utilitarianism-第13部分

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tribunal　which　fails　to　enforce　them　with　equal　strictness　is　wanting　in　justice；　while；　at　the　same　time；　institutions　which　leave　to　the　slave　scarcely　any　rights　to　enforce；　are　not　deemed　unjust；　because　they　are　not　deemed　inexpedient。　Those　who　think　that　utility　requires　distinctions　of　rank；　do　not　consider　it　unjust　that　riches　and　social　privileges　should　be　unequally　dispensed；　but　those　who　think　this　inequality　inexpedient；　think　it　unjust　also。　Whoever　thinks　that　government　is　necessary；　sees　no　injustice　in　as　much　inequality　as　is　constituted　by　giving　to　the　magistrate　powers　not　granted　to　other　people。　Even　among　those　who　hold　levelling　doctrines；　there　are　as　many　questions　of　justice　as　there　are　differences　of　opinion　about　expediency。　Some　Communists　consider　it　unjust　that　the　produce　of　the　labour　of　the　community　should　be　shared　on　any　other　principle　than　that　of　exact　equality；　others　think　it　just　that　those　should　receive　most　whose　wants　are　greatest；　while　others　hold　that　those　who　work　harder；　or　who　produce　more；　or　whose　services　are　more　valuable　to　the　community；　may　justly　claim　a　larger　quota　in　the　division　of　the　produce。　And　the　sense　of　natural　justice　may　be　plausibly　appealed　to　in　behalf　of　every　one　of　these　opinions。　　　Among　so　many　diverse　applications　of　the　term　justice；　which　yet　is　not　regarded　as　ambiguous；　it　is　a　matter　of　some　difficulty　to　seize　the　mental　link　which　holds　them　together；　and　on　which　the　moral　sentiment　adhering　to　the　term　essentially　depends。　Perhaps；　in　this　embarrassment；　some　help　may　be　derived　from　the　history　of　the　word；　as　indicated　by　its　etymology。　　　In　most；　if　not　in　all；　languages；　the　etymology　of　the　word　which　corresponds　to　Just；　points　distinctly　to　an　origin　connected　with　the　ordinances　of　law。　Justum　is　a　form　of　jussum；　that　which　has　been　ordered。　Dikaion　comes　directly　from　dike；　a　suit　at　law。　Recht；　from　which　came　right　and　righteous；　is　synonymous　with　law。　The　courts　of　justice；　the　administration　of　justice；　are　the　courts　and　the　administration　of　law。　La　justice；　in　French；　is　the　established　term　for　judicature。　I　am　not　committing　the　fallacy　imputed　with　some　show　of　truth　to　Horne　Tooke；　of　assuming　that　a　word　must　still　continue　to　mean　what　it　originally　meant。　Etymology　is　slight　evidence　of　what　the　idea　now　signified　is；　but　the　very　best　evidence　of　how　it　sprang　up。　There　can；　I　think；　be　no　doubt　that　the　idee　mere；　the　primitive　element；　in　the　formation　of　the　notion　of　justice；　was　conformity　to　law。　It　constituted　the　entire　idea　among　the　Hebrews；　up　to　the　birth　of　Christianity；　as　might　be　expected　in　the　case　of　a　people　whose　laws　attempted　to　embrace　all　subjects　on　which　precepts　were　required；　and　who　believed　those　laws　to　be　a　direct　emanation　from　the　Supreme　Being。　But　other　nations；　and　in　particular　the　Greeks　and　Romans；　who　knew　that　their　laws　had　been　made　originally；　and　still　continued　to　be　made；　by　men；　were　not　afraid　to　admit　that　those　men　might　make　bad　laws；　might　do；　by　law；　the　same　things；　and　from　the　same　motives；　which　if　done　by　individuals　without　the　sanction　of　law；　would　be　called　unjust。　And　hence　the　sentiment　of　injustice　came　to　be　attached；　not　to　all　violations　of　law；　but　only　to　violations　of　such　laws　as　ought　to　exist；　including　such　as　ought　to　exist；　but　do　not；　and　to　laws　themselves；　if　supposed　to　be　contrary　to　what　ought　to　be　law。　In　this　manner　the　idea　of　law　and　of　its　injunctions　was　still　predominant　in　the　notion　of　justice；　even　when　the　laws　actually　in　force　ceased　to　be　accepted　as　the　standard　of　it。　　　It　is　true　that　mankind　consider　the　idea　of　justice　and　its　obligations　as　applicable　to　many　things　which　neither　are；　nor　is　it　desired　that　they　should　be；　regulated　by　law。　Nobody　desires　that　laws　should　interfere　with　the　whole　detail　of　private　life；　yet　every　one　allows　that　in　all　daily　conduct　a　person　may　and　does　show　himself　to　be　either　just　or　unjust。　But　even　here；　the　idea　of　the　breach　of　what　ought　to　be　law；　still　lingers　in　a　modified　shape。　It　would　always　give　us　pleasure；　and　chime　in　with　our　feelings　of　fitness；　that　acts　which　we　deem　unjust　should　be　punished；　though　we　do　not　always　think　it　expedient　that　this　should　be　done　by　the　tribunals。　We　forego　that　gratification　on　account　of　incidental　inconveniences。　We　should　be　glad　to　see　just　conduct　enforced　and　injustice　repressed；　even　in　the　minutest　details；　if　we　were　not；　with　reason；　afraid　of　trusting　the　magistrate　with　so　unlimited　an　amount　of　power　over　individuals。　When　we　think　that　a　person　is　bound　in　justice　to　do　a　thing；　it　is　an　ordinary　form　of　language　to　say；　that　he　ought　to　be　compelled　to　do　it。　We　should　be　gratified　to　see　the　obligation　enforced　by　anybody　who　had　the　power。　If　we　see　that　its　enforcement　by　law　would　be　inexpedient；　we　lament　the　impossibility；　we　consider　the　impunity　given　to　injustice　as　an　evil；　and　strive　to　make　amends　for　it　by　bringing　a　strong　expression　of　our　own　and　the　public　disapprobation　to　bear　upon　the　offender。　Thus　the　idea　of　legal　constraint　is　still　the　generating　idea　of　the　notion　of　justice；　though　undergoing　several　transformations　before　that　notion；　as　it　exists　in　an　advanced　state　of　society；　becomes　complete。　　　The　above　is；　I　think；　a　true　account；　as　far　as　it　goes；　of　the　origin　and　progressive　growth　of　the　idea　of　justice。　But　we　must　observe；　that　it　contains；　as　yet；　nothing　to　distinguish　that　obligation　from　moral　obligation　in　general。　For　the　truth　is；　that　the　idea　of　penal　sanction；　which　is　the　essence　of　law；　enters　not　only　into　the　conception　of　injustice；　but　into　that　of　any　kind　of　wrong。　We　do　not　call　anything　wrong；　unless　we　mean　to　imply　that　a　person　ought　to　be　punished　in　some　way　or　other　for　doing　it；　if　not　by　law；　by　the　opinion　of　his　fellow…creatures；　if　not　by　opinion；　by　the　reproaches　of　his　own　conscience。　This　seems　the　real　turning　point　of　the　distinction　between　morality　and　simple　expediency。　It　is　a　part　of　the　notion　of　Duty　in　every　one　of　its　forms；　that　a　person　may　rightfully　be　compelled　to　fulfil　it。　Duty　is　a　thing　which　may　be　exacted　from　a　person；　as　one　exacts　a　debt。　Unless　we　think　that　it　may　be　exacted　from　him；　we　do　not　call　it　his　duty。　Reasons　of　prudence；　or　the　interest　of　other　people；　may　militate　against　actually　exacting　it；　but　the　person　himself；　it　is　clearly　understood；　would　not　be　entitled　to　complain。　There　are　other　things；　on　the　contrary；　which　we　wish　that　people　should　do；　which　we　like　or　admire　them　for　doing；　perhaps　dislike　or　despise　them　for　not　doing；　but　yet　admit　that　they　are　not　bound　to　do；　it　is　not　a　case　of　moral　obligation；　we　do　not　blame　them；　that　is；　we　do　not　think　that　they　are　proper　objects　of　punishment。　How　we　come　by　these　ideas　of　deserving　and　not　deserving　punishment；　will　appear；　perhaps；　in　the　sequel；　but　I　think　there　is　no　doubt　that　this　distinction　lies　at　the　bottom　of　the　notions　of　right　and　wrong；　that　we　call　any　conduct　wrong；　or　employ；　instead；　some　other　term　of　dislike　or　disparagement；　according　as　we　think　that　the　person　ought；　or　ought　not；　to　be　punished　for　it；　and　we　say；　it　would　be　right；　to　do　so　and　so；　or　merely　that　it　would　be　desirable　or　laudable；　according　as　we　would　wish　to　see　the　person　whom　it　concerns；　compelled；　or　only　persuaded　and　exhorted；　to　act　in　that　manner。*

