot　he　but　that　Bentham　by　his　own　inquiries　must　have　accomplished　something　considerable。　And　so；　it　will　be　found；　he　has；　something　not　only　considerable；　but　extraordinary；　though　but　little　compared　with　what　he　has　left　undone；　and　far　short　of　what　his　sanguine　and　almost　boyish　fancy　made　him　flatter　himself　that　he　had　accomplished。　His　peculiar　method；　admirably　calculated　to　make　clear　thinkers；　and　sure　ones　to　the　extent　of　their　materials；　has　not　equal　efficacy　for　making　those　materials　complete。　It　is　a　security　for　accuracy；　but　not　for　comprehensiveness；　or　rather；　it　is　a　security　for　one　sort　of　comprehensiveness；　but　not　for　another。　　　　　Bentham's　method　of　laying　out　his　subject　is　admirable　as　a　preservative　against　one　kind　of　narrow　and　partial　views。　He　begins　by　placing　before　himself　the　whole　of　the　field　of　inquiry　to　which　the　particular　question　belongs；　and　divides　down　till　he　arrives　at　the　thing　he　is　in　search　of；　and　thus　by　successively　rejecting　all　which　is　not　the　thing；　he　gradually　works　out　a　definition　of　what　it　is。　This；　which　he　calls　the　exhaustive　method；　is　as　old　as　philosophy　itself。　Plato　owes　everything　to　it；　and　does　everything　by　it；　and　the　use　made　of　it　by　that　great　man　in　his　Dialogues；　Bacon；　in　one　of　those　pregnant　logical　hints　scattered　through　his　writings；　and　so　much　neglected　by　most　of　his　pretended　followers；　pronounces　to　be　the　nearest　approach　to　a　true　inductive　method　in　the　ancient　philosophy。　Bentham　was　probably　not　aware　that　Plato　had　anticipated　him　in　the　process　to　which　he　too　declared　that　he　owed　everything。　By　the　practice　of　it；　his　speculations　are　rendered　eminently　systematic　and　consistent；　no　question；　with　him；　is　ever　an　insulated　one；　he　sees　every　subject　in　connexion　with　all　the　other　subjects　with　which　in　his　view　it　is　related；　and　from　which　it　requires　to　be　distinguished；　and　as　all　that　he　knows；　in　the　least　degree　allied　to　the　subject；　has　been　marshalled　in　an　orderly　manner　before　him；　he　does　not；　like　people　who　use　a　looser　method；　forget　and　overlook　a　thing　on　one　occasion　to　remember　it　on　another。　Hence　there　is　probably　no　philosopher　of　so　wide　a　range；　in　whom　there　are　so　few　inconsistencies。　If　any　of　the　truths　which　he　did　not　see；　had　come　to　be　seen　by　him；　he　would　have　remembered　it　everywhere　and　at　all　times；　and　would　have　adjusted　his　whole　system　to　it。　And　this　is　another　admirable　quality　which　he　has　impressed　upon　the　best　of　the　minds　trained　in　his　habits　of　thought：　when　those　minds　open　to　admit　new　truths；　they　digest　them　as　fast　as　they　receive　them。　　　　　But　this　system；　excellent　for　keeping　before　the　mind　of　the　thinker　all　that　he　knows；　does　not　make　him　know　enough；　it　does　not　make　a　knowledge　of　some　of　the　properties　of　a　thing　suffice　for　the　whole　of　it；　nor　render　a　rooted　habit　of　surveying　a　complex　object　（though　ever　so　carefully）　in　only　one　of　its　aspects；　tantamount　to　the　power　of　contemplating　it　in　all。　To　give　this　last　power；　other　qualities　are　required：　whether　Bentham　possessed　those　other　qualities　we　now　have　to　see。　Bentham's　mind；　as　we　have　already　said；　was　eminently　synthetical。　He　begins　all　his　inquiries　by　supposing　nothing　to　he　known　on　the　subject；　and　reconstructs　all　philosophy　ab　initio；　without　reference　to　the　opinions　of　his　predecessors。　