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meditations on first philosophy-及15何蛍
酔楯荷恬: 梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ○ 賜 ★ 辛酔堀貧和鍬匈 梓囚徒貧議 Enter 囚辛指欺云慕朕村匈 梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ● 辛指欺云匈競何! 泌惚云慕短嗤堋響頼���誅卒亮茂�俊彭堋響��辛聞喘貧圭 "辺茄欺厘議箝誓匂" 孔嬬 才 "紗秘慕禰" 孔嬬��
of the other。 And as regards God�察�if my mind were not pre´occupied with prejudices�察�and if my thought did not find itself on all hands diverted by the continual pressure of sensible things�察�there would be nothing which I could know more immediately and more easily than Him。 For is there anything more manifest than that there is a God�察�that is to say�察�a Supreme Being�察�to whose essence alone existence pertains��21 And although for a firm grasp of this truth I have need of a strenuous application of mind�察�at present I not only feel myself to be as assured of it as of all that I hold as most certain�察�but I also remark that the certainty of all other things depends on it so absolutely�察�that without this knowledge it is impossible ever to know anything perfectly。 For although I am of such a nature that as long as22 I understand anything very clearly and distinctly�察�I am naturally impelled to believe it to be true�察�yet because I am also of such a nature that I cannot have my mind constantly fixed on the same object in order to perceive it clearly�察�and as I often recollect having formed a past judgment without at the same time properly recollecting the reasons that led me to make it�察�it may happen meanwhile that other reasons present themselves to me�察�which would easily cause me to change my opinion�察�if I were ignorant of the facts of the existence of God�察�and thus I should have no true and certain knowledge�察�but only vague and vacillating opinions。 Thus�察�for example�察�when I consider the nature of a ��rectilinear�А�triangle�察�I who have some little knowledge of the principles of geometry recognise quite clearly that the three angles are equal to two right angles�察�and it is not possible for me not to believe this so long as I apply my mind to its demonstration�察�but so soon as I abstain from attending to the proof�察�although I still recollect having clearly comprehended it�察�it may easily occur that I come to doubt its truth�察�if I am ignorant of there being a God。 For I can persuade myself of having been so constituted by nature that I can easily deceive myself even in those matters which I believe myself to apprehend with the greatest evidence and certainty�察�especially when I recollect that I have frequently judged matters to be true and certain which other reasons have afterwards impelled me to judge to be altogether false。 But after I have recognised that there is a God��because at the same time I have also recognised that all things depend upon Him�察�and that He is not a deceiver�察�and from that have inferred that what I perceive clearly and distinctly cannot fail to be true��although I no longer pay attention to the reasons for which I have judged this to be true�察�provided that I recollect having clearly and distinctly perceived it no contrary reason can be brought forward which could ever cause me to doubt of its truth�察�and thus I have a true and certain knowledge of it。 And this same knowledge extends likewise to all other things which I recollect having formerly demonstrated�察�such as the truths of geometry and the like�察�for what can be alleged against them to cause me to place them in doubt�拭 �Will it be said that my nature is such as to cause me to be frequently deceived�拭 �But I already know that I cannot be deceived in the judgment whose grounds I know clearly。 Will it be said that I formerly held many things to be true and certain which I have afterwards recognised to be false�拭�But I had not had any clear and distinct knowledge of these things�察�and not as yet knowing the rule whereby I assure myself of the truth�察�I had been impelled to give my assent from reasons which I have since recognised to be less strong than I had at the time imagined them to be。 What further objection can then be raised�拭 �That possibly I am dreaming ��an objection I myself made a little while ago���察�or that all the thoughts which I now have are no more true than the phantasies of my dreams�拭 �But even though I slept the case would be the same�察�for all that is clearly present to my mind is absolutely true。 And so I very clearly recognise that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends alone on the knowledge of the true God�察�in so much that�察�before I knew Him�察�I could not have a perfect knowledge of any other thing。 And now that I know Him I have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge of an infinitude of things�察�not only of those which relate to God Himself and other intellectual matters�察�but also of those which pertain to corporeal nature in so far as it is the object of pure mathematics ��which have no concern with whether it exists or not�А� Meditation VI。 Of the Existence of Material Things�察�and of the real distinction between the Soul and Body of Man。