　　*　See　this　point　enforced　and　illustrated　by　Professor　Bain；　in　an　admirable　chapter　（entitled　〃The　Ethical　Emotions；　or　the　Moral　Sense〃）；　of　the　second　of　the　two　treatises　composing　his　elaborate　and　profound　work　on　the　Mind。

　　This；　therefore；　being　the　characteristic　difference　which　marks　off；　not　justice；　but　morality　in　general；　from　the　remaining　provinces　of　Expediency　and　Worthiness；　the　character　is　still　to　be　sought　which　distinguishes　justice　from　other　branches　of　morality。　Now　it　is　known　that　ethical　writers　divide　moral　duties　into　two　classes；　denoted　by　the　ill…chosen　expressions；　duties　of　perfect　and　of　imperfect　obligation；　the　latter　being　those　in　which；　though　the　act　is　obligatory；　the　particular　occasions　of　performing　it　are　left　to　our　choice；　as　in　the　case　of　charity　or　beneficence；　which　we　are　indeed　bound　to　practise；　but　not　towards　any　definite　person；　nor　at　any　prescribed　time。　In　the　more　precise　language　of　philosophic　jurists；　duties　of　perfect　obligation　are　those　duties　in　virtue　of　which　a　correlative　right　resides　in　some　person　or　persons；　duties　of　imperfect　obligation　are　those　moral　obligations　which　do　not　give　birth　to　any　right。　I　think　it　will　be　found　that　this　distinction　exactly　coincides　with　that　which　exists　between　justice　and　the　other　obligations　of　morality。　In　our　survey　of　the　various　popular　acceptations　of　justice；　the　term　appeared　generally　to　involve　the　idea　of　a　personal　right…　a　claim　on　the　part　of　one　or　more　individuals；　like　that　which　the　law　gives　when　it　confers　a　proprietary　or　other　legal　right。　Whether　the　injustice　consists　in　depriving　a　person　of　a　possession；　or　in　breaking　faith　with　him；　or　in　treating　him　worse　than　he　deserves；　or　worse　than　other　people　who　have　no　greater　cla