the six enneads-第124部分

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lute　Good　and　not　merely　a　good　being　or　thing；　can　contain　nothing；　since　there　is　nothing　that　could　be　its　good。　　　　　Anything　it　could　contain　must　be　either　good　to　it　or　not　good；　but　in　the　supremely　and　primally　Good　there　can　be　nothing　not　good；　nor　can　the　Absolute　Good　be　a　container　to　the　Good：　containing；　then；　neither　the　good　nor　the　not　good　it　contains　nothing　and；　containing　nothing；　it　is　alone：　it　is　void　of　all　but　itself。　　　　　If　the　rest　of　being　either　is　good…　without　being　the　absolute　good…　or　is　not　good；　while　on　the　other　hand　the　Supreme　contains　neither　what　is　good　nor　what　is　not　good；　then；　containing　nothing；　it　is　The　Good　by　that　very　absence　of　content。　　　　　Thus　we　rob　it　of　its　very　being　as　The　Absolute　Good　if　we　ascribe　anything　to　it；　existence　or　intellect　or　goodness。　The　only　way　is　to　make　every　denial　and　no　assertion；　to　feign　no　quality　or　content　there　but　to　permit　only　the　〃It　is〃　in　which　we　pretend　to　no　affirmation　of　non…existent　attribute：　there　is　an　ignorant　praise　which；　missing　the　true　description；　drags　in　qualities　beneath　the　real　worth　and　so　abases；　philosophy　must　guard　against　attaching　to　the　Supreme　what　is　later　and　lower：　moving　above　all　that　order；　it　is　the　cause　and　source　of　all　these；　and　is　none　of　them。　　　　　For；　once　more；　the　nature　of　the　Good　is　not　such　as　to　make　it　all　things　or　a　thing　among　all：　that　would　range　it　under　the　same　classification　with　them　all　and　it　would　differ；　thus；　only　by　its　individual　quality；　some　specialty；　some　addition。　At　once　it　becomes　not　a　unity　but　a　duality；　there　is　one　common　element　not　good　and　another　element　that　is　good；　but　a　combination　so　made　up　of　good　and　not　good　cannot　be　the　purely　good；　the　primarily　good；　the　primarily　good　must　be　that　principle　in　which　the　better　element　has　more　effectively　participated　and　so　attained　its　goodness。　Any　good　thing　has　become　so　by　communion；　but　that　in　which　it　has　communion　is　not　a　thing　among　the　things　of　the　all；　therefore　the　Good　is　not　a　thing　of　the　All。　　　　　Since　there　is　this　Good　in　any　good　thing…　the　specific　difference　by　which　the　combination　becomes　good…　it　must　enter　from　elsewhere　than　the　world　of　things：　that　source　must　be　a　Good　absolute　and　isolated。　　　　　Thus　is　revealed　to　us　the　Primarily　existent；　the　Good；　above　all　that　has　being；　good　unalloyed；　containing　nothing　in　itself；　utterly　unmingling；　all…transcending；　cause　of　all。　　　　　Certainly　neither　Being　nor　Beauty　springs　from　evil　or　from　the　neutral；　the　maker；　as　the　more　consummate；　must　surpass　the　made。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SIXTH　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　THAT　THE　PRINCIPLE　TRANSCENDING　BEING　HAS　　　　　　　　　　　　　　NO　INTELLECTUAL　ACT。　WHAT　BEING　HAS　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　INTELLECTION　PRIMALLY　AND　WHAT　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　BEING　HAS　IT　SECONDARILY。

　　　　1。　There　is　a　principle　having　intellection　of　the　external　and　another　having　self…intellection　and　thus　further　removed　from　duality。　　　　　Even　the　first　mentioned　is　not　without　an　effort　towards　the　pure　unity　of　which　it　is　not　so　capable：　it　does　actually　contain　its　object；　though　as　something　other　than　itself。　　　　　In　the　self…intellective；　there　is　not　even　this　distinction　of　being：　self…conversing；　the　subject　is　its　own　object；　and　thus　takes　the　double　form　while　remaining　essentially　a　unity。　The　intellection　is　the　more　profound　for　this　internal　possession　of　the　object。　　　　　This　principle　is　the　primally　intellective　since　there　can　be　no　intellection　without　duality　in　unity。　If　there　is　no　unity；　perceiving　principle　and　perceived　object　will　be　different；　and　the　intellection；　therefore；　not　primal：　a　principle　concerned　with　something　external　cannot　be　the　primally　intellective　since　it　does　not　possess　the　object　as　integrally　its　own　or　as　itself；　if　it　does　possess　the　object　as　itself…　the　condition　of　true　intellection…　the　two　are　one。　Thus　＇in　order　to　primal　intellection＇　there　must　be　a　unity　in　duality；　while　a　pure　unity　with　no　counterbalancing　duality　can　have　no　object　for　its　intellection　and　ceases　to　be　intellective：　in　other　words　the　primally　intellective　must　be　at　once　simplex　and　something　else。　　　　　But　the　surest　way　of　realizing　that　its　nature　demands　this　combination　of　unity　and　duality　is　to　proceed　upwards　from　the　Soul；　where　the　distinction　can　be　made　more　dearly　since　the　duality　is　exhibited　more　obviously。　　　　　