Nothing further now remains but to inquire whether material things exist。 And certainly I at least know that these may exist in so far as they are considered as the objects of pure mathematics�察�since in this aspect I perceive them clearly and distinctly。 For there is no doubt that God possesses the power to produce everything that I am capable of perceiving with distinctness�察�and I have never deemed that anything was impossible for Him�察�unless I found a contradiction in attempting to conceive it clearly。 Further�察�the faculty of imagination which I possess�察�and of which�察�experience tells me�察�I make use when I apply myself to the consideration of material things�察�is capable of persuading me of their existence�察�for when I attentively consider what imagination is�察�I find that it is nothing but a certain application of the faculty of knowledge to the body which is immediately present to it�察�and which therefore exists。 And to render this quite clear�察�I remark in the first place the difference that exists between the imagination and pure intellection ��or conception23�А� For example�察�when I imagine a triangle�察�I do not conceive it only as a figure comprehended by three lines�察�but I also apprehend24 these three lines as present by the power and inward vision of my mind��25 and this is what I call imagining。 But if I desire to think of a chiliagon�察�I certainly conceive truly that it is a figure composed of a thousand sides�察�just as easily as I conceive of a triangle that it is a figure of three sides only�察�but I cannot in any way imagine the thousand sides of a chiliagon ��as I do the three sides of a triangle�В察�nor do I�察�so to speak�察�regard them as present ��with the eyes of my mind�А� And although in accordance with the habit I have formed of always employing the aid of my imagination when I think of corporeal things�察�it may happen that in imagining a chiliagon I confusedly represent to myself some figure�察�yet it is very evident that this figure is not a chiliagon�察�since it in no way differs from that which I represent to myself when I think of a myriagon or any other many´sided figure�察�nor does it serve my purpose in discovering the properties which go to form the distinction between a chiliagon and other polygons。 But if the question turns upon a pentagon�察�it is quite true that I can conceive its figure as well as that of a chiliagon without the help of my imagination�察�but I can also imagine it by applying the attention of my mind to each of its five sides�察�and at the same time to the space which they enclose。 And thus I clearly recognise that I have need of a particular effort of mind in order to effect the act of imagination�察�such as I do not require in order to understand�察�and this particular effort of mind clearly manifests the difference which exists between imagination and pure intellection。26 I remark besides that this power of imagination which is in one�察�inasmuch as it differs from the power of understanding�察�is in no wise a necessary element in my nature�察�or in ��my essence�察�that is to say�察�in�А�the essence of my mind�察�for although I did not possess it I should doubtless ever remain the same as I now am�察�from which it appears that we might conclude that it depends on something which differs from me。 And I easily conceive that if some body exists with which my mind is conjoined and united in such a way that it can apply itself to consider it when it pleases�察�it may be that by this means it can imagine corporeal objects�察�so that this mode of thinking differs from pure intellection only inasmuch as mind in its intellectual activity in some manner turns on itself�察�and considers some of the ideas which it possesses in itself�察�while in imagining it turns towards the body�察�and there beholds in it something conformable to the idea which it has either conceived of itself or perceived by the senses。 I easily understand�察�I say�察�that the imagination could be thus constituted if it is true that body exists�察�and because I can discover no other convenient mode of explaining it�察�I conjecture with probability that body does exist�察�but this is only with probability�察�and although I examine all things with care�察�I nevertheless do not find that from this distinct idea of corporeal nature�察�which I have in my imagination�察�I can derive any argument from which there will necessarily be deduced the existence of body。 But I am in the habit of imagining many other things besides this corporeal nature which is the
酔楯荷恬: 梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ○ 賜 ★ 辛酔堀貧和鍬匈 梓囚徒貧議 Enter 囚辛指欺云慕朕村匈 梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ● 辛指欺云匈競何!
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