representative government-第5部分

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instance；　the　common　institution　of　a　police。　Order　is　the　object　which　seems　most　immediately　interested　in　the　efficiency　of　this　part　of　the　social　organisation。　Yet　if　it　is　effectual　to　promote　Order；　that　is；　if　it　represses　crime；　and　enables　every　one　to　feel　his　person　and　property　secure；　can　any　state　of　things　be　more　conducive　to　Progress？　The　greater　security　of　property　is　one　of　the　main　conditions　and　causes　of　greater　production；　which　is　Progress　in　its　most　familiar　and　vulgarest　aspect。　The　better　repression　of　crime　represses　the　dispositions　which　tend　to　crime；　and　this　is　Progress　in　a　somewhat　higher　sense。　The　release　of　the　individual　from　the　cares　and　anxieties　of　a　state　of　imperfect　protection；　sets　his　faculties　free　to　be　employed　in　any　new　effort　for　improving　his　own　state　and　that　of　others：　while　the　same　cause；　by　attaching　him　to　social　existence；　and　making　him　no　longer　see　present　or　prospective　enemies　in　his　fellow　creatures；　fosters　all　those　feelings　of　kindness　and　fellowship　towards　others；　and　interest　in　the　general　well…being　of　the　community；　which　are　such　important　parts　of　social　improvement。　　　Take；　again；　such　a　familiar　case　as　that　of　a　good　system　of　taxation　and　finance。　This　would　generally　be　classed　as　belonging　to　the　province　of　Order。　Yet　what　can　be　more　conducive　to　Progress？　A　financial　system　which　promotes　the　one；　conduces；　by　the　very　same　excellences；　to　the　other。　Economy；　for　example；　equally　preserves　the　existing　stock　of　national　wealth；　and　favours　the　creation　of　more。　A　just　distribution　of　burthens；　by　holding　up　to　every　citizen　an　example　of　morality　and　good　conscience　applied　to　difficult　adjustments；　and　an　evidence　of　the　value　which　the　highest　authorities　attach　to　them；　tends　in　an　eminent　degree　to　educate　the　moral　sentiments　of　the　community；　both　in　respect　of　strength　and　of　discrimination。　Such　a　mode　of　levying　the　taxes　as　does　not　impede　the　industry；　or　unnecessarily　interfere　with　the　liberty；　of　the　citizen；　promotes；　not　the　preservation　only；　but　the　increase　of　the　national　wealth；　and　encourages　a　more　active　use　of　the　individual　faculties。　And　vice　versa；　all　errors　in　finance　and　taxation　which　obstruct　the　improvement　of　the　people　in　wealth　and　morals　tend　also；　if　of　sufficiently　serious　amount；　positively　to　impoverish　and　demoralise　them。　It　holds；　in　short；　universally；　that　when　Order　and　Permanence　are　taken　in　their　widest　sense；　for　the　stability　of　existing　advantages；　the　requisites　of　Progress　are　but　the　requisites　of　Order　in　a　greater　degree；　those　of　Permanence　merely　those　of　Progress　in　a　somewhat　smaller　measure。　　　In　support　of　the　position　that　Order　is　intrinsically　different　from　Progress；　and　that　preservation　of　existing　and　acquisition　of　additional　good　are　sufficiently　distinct　to　afford　the　basis　of　a　fundamental　classification；　we　shall　perhaps　be　reminded　that　Progress　may　be　at　the　expense　of　Order；　that　while　we　are　acquiring；　or　striving　to　acquire；　good　of　one　kind；　we　may　be　losing　ground　in　respect　to　others：　thus　there　may　be　progress　in　wealth；　while　there　is　deterioration　in　virtue。　Granting　this；　what　it　proves　is　not　that　Progress　is　generically　a　different　thing　from　Permanence；　but　that　wealth　is　a　different　thing　from　virtue。　Progress　is　permanence　and　something　more；　and　it　is　no　answer　to　this　to　say　that　Progress　in　one　thing　does　not　imply　Permanence　in　everything。　No　more　does　Progress　in　one　thing　imply　Progress　in　everything。　Progress　of　any　kind　includes　Permanence　in　that　same　kind；　whenever　Permanence　is　sacrificed　to　some　particular　kind　of　Progress；　other　Progress　is　still　more　sacrificed　to　it；　and　if　it　be　not　worth　the　sacrifice；　not　the　interest　of　Permanence　alone　has　been　disregarded；　but　the　general　interest　of　Progress　has　been　mistaken。　　　If　these　improperly　contrasted　ideas　are　to　be　used　at　all　in　the　attempt　to　give　a　first　commencement　of　scientific　precision　to　the　notion　of　good　government；　it　would　be　more　philosophically　correct　to　leave　out　of　the　definition　the　word　Order；　and　to　say　that　the　best　government　is　that　which　is　most　conducive　to　Progress。　For　Progress　includes　Order；　but　Order　does　not　include　Progress。　Progress　is　a　greater　degree　of　that　of　which　Order　is　a　less。　Order；　in　any　other　sense；　stands　only　for　a　part　of　the　pre…requisites　of　good　government；　not　for　its　idea　and　essence。　Order　would　find　a　more　suitable　place　among　the　conditions　of　Progress；　since；　if　we　would　increase　our　sum　of　good；　nothing　is　more　indispensable　than　to　take　due　care　of　what　we　already　have。　