utilitarianism-第15部分

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　to　him；　but　should　leave　him　to　chance；　or　to　his　own　exertions。　Thus；　a　person　is　said　to　have　a　right　to　what　he　can　earn　in　fair　professional　competition；　because　society　ought　not　to　allow　any　other　person　to　hinder　him　from　endeavouring　to　earn　in　that　manner　as　much　as　he　can。　But　he　has　not　a　right　to　three　hundred　a…year；　though　he　may　happen　to　be　earning　it；　because　society　is　not　called　on　to　provide　that　he　shall　earn　that　sum。　On　the　contrary；　if　he　owns　ten　thousand　pounds　three　per　cent　stock；　he　has　a　right　to　three　hundred　a…year；　because　society　has　come　under　an　obligation　to　provide　him　with　an　income　of　that　amount。　　　To　have　a　right；　then；　is；　I　conceive；　to　have　something　which　society　ought　to　defend　me　in　the　possession　of。　If　the　objector　goes　on　to　ask；　why　it　ought？　I　can　give　him　no　other　reason　than　general　utility。　If　that　expression　does　not　seem　to　convey　a　sufficient　feeling　of　the　strength　of　the　obligation；　nor　to　account　for　the　peculiar　energy　of　the　feeling；　it　is　because　there　goes　to　the　composition　of　the　sentiment；　not　a　rational　only；　but　also　an　animal　element；　the　thirst　for　retaliation；　and　this　thirst　derives　its　intensity；　as　well　as　its　moral　justification；　from　the　extraordinarily　important　and　impressive　kind　of　utility　which　is　concerned。　The　interest　involved　is　that　of　security；　to　every　one's　feelings　the　most　vital　of　all　interests。　All　other　earthly　benefits　are　needed　by　one　person；　not　needed　by　another；　and　many　of　them　can；　if　necessary；　be　cheerfully　foregone；　or　replaced　by　something　else；　but　security　no　human　being　can　possibly　do　without　on　it　we　depend　for　all　our　immunity　from　evil；　and　for　the　whole　value　of　all　and　every　good；　beyond　the　passing　moment；　since　nothing　but　the　gratification　of　the　instant　could　be　of　any　worth　to　us；　if　we　could　be　deprived　of　anything　the　next　instant　by　whoever　was　momentarily　stronger　than　ourselves。　Now　this　most　indispensable　of　all　necessaries；　after　physical　nutriment；　cannot　be　had；　unless　the

machinery　for　providing　it　is　kept　unintermittedly　in　active　play。　Our　notion；　therefore；　of　the　claim　we　have　on　our　fellow…creatures　to　join　in　making　safe　for　us　the　very　groundwork　of　our　existence；　gathers　feelings　around　it　so　much　more　intense　than　those　concerned　in　any　of　the　more　common　cases　of　utility；　that　the　difference　in　degree　（as　is　often　the　case　in　psychology）　becomes　a　real　difference　in　kind。　The　claim　assumes　that　character　of　absoluteness；　that　apparent　infinity；　and　incommensurability　with　all　other　considerations；　which　constitute　the　distinction　between　the　feeling　of　right　and　wrong　and　that　of　ordinary　expediency　and　inexpediency。　The　feelings　concerned　are　so　powerful；　and　we　count　so　positively　on　finding　a　responsive　feeling　in　others　（all　being　alike　interested）；　that　ought　and　should　grow　into　must；　and　recognised　indispensability　becomes　a　moral　necessity；　analogous　to　physical；　and　often　not　inferior　to　it　in　binding　force　exhorted；

