criminal psychology-第47部分

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But　just　as　we　presuppose　that　wherever　the　human　will　played　any　part；　regular　forms　will　come　to　light；　so　we　begin　to　doubt　that　such　forms　will　occur　where　we　find　that　accident；　natural　　law；　or　the　unplanned　coperation　of　men　were　determining　factors；　If　I　permit　anybody　to　count　up　accidentally　concurrent　things　and　he　announces　that　their　number　is　one　hundred；　I　shall　probably　have　him　count　over　again。　I　shall　be　surprised　to　hear　that　somebody's　collection　contains　exactly　1000　pieces；　and　when　any　one　cites　a　distance　of　300　steps　I　will　suppose　that　he　had　made　an　approximate　estimation　but　had　not　counted　the　steps。　This　fact　is　well　known　to　people　who　do　not　care　about　accuracy；　or　who　want　to　give　their　statements　the　greatest　possible　appearance　of　correctness；　hence；　in　citing　figures；　they　make　use　of　especially　irregular　numbers；　e。　g。　1739；　；　3。25％；　etc。　I　know　a　case　of　a　vote　of　jurymen　in　which　even　the　proportion　of　votes　had　to　be　rendered　probable。　The　same　jury　had　to　pass　that　day　on　three　small　cases。　In　the　first　case　the　proportion　was　8　for；　4　against；　the　second　case　showed　the　same　proportion　and　the　third　case　the　same。　But　when　the　foreman　observed　the　proportion　he　announced　that　one　juryman　must　change　his　vote　because　the　same　proportion　three　times　running　would　appear　too　improbable！　If　we　want　to　know　the　reason　for　our　superior　trust　in　irregularity　in　such　cases；　it　is　to　be　found　in　the　fact　that　experience　shows　nature；　in　spite　of　all　her　marvelous　orderliness　in　the　large；　to　be　completely　free；　and　hence　irregular　in　little　things。　Hence；　as　Mill　shows　in　more　detail；　we　expect　no　identity　of　form　in　nature。　We　do　not　expect　next　year　to　have　the　same　order　of　days　as　this　year；　and　we　never　wonder　when　some　suggestive　regularity　is　broken　by　a　new　event。　Once　it　was　supposed　that　all　men　were　either　black　or　white；　and　then　red　men　were　discovered　in　America。　Now　just　exactly　such　suppositions　cause　the　greatest　difficulties；　because　we　do　not　know　the　limits　of　natural　law。　For　example；　we　do　not　doubt　that　all　bodies　on　earth　have　weight。　And　we　expect　to　find　no　exception　to　this　rule　on　reaching　some　undiscovered　island　on　our　planet；　all　bodies　will　have　weight　there　as　well　as　everywhere　else。　But　the　possibility　of　the　existence　of　red　men　had　to　be　granted　even　before　the　discovery　of　America。　Now　where　is　the　difference　between　the　propositions：　All　bodies　have　weight；　and；　All　men　are　either　white　or　black？　It　may　be　said　circularly　the　first　is　a　natural　law　and　the　second　is　not。　But　why　not？　Might　not　the　human　body　be　so　organized　that　according　to　the　natural　law　it　would　be　impossible　for　red　men　to　exist？　And　what　accurate　knowledge　have　we　of　pigmentation？　Has　anybody　ever　seen　a　green　horse？　And　is　the　accident　that　nobody　has　ever　seen　one　to　prevent　the　　discovery　of　green　horses　in　the　heart　of　Africa？　May；　perhaps；　somebody　not　breed　green　horses　by　crossings　or　other　experiments？　Or　is　the　existence　of　green　horses　contrary　to　some　unknown　but　invincible　natural　law？　Perhaps　somebody　may　have　a　green　horse　to…morrow；　perhaps　it　is　as　impossible　as　water　running　up　hill。

To　know　whether　anything　is　natural　law　or　not　always　depends　upon　the　grade　and　standing　of　our　immediate　experienceand　hence　we　shall　never　be　able　honestly　to　make　any　universal　proposition。　The　only　thing　possible　is　the　greatest　possible　accurate　observation　of　probability　in　all　known　possible　cases；　and　of　the　probability　of　the　discovery　of　exceptions。　Bacon　called　the　establishment　of　reliable　assumptions；　counting　up　without　meeting　any　contradictory　case。　But　what　gives　us　the　law　is　the　manner　of　counting。　The　untrained　mind　accepts　facts　as　they　occur　without　taking　the　trouble　to　seek　others；　the　trained　mind　seeks　the　facts　he　needs　for　the　premises　of　his　inference。　As　Mill　says；　whatever　has　shown　itself　to　be　true　without　exception　may　be　held　universal　so　long　as　no　doubtful　exception　is　presented；　and　when　the　case　is　of　such　a　nature　that　a　real　exception　could　not　escape　our　observation。

