representative government-第57部分

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strongly　that　it　hardly　ever　attempted　to　exercise　any　real　authority。　In　America；　the　experiment　of　a　Federation　on　this　principle　broke　down　in　the　first　few　years　of　its　existence；　happily　while　the　men　of　enlarged　knowledge　and　acquired　ascendancy；　who　founded　the　independence　of　the　Republic；　were　still　alive　to　guide　it　through　the　difficult　transition。　The　Federalist；　a　collection　of　papers　by　three　of　these　eminent　men；　written　in　explanation　and　defence　of　the　new　Federal　Constitution　while　still　awaiting　the　national　acceptance；　is　even　now　the　most　instructive　treatise　we　possess　on　federal　government。*

　　*　Mr。　Freeman's　History　of　Federal　Governments；　of　which　only　the　first　volume　has　yet　appeared；　is　already　an　accession　to　the　literature　of　the　subject；　equally　valuable　by　its　enlightened　principles　and　its　mastery　of　historical　details。

　　In　Germany；　the　more　imperfect　kind　of　federation；　as　all　know；　has　not　even　answered　the　purpose　of　maintaining　an　alliance。　It　has　never；　in　any　European　war；　prevented　single　members　of　the　Confederation　from　allying　themselves　with　foreign　powers　against　the　rest。　Yet　this　is　the　only　federation　which　seems　possible　among　monarchical　states。　A　king；　who　holds　his　power　by　inheritance；　not　by　delegation；　and　who　cannot　be　deprived　of　it；　nor　made　responsible　to　any　one　for　its　use；　is　not　likely　to　renounce　having　a　separate　army；　or　to　brook　the　exercise　of　sovereign　authority　over　his　own　subjects；　not　through　him　but　directly；　by　another　power。　To　enable　two　or　more　countries　under　kingly　government　to　be　joined　together　in　an　effectual　confederation　it　seems　necessary　that　they　should　all　be　under　the　same　king。　England　and　Scotland　were　a　federation　of　this　description　during　the　interval　of　about　a　century　between　the　union　of　the　Crowns　and　that　of　the　Parliaments。　Even　this　was　effective；　not　through　federal　institutions；　for　none　existed；　but　because　the　regal　power　in　both　Constitutions　was　during　the　greater　part　of　that　time　so　nearly　absolute　as　to　enable　the　foreign　policy　of　both　to　be　shaped　according　to　a　single　will。　　　Under　the　more　perfect　mode　of　federation；　where　every　citizen　of　each　particular　State　owes　obedience　to　two　Governments；　that　of　his　own　state　and　that　of　the　federation；　it　is　evidently　necessary　not　only　that　the　constitutional　limits　of　the　authority　of　each　should　be　precisely　and　clearly　defined；　but　that　the　power　to　decide　between　them　in　any　case　of　dispute　should　not　reside　in　either　of　the　Governments；　or　in　any　functionary　subject　to　it；　but　in　an　umpire　independent　of　both。　There　must　be　a　Supreme　Court　of　justice；　and　a　system　of　subordinate　Courts　in　every　State　of　the　Union；　before　whom　such　questions　shall　be　carried；　and　whose　judgment　on　them；　in　the　last　stage　of　appeal；　shall　be　final。　Every　State　of　the　Union；　and　the　Federal　Government　itself；　as　well　as　every　functionary　of　each；　must　be　liable　to　be　sued　in　those　Courts　for　exceeding　their　powers；　or　for　non…performance　of　their　federal　duties；　and　must　in　general　be　obliged　to　employ　those　Courts　as　the　instrument　for　enforcing　their　federal　rights。　This　involves　the　remarkable　consequence；　actually　realised　in　the　United　States；　that　a　Court　of　justice；　the　highest　federal　tribunal；　is　supreme　over　the　various　Governments；　both　State　and　Federal；　having　the　right　to　declare　that　any　law　made；　or　act　done　by　them；　exceeds　the　powers　assigned　to　them　by　the　Federal　Constitution；　and；　in　consequence；　has　no　legal　validity。　It　was　natural　to　feel　strong　doubts；　before　trial　had　been　made；　how　such　a　provision　would　work；　whether　the　tribunal　would　have　the　courage　to　exercise　its　constitutional　power；　if　it　did；　whether　it　would　exercise　it　wisely　and　whether　the　Governments　would　consent　to　submit　peaceably　to　its　decision。　The　discussions　on　the　American　Constitution；　before　its　final　adoption；　give　evidence　that　these　natural　apprehensions　were　strongly　felt；　but　they　are　now　entirely　quieted；　since；　during　the　two　generations　and　more　which　have　subsequently　elapsed；　nothing　has　occurred　to　verify　them；　though　there　have　at　times　been　disputes　of　considerable　acrimony；　and　which　became　the　badges　of　parties；　respecting　the　limits　of　the　authority　of　the　Federal　and　State　Governments。　　　The　eminently　beneficial　working　of　so　singular　a　provision　is　probably；　as　M。　