　　If　the　preceding　analysis；　or　something　resembling　it；　be　not　the　correct　account　of　the　notion　of　justice；　if　justice　be　totally　independent　of　utility；　and　be　a　standard　per　se；　which　the　mind　can　recognise　by　simple　introspection　of　itself；　it　is　hard　to　understand　why　that　internal　oracle　is　so　ambiguous；　and　why　so　many　things　appear　either　just　or　unjust；　according　to　the　light　in　which　they　are　regarded。　　　We　are　continually　informed　that　Utility　is　an　uncertain　standard；　which　every　different　person　interprets　differently；　and　that　there　is　no　safety　but　in　the　immutable；　ineffaceable；　and　unmistakable　dictates　of　justice；　which　carry　their　evidence　in　themselves；　and　are　independent　of　the　fluctuations　of　opinion。　One　would　suppose　from　this　that　on　questions　of　justice　there　could　be　no　controversy；　that　if　we　take　that　for　our　rule；　its　application　to　any　given　case　could　leave　us　in　as　little　doubt　as　a　mathematical　demonstration。　So　far　is　this　from　being　the　fact；　that　there　is　as　much　difference　of　opinion；　and　as　much　discussion；　about　what　is　just；　as　about　what　is　useful　to　society。　Not　only　have　different　nations　and　individuals　different　notions　of　justice；　but　in　the　mind　of　one　and　the　same　individual；　justice　is　not　some　one　rule；　principle；　or　maxim；　but　many；　which　do　not　always　coincide　in　their　dictates；　and　in　choosing　between　which；　he　is　guided　either　by　some　extraneous　standard；　or　by　his　own　personal　predilections。　　　For　instance；　there　are　some　who　say；　that　it　is　unjust　to　punish　any　one　for　the　sake　of　example　to　others；　that　punishment　is　just；　only　when　intended　for　the　good　of　the　sufferer　himself。　Others　maintain　the　extreme　reverse；　contending　that　to　punish　persons　who　have　attained　years　of　discretion；　for　their　own　benefit；　is　despotism　and　injustice；　since　if　the　matter　at　issue　is　solely　their　own　good；　no　one　has　a　right　to　control　their　own　judgment　of　it；　but　that　they　may　justly　be　punished　to　prevent　evil　to　others；　this　being　the　exercise　of　the　legitimate　right　of　self…defence。　Mr。　Owen；　again；　affirms　that　it　is　unjust　to　punish　at　all；　for　the　criminal　did　not　make　his　own　character；　his　education；　and　the　circumstances　which　surrounded　him；　have　made　him　a　criminal；　and　for　these　he　is　not　responsible。　All　these　opinions　are　extremely　plausible；　and　so　long　as　the　question　is　argued　as　one　of　justice　simply；　without　going　down　to　the　principles　which　lie　under　justice　and　are　the　source　of　its　authority；　I　am　unable　to　see　how　any　of　these　reasoners　can　be　refuted。　For　in　truth　every　one　of　the　three　builds　upon　rules　of　justice　confessedly　true。　The　first　appeals　to　the　acknowledged　injustice　of　singling　out　an　individual；　and　making　a　sacrifice；　without　his　consent；　for　other　people's　benefit。　The　second　relies　on　the　acknowledged　justice　of　self…defence；　and　the　admitted　injustice　of　forcing　one　person　to　conform　to　another's　notions　of　what　constitutes　his　good。　The　Owenite　invokes　the　admitted　principle；　that　it　is　unjust　to　punish　any　one　for　what　he　cannot　help。　Each　is　triumphant　so　long　as　he　is　not　compelled　to　take　into　consideration　any　other　maxims　of　justice　than　the　one　he　has　selected；　but　as　soon　as　their　several　maxims　are　brought　face　to　face；　each　disputant　seems　to　have　exactly　as　much　to　say　for　himself　as　the　others。　No　one　of　them　can　carry　out　his　own　notion　of　justice　without　trampling　upon　another　equally　binding。　　　These　are　difficulties；　they　have　always　been　felt　to　be　such；　and　many　devices　have　been　invented　to　turn　rather　than　to　overcome　them。　As　a　refuge　from　the　last　of　the　three；　men　imagined　what　they　called　the　freedom　of　the　will；　fancying　that　they　could　not　justify　punishing　a　man　whose　will　is　in　a　thoroughly　hateful　state；　unless　it　be　supposed　to　have　come　into　that　state　through　no　influence　of　anterior　circumstances。　To　escape　from　the　other　difficulties；　a　favourite　contrivance　has　been　the　fiction　of　a　contract；　whereby　at　some　unknown　period　all　the　members　of　society　engaged　to　obey　the　laws；　and　consented　to　be　punished　for　any　disobedience　to　them；　thereby　giving　to　their　legislators　the　right；　which　it　is　assumed　they　would　not　otherwise　have　had；　of　punishing　them；　either　for　their　own　good　or　for　that　of　society。　This　happy　thought　was　considered　to　get　rid　of　the　whole　difficulty；　and　to　legitimate　the　infliction　of　punishment；　in　virtue　of　another　received　maxim　of　justice；　Volenti　non　fit　injuria；　that　is　not　unjust　which　is　done　with　the　consent　of　the　person　who　is　supposed　to　be　hurt　by　it。　I　need　hardly　remark；　that　even　if　the　consent　were　not　a　mere　fiction；　this　maxim　is　not　superior　in　authority　to　the　others　which　it　is　brought　in　to　supersede。　It　is；　on　the　contrary；　an　instructive　specimen　of　the　loose　and　irregular　manner　in　which　supposed　principles　of　justice　grow　up。　This　particular　one　evidently　came　into　use　as　a　help　to　the　coarse　exigencies　of　courts　of　law；　which　are　sometimes　obliged　to　be　content　with　very　uncertain　presumptions；　on　account　of　the　greater　evils　which　would　often　arise　from　any　attempt　on　their　part　to　cut　finer。　But　even　courts　of　law　are　not　able　to　adhere　consistently　to　the　maxim；　for　they　allow　voluntary　engagements　to　be　set　aside　on　the　ground　of　fraud；　and　sometimes　on　that　of　mere　mistake　or　misinformation。　　　Again；　when　the　legitimacy　of　inflicting　punishment　is　admitted；　how　many　conflicting　conceptions　of　justice　come　to　light　in　discussing　the　proper　apportionment　of　punishments　to　offences。　No　rule　on　the　subject　recommends　itself　so　strongly　to　the　primitive　and　spontaneous　sentiment　of　justice；　as　the　bex　talionis；　an　eye　for　an　eye　and　a　tooth　for　a　tooth。　Though　this　principle　of　the　Jewish　and　of　the　Mahometan　law　has　been　generally　abandoned　in　Europe　as　a　practical　maxim；　there　is；　I　suspect；　in　most　minds；　a　secret　hankering　after　it；　and　when　retribution　accidentally　falls　on　an　offender　in　that　precise　shape；　the　general　feeling　of　satisfaction　evinced　bears　witness　how　natural　is　the　sentiment　to　which　this　repayment　in　kind　is　acceptable。　With　many；　the　test　of　justice　in　penal　infliction　is　that　the　punishment　should　be　proportioned　to　the　offence；　meaning　that　it　should　be　exactly　measured　b