We　can　imagine　the　Soul　as　a　double　light；　a　lesser　corresponding　to　the　soul　proper；　a　purer　representing　its　intellective　phase；　if　now　we　suppose　this　intellective　light　equal　to　the　light　which　is　to　be　its　object；　we　no　longer　distinguish　between　them；　the　two　are　recognised　as　one：　we　know；　indeed；　that　there　are　two；　but　as　we　see　them　they　have　become　one：　this　gives　us　the　relation　between　the　intellective　subject　and　the　object　of　intellection　＇in　the　duality　and　unity　required　by　that　primal　intellection＇：　in　our　thought　we　have　made　the　two　into　one；　but　on　the　other　hand　the　one　thing　has　become　two；　making　itself　into　a　duality　at　the　moment　of　intellection；　or；　to　be　more　exact；　being　dual　by　the　fact　of　intellection　and　single　by　the　fact　that　its　intellectual　object　is　itself。　　　　　2。　Thus　there　is　the　primally　intellective　and　there　is　that　in　which　intellection　has　taken　another　mode；　but　this　indicates　that　what　transcends　the　primarily　intellective　has　no　intellection；　for；　to　have　intellection；　it　must　become　an　Intellectual…Principle；　and；　if　it　is　to　become　that；　it　must　possess　an　intellectual　object　and；　as　primarily　intellective；　it　must　possess　that　intellectual　object　as　something　within　itself。　　　　　But　it　is　not　inevitable　that　every　intellectual　object　should　both　possess　the　intellective　principle　in　itself　and　exercise　intellection：　at　that；　it　would　be　not　merely　object　but　subject　as　well　and；　besides；　being　thus　dual；　could　not　be　primal：　further；　the　intellectual　principle　that　is　to　possess　the　intellectual　object　could　not　cohere　unless　there　existed　an　essence　purely　intellectual；　something　which；　while　standing　as　intellectual　object　to　the　intellectual　principle；　is　in　its　own　essence　neither　an　agent　nor　an　object　of　intellection。　The　intellectual　object　points　to　something　beyond　itself　＇to　a　percipient＇；　and　the　intellectual　agent　has　its　intellection　in　vain　unless　by　seizing　and　holding　an　object…　since；　failing　that；　it　can　have　no　intellection　but　is　consummated　only　when　it　possesses　itself　of　its　natural　term。　　　　　There　must　have　been　something　standing　consummate　independently　of　any　intellectual　act；　something　perfect　in　its　own　essence：　thus　that　in　which　this　completion　is　inherent　must　exist　before　intellection；　in　other　words　it　has　no　need　of　intellection；　having　been　always　self…sufficing：　this；　then；　will　have　no　intellectual　act。　　　　　Thus　we　arrive　at：　a　principle　having　no　intellection；　a　principle　having　intellection　primarily；　a　principle　having　it　secondarily。　　　　　It　may　be　added　that；　supposing　The　First　to　be　intellective；　it　thereby　possesses　something　＇some　object；　some　attribute＇：　at　once　it　ceases　to　be　a　first；　it　is　a　secondary；　and　not　even　a　unity；　it　is　a　many；　it　is　all　of　which　it　takes　intellectual　possession；　even　though　its　intellection　fell　solely　upon　its　own　content；　it　must　still　be　a　manifold。　　　　　3。　We　may　be　told　that　nothing　prevents　an　identity　being　thus　multiple。　But　there　must　be　a　unity　underlying　the　aggregate：　a　manifold　is　impossible　without　a　unity　for　its　source　or　ground；　or　at　least；　failing　some　unity；　related　or　unrelated。　This　unity　must　be　numbered　as　first　before　all　and　can　be　apprehended　only　as　solitary　and　self…existent。　　　　　When　we　recognize　it；　resident　among　the　mass　of　things；　our　business　is　to　see　it　for　what　it　is…　present　to　the　items　but　essentially　distinguished　from　them…　and；　while　not　denying　it　there；　to　seek　this　underly　of　all　no　longer　as　it　appears　in　those　other　things　but　as　it　stands　in　its　pure　identity　by　itself。　The　identity　resident　in　the　rest　of　things　is　no　doubt　close　to　authentic　identity　but　cannot　be　it；　and；　if　the　identity　of　unity　is　to　be　displayed　beyond　itself；　it　must　also　exist　within　itself　alone。　　　　　It　may　be　suggested　that　its　existence　takes　substantial　form　only　by　its　being　resident　among　outside　things：　but；　at　this；　it　is　itself　no　longer　simplex　nor　could　any　coherence　of　manifolds　occur。　On　the　one　hand　things　could　take　substantial　existence　only　if　they　were　in　their　own　virtue　simplex。　On　the　other　hand；　failing　a　simplex；　the　aggregate　of　multiples　is　itself　impossible：　for　the　simplex　individual　thing　could　not　exist　if　there　were　no　simplex　unity　independent　of　the　individual；　＇a　principle　of　identity＇　and；　not　existing；　much　less　could　it　enter　into　composition　with　any　other　such：　it　becomes　impossible　then　for　the　compound　universe；　the　aggregate　of　all；　to　exist；　it　would　be　the　coming　together　of　things　that　are　not；　things　not　merely　lacking　an　identity　of　their　own　but　utterly　non…existent。　　　　　Once　there　is　any　manifold；　there　must　be　a　precedent　unity：　since　any　intellection　implies　multiplicity　in　the　intellective　subject；　the　non…multiple　must　be　without　intellection；　that　non…multiple　will　be　the　First