de　Tocqueville　remarks；　in　a　great　measure　attributable　to　the　peculiarity　inherent　in　a　Court　of　justice　acting　as　such…　namely；　that　it　does　not　declare　the　law　eo　nomine　and　in　the　abstract；　but　waits　until　a　case　between　man　and　man　is　brought　before　it　judicially　involving　the　point　in　dispute：　from　which　arises　the　happy　effect　that　its　declarations　are　not　made　in　a　very　early　stage　of　the　controversy；　that　much　popular　discussion　usually　precedes　them；　that　the　Court　decides　after　hearing　the　point　fully　argued　on　both　sides　by　lawyers　of　reputation；　decides　only　as　much　of　the　question　at　a　time　as　is　required　by　the　case　before　it；　and　its　decision；　instead　of　being　volunteered　for　political　purposes；　is　drawn　from　it　by　the　duty　which　it　cannot　refuse　to　fulfil；　of　dispensing　justice　impartially　between　adverse　litigants。　Even　these　grounds　of　confidence　would　not　have　sufficed　to　produce　the　respectful　submission　with　which　all　authorities　have　yielded　to　the　decisions　of　the　Supreme　Court　on　the　interpretation　of　the　Constitution；　were　it　not　that　complete　reliance　has　been　felt；　not　only　on　the　intellectual　pre…eminence　of　the　judges　composing　that　exalted　tribunal；　but　on　their　entire　superiority　over　either　private　or　sectional　partialities。　This　reliance　has　been　in　the　main　justified；　but　there　is　nothing　which　more　vitally　imports　the　American　people　than　to　guard　with　the　most　watchful　solicitude　against　everything　which　has　the　remotest　tendency　to　produce　deterioration　in　the　quality　of　this　great　national　institution。　The　confidence　on　which　depends　the　stability　of　federal　institutions　was　for　the　first　time　impaired　by　the　judgment　declaring　slavery　to　be　of　common　right；　and　consequently　lawful　in　the　Territories　while　not　yet　constituted　as　States；　even　against　the　will　of　a　majority　of　their　inhabitants。　This　memorable　decision　has　probably　done　more　than　anything　else　to　bring　the　sectional　division　to　the　crisis　which　has　issued　in　civil　war。　The　main　pillar　of　the　American　Constitution　is　scarcely　strong　enough　to　bear　many　more　such　shocks。　　　The　tribunals　which　act　as　umpires　between　the　Federal　and　the　State　Governments　naturally　also　decide　all　disputes　between　two　States；　or　between　a　citizen　of　one　State　and　the　government　of　another。　The　usual　remedies　between　nations；　war　and　diplomacy；　being　precluded　by　the　federal　union；　it　is　necessary　that　a　judicial　remedy　should　supply　their　place。　The　Supreme　Court　of　the　Federation　dispenses　international　law；　and　is　the　first　great　example　of　what　is　now　one　of　the　most　prominent　wants　of　civilised　society；　a　real　International　Tribunal。　　　The　powers　of　a　Federal　Government　naturally　extend　not　only　to　peace　and　war；　and　all　questions　which　arise　between　the　country　and　foreign　governments；　but　to　making　any　other　arrangements　which　are；　in　the　opinion　of　the　States；　necessary　to　their　enjoyment　of　the　full　benefits　of　union。　For　example；　it　is　a　great　advantage　to　them　that　their　mutual　commerce　should　be　free；　without　the　impediment　of　frontier　duties　and　custom…houses。　But　this　internal　freedom　cannot　exist　if　each　State　has　the　power　of　fixing　the　duties　on　interchange　of　commodities　between　itself　and　foreign　countries；　since　every　foreign　product　let　in　by　one　State　would　be　let　into　all　the　rest。　And　hence　all　custom　duties　and　trade　regulations；　in　the　United　States；　are　made　or　repealed　by　the　Federal　Government　exclusively。　Again；　it　is　a　great　convenience　to　the　States　to　have　but　one　coinage；　and　but　one　system　of　weights　and　measures；　which　can　only　be　ensured　if　the　regulation　of　these　matters　is　entrusted　to　the　Federal　Government。　The　certainty　and　celerity　of　Post　Office　communication　is　impeded；　and　its　expense　increased；　if　a　letter　has　to　pass　through　half　a　dozen　sets　of　public　offices；　subject　to　different　supreme　authorities：　it　is　convenient；　therefore；　that　all　Post　Offices　should　be　under　the　Federal　Government。　But　on　such　questions　the　feelings　of　different　communities　are　liable　to　be　different。　One　of　the　American　States；　under　the　guidance　of　a　man　who　has　displayed　powers　as　a　speculative　political　thinker　superior　to　any　who　has　appeared　in　American　politics　since　the　authors　of　the　Federalist；*　claimed　a　veto　for　each　State　on　the　custom　laws　of　the　Federal　Congress：　and　that　statesman；　in　a　posthumous　work　of　great　ability；　which　has　been　printed　and　widely　circulated　by　the　legislature　of　South　Carolina；　vindicated　this　pretension　on　the　general　principle　of　limiting　the　tyranny　of　the　majority；　and　protecting　minorities　by　admitting　them　to　a　substantial　participation　in　political　power。　One　of　the　most　disputed　topics　in　American　politics；　during　the　early　part　of　this　century；　was　whether　the　power　of　the　Federal　Government　ought　to　extend；　and　whether　by　the　Constitution　it　did　extend；　to　m