This　indicates　how　we　are　to　interpret　information　given　by　others。　We　hear；　‘‘Inasmuch　as　this　is　always　so　it　may　be　assumed　to　be　so　in　the　present　case。''　Immediate　acceptance　of　this　proposition　would　be　as　foolhardy　as　doubt　in　the　face　of　all　the　facts。　The　proper　procedure　is　to　examine　and　establish　the　determining　conditions；　i。　e。；　who　has　counted　up　this　‘‘always；''　and　what　caution　was　used　to　avoid　the　overlooking　of　any　exception。　The　real　work　of　interpretation　lies　in　such　testing。　We　do　not　want　to　reach　the　truth　with　one　blow；　we　aim　only　to　approach　it。　But　the　step　must　be　taken　and　we　must　know　how　large　it　is　to　be；　and　know　how　much　closer　it　has　brought　us　to　the　truth。　And　this　is　learned　only　through　knowing　who　made　the　step　and　how　it　was　made。　Goethe's　immortal　statement；　‘‘Man　was　not　born　to　solve　the　riddle　of　the　universe；　but　to　seek　out　what　the　problem　leads　to　in　order　to　keep　himself　within　the　limits　of　the　conceivable；''　is　valid　for　us　too。

Our　great　mistake　in　examining　and　judging　often　lies　in　our　setting　too　much　value　upon　individual　circumstances；　and　trying　to　solve　the　problem　with　those　alone；　or　in　not　daring　to　use　any　given　circumstance　sufficiently。　The　latter　represents　that　stupidity　which　is　of　use　to　scientific　spirits　when　they　lack　complete　proof　　of　their　points；　but　is　dangerous　in　practical　affairs。　As　a　rule；　it　is　also　the　consequence　of　the　failure　to　evaluate　what　is　given；　simply　because　one　forgets　or　is　too　lazy　to　do　so。　Proper　action　in　this　regard　is　especially　necessary　where　certain　legal　proceedings　have　to　occur　which　are　entitled　to　a　definite　degree　of　probability　without　requiring　certainty；　i。　e。；　preliminary　examinations；　arrests；　investigations　of　the　premises；　etc。　No　law　says　how　much　probability　is　in　such　cases　required。　To　say　how　much　is　impossible；　but　it　is　not　unwise　to　stick　to　the　notion　that　the　event　must　appear　true；　if　not　be　proved　true；　i。　e。；　nothing　must　be　present　to　destroy　the　appearance　of　truth。　As　Hume　says；　‘‘Whenever　we　have　reason　to　trust　earlier　experiences　and　to　take　them　as　standards　of　judgment　of　future　experiences；　these　reasons　may　have　probability。''

The　place　of　probability　in　the　positive　determination　of　the　order　of　modern　criminal　procedure　is　not　insignificant。　When　the　law　determines　upon　a　definite　number　of　jurymen　or　judges；　it　is　probable　that　this　number　is　sufficient　for　the　discovery　of　the　truth。　The　system　of　prosecution　establishes　as　a　probability　that　the　accused　is　the　criminal。　The　idea　of　time…lapse　assumes　the　probability　that　after　the　passage　of　a　certain　time　punishment　becomes　illusory；　and　prosecution　uncertain　and　difficult。　The　institution　of　experts　depends　on　the　probability　that　the　latter　make　no　mistakes。　The　warrant　for　arrest　depends　on　the　probability　that　the　accused　behaved　suspiciously　or　spoke　of　his　crime；　etc。　The　oath　of　the　witness　depends　on　the　probability　that　the　witness　will　be　more　likely　to　tell　the　truth　under　oath；　etc。

Modern　criminal　procedure　involves　not　only　probabilities　but　also　various　types　of　possibility。　Every　appeal　has　for　its　foundation　the　possibility　of　an　incorrect　judgment；　the　exclusion　of　certain　court　officials　is　based　on　the　possibility　of　prejudice；　or　at　least　on　the　suspicion　of　prejudice；　the　publicity　of　the　trial　is　meant　to　prevent　the　possibility　of　incorrectness；　the　revision　of　a　trial　depends　on　the　possibility　that　even　legal　sentences　may　be　false　and　the　institution　of　the　defendant　lawyer　depends　upon　the　possibility　that　a　person　without　defense　may　receive　injustice。　All　the　formalities　of　the　action　of　the　court　assume　the　possibility　that　without　them　improprieties　may　occur；　and　the　institution　of　seizing　letters　and　messages　for　evidence；　asserts　only　the　possibility　that　the　latter　contain　things　of　importance；　etc。

When　the　positive　dicta　of　the　law　deal　with　possibility　and　proba…　　bility　in　questions　of　great　importance　the　latter　become　especially　significant。

We　have　yet　to　ask　what　is　meant　by　‘‘rule''　and　what　its　relation　is　to　probability。　Scientifically　‘‘rule''　means　law　subjectively　taken　and　is　of　equal　significance　with　the　guiding　line　for　one's　own　conduct；　whence　it　follows　that　there　are　only　rules　of　art　and　morality；　but　no　rules　of　nature。　Usage　does　not　imply　this　interpretation。　We　say　that　as　a　rule　it　hails　only　in　the　daytime；　by　way　of　exception；　in　the　night　also；　the　rule　for　the　appearance　of　whales　indicates　that　they　live　in　the　Arctic　Ocean；　a　general　rule　indicates　that　bodies　that　are　especially　soluble　in　water　should　dissolve　more　easily　in　warm　than　in　cold　water；　but　salt　dissolves　equally　well　in　both。　Again　we　say：　As　a　rule　the　murderer　is　an　unpunished　criminal；　it　is　a　rule　that　the　brawler　is　no　thief　and　vice　versa；　the　gambler　is　as　a　rule　a　man　of　parts；　etc。　We　may　say　therefore；　that　regularity　is　equivalent　to　customary　recurrence　and　that　whatever　serves　as　rule　may　be　expected　as　probable。　If；　i。　e。；　it　be　said；　that　this　or　that　happens　as　a　rule；　we　may　suppose