But　to　build　either　a　philosophy　or　anything　else；　there　must　be　materials。　For　the　philosophy　of　matter；　the　materials　are　the　properties　of　matter；　for　moral　and　political　philosophy；　the　properties　of　man；　and　of　man's　position　in　the　world。　The　knowledge　which　any　inquirer　possesses　of　these　properties；　constitutes　a　limit　beyond　which；　as　a　moralist　or　a　political　philosopher；　whatever　be　his　powers　of　mind；　he　cannot　reach。　Nobody's　synthesis　can　be　more　complete　than　his　analysis。　If　in　his　survey　of　human　nature　and　life　he　has　left　any　element　out；　then；　wheresoever　that　element　exerts　any　influence；　his　conclusions　will　fail；　more　or　less；　in　their　application。　If　he　has　left　out　many　elements；　and　those　very　important；　his　labours　may　be　highly　valuable；　he　may　have　largely　contributed　to　that　body　of　partial　truths　which；　when　completed　and　corrected　by　one　another；　constitute　practical　truth；　but　the　applicability　of　his　system　to　practice　in　its　own　proper　shape　will　be　of　an　exceedingly　limited　range。　　　　　Human　nature　and　human　life　are　wide　subjects；　and　whoever　would　embark　in　an　enterprise　requiring　a　thorough　knowledge　of　them；　has　need　both　of　large　stores　of　his　own；　and　of　all　aids　and　appliances　from　elsewhere。　His　qualifications　for　success　will　be　proportional　to　two　things：　the　degree　in　which　his　own　nature　and　circumstances　furnish　them　with　a　correct　and　complete　picture　of　man's　nature　and　circumstances；　and　his　capacity　of　deriving　light　from　other　minds。　　　　　Bentham　failed　in　deriving　light　from　other　minds。　His　writings　contain　few　traces　of　the　accurate　knowledge　of　any　schools　of　thinking　but　his　own；　and　many　proofs　of　his　entire　conviction　that　they　could　teach　him　nothing　worth　knowing。　For　some　of　the　most　illustrious　of　previous　thinkers；　his　contempt　was　unmeasured。　In　almost　the　only　passage　of　the　'Deontology'　which；　from　its　style；　and　from　its　having　before　appeared　in　print；　may　be　known　to　be　Bentham's；　Socrates；　and　Plato　are　spoken　of　in　terms　distressing　to　his　great　admirers；　and　the　incapacity　to　appreciate　such　men；　is　a　fact　perfectly　in　unison　with　the　general　habits　of　Bentham's　mind。　He　had　a　phrase；　expressive　of　the　view　he　took　of　all　moral　speculations　to　which　his　method　had　not　been　applied；　or　（which　he　considered　as　the　same　thing）　not　founded　on　a　recognition　of　utility　as　the　moral　standard；　this　phrase　was　'vague　generalities'。　Whatever　presented　itself　to　him　in　such　a　shape；　he　dismissed　as　unworthy　of　notice；　or　dwelt　upon　only　to　denounce　as　absurd。　He　did　not　heed；　or　rather　the　nature　of　his　mind　prevented　it　from　occurring　to　him；　that　these　generalities　contained　the　whole　unanalysed　experience　of　the　human　race。　　　　　Unless　it　can　be　asserted　that　mankind　did　not　know　anything　until　logicians　taught　it　to　them　that　until　the　last　hand　has　been　put　to　a　moral　truth　by　giving　it　a　metaphysically　precise　expression；　all　the　previous　rough…hewing　which　it　has　undergone　by　the　common　intellect　at　the　suggestion　of　common　wants　and　common　experience　is　to　go　for　nothing；　it　must　be　allowed；　that　even　the　originality　which　can；　and　the　courage　which　dares；　think　for　itself；　is　not　a　more　necessary　part　of　the　philosophical　character　than　a　thoughtful　regard　for　previous　thinkers；　and　for　the　collective　mind　of　the　human　race。　What