If　we　are　endeavouring　after　more　riches；　our　very　first　rule　should　be　not　to　squander　uselessly　our　existing　means。　Order；　thus　considered；　is　not　an　additional　end　to　be　reconciled　with　Progress；　but　a　part　and　means　of　Progress　itself。　If　a　gain　in　one　respect　is　purchased　by　a　more　than　equivalent　loss　in　the　same　or　in　any　other；　there　is　not　Progress。　Conduciveness　to　Progress；　thus　understood；　includes　the　whole　excellence　of　a　government。　　　But；　though　metaphysically　defensible；　this　definition　of　the　criterion　of　good　government　is　not　appropriate；　because；　though　it　contains　the　whole　of　the　truth；　it　recalls　only　a　part。　What　is　suggested　by　the　term　Progress　is　the　idea　of　moving　onward；　whereas　the　meaning　of　it　here　is　quite　as　much　the　prevention　of　falling　back。　The　very　same　social　causes…　the　same　beliefs；　feelings；　institutions；　and　practices…　are　as　much　required　to　prevent　society　from　retrograding；　as　to　produce　a　further　advance。　Were　there　no　improvement　to　be　hoped　for；　life　would　not　be　the　less　an　unceasing　struggle　against　causes　of　deterioration；　as　it　even　now　is。　Politics；　as　conceived　by　the　ancients；　consisted　wholly　in　this。　The　natural　tendency　of　men　and　their　works　was　to　degenerate；　which　tendency；　however；　by　good　institutions　virtuously　administered；　it　might　be　possible　for　an　indefinite　length　of　time　to　counteract。　Though　we　no　longer　hold　this　opinion；　though　most　men　in　the　present　age　profess　the　contrary　creed；　believing　that　the　tendency　of　things；　on　the　whole；　is　towards　improvement；　we　ought　not　to　forget　that　there　is　an　incessant　and　ever…flowing　current　of　human　affairs　towards　the　worse；　consisting　of　all　the　follies；　all　the　vices；　all　the　negligences；　indolences；　and　supinenesses　of　mankind；　which　is　only　controlled；　and　kept　from　sweeping　all　before　it；　by　the　exertions　which　some　persons　constantly；　and　others　by　fits；　put　forth　in　the　direction　of　good　and　worthy　objects。　It　gives　a　very　insufficient　idea　of　the　importance　of　the　strivings　which　take　place　to　improve　and　elevate　human　nature　and　life；　to　suppose　that　their　chief　value　consists　in　the　amount　of　actual　improvement　realised　by　their　means；　and　that　the　consequence　of　their　cessation　would　merely　be　that　we　should　remain　as　we　are。　A　very　small　diminution　of　those　exertions　would　not　only　put　a　stop　to　improvement；　but　would　turn　the　general　tendency　of　things　towards　deterioration；　which；　once　begun；　would　proceed　with　increasingly　rapidity；　and　become　more　and　more　difficult　to　check；　until　it　reached　a　state　often　seen　in　history；　and　in　which　many　large　portions　of　mankind　even　now　grovel；　when　hardly　anything　short　of　superhuman　power　seems　sufficient　to　turn　the　tide；　and　give　a　fresh　commencement　to　the　upward　movement。　　　These　reasons　make　the　word　Progress　as　unapt　as　the　terms　Order　and　Permanence　to　become　the　basis　for　a　classification　of　the　requisites　of　a　form　of　government。　The　fundamental　antithesis　which　these　words　express　does　not　lie　in　the　things　themselves；　so　much　as　in　the　types　of　human　character　which　answer　to　them。　There　are；　we　know；　some　minds　in　which　caution；　and　others　in　which　boldness；　predominates：　in　some；　the　desire　to　avoid　imperilling　what　is　already　possessed　is　a　stronger　sentiment　than　that　which　prompts　to　improve　the　old　and　acquire　new　advantages；　while　there　are　others　who　lean　the　contrary　way；　and　are　more　eager　for　future　than　careful　of　present　good。　The　road　to　the　ends　of　both　is　the　same；　but　they　are　liable　to　wander　from　it　in　opposite　directions。　This　consideration　is　of　importance　in　composing　the　personnel　of　any　political　body：　persons　of　both　types　ought　to　be　included　in　it；　that　the　tendencies　of　each　may　be　tempered；　in　so　far　as　they　are　excessive；　by　a　due　proportion　of　the　other。　There　needs　no　express　provision　to　ensure　this　object；　provided　care　is　taken　to　admit　nothing　inconsistent　with　it。　The　natural　and　spontaneous　admixture　of　the　old　and　the　young；　of　those　whose　position　and　reputation　are　made　and　those　who　have　them　still　to　make；　will　in　general　sufficiently　answer　the　purpose；　if　only　this　natural　balance　is　not　disturbed　by　artificial　regulation。

　　Since　the　distinction　most　commonly　adopted　for　the　classification　of　social　exigencies　does　not　possess　the　properties　needful　for　that　use；　we　have　to　seek　for　some　other　leading　distinction　better　adapted　to　the　purpose。　Such　a　distinction　would　seem　to　be　indicated　by　the　considerations　to　which　I　now　proceed。　　　If　we　ask　ourselves　on　what　causes　and　conditions　good　government　in　all　its　senses；　from　the　humbl