representative government-第42部分

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　supreme　power　is　divided；　and　each　sharer　is　protected　against　the　usurpations　of　the　others　in　the　only　manner　possible…　namely；　by　being　armed　for　defence　with　weapons　as　strong　as　the　others　can　wield　for　attack…　the　government　can　only　be　carried　on　by　forbearance　on　all　sides　to　exercise　those　extreme　powers；　unless　provoked　by　conduct　equally　extreme　on　the　part　of　some　other　sharer　of　power：　and　in　this　case　we　may　truly　say　that　only　by　the　regard　paid　to　maxims　of　constitutional　morality　is　the　constitution　kept　in　existence。　The　question　of　pledges　is　not　one　of　those　which　vitally　concern　the　existence　of　representative　governments；　but　it　is　very　material　to　their　beneficial　operation。　The　laws　cannot　prescribe　to　the　electors　the　principles　by　which　they　shall　direct　their　choice；　but　it　makes　a　great　practical　difference　by　what　principles　they　think　they　ought　to　direct　it。　And　the　whole　of　that　great　question　is　involved　in　the　inquiry　whether　they　should　make　it　a　condition　that　the　representative　shall　adhere　to　certain　opinions　laid　down　for　him　by　his　constituents。　　　No　reader　of　this　treatise　can　doubt　what　conclusion；　as　to　this　matter；　results　from　the　general　principles　which　it　professes。　We　have　from　the　first　affirmed；　and　unveryingly　kept　in　view；　the　co…equal　importance　of　two　great　requisites　of　government：　responsibility　to　those　for　whose　benefit　political　power　ought　to　be；　and　always　professes　to　be；　employed；　and　jointly　therewith　to　obtain；　in　the　greatest　measure　possible；　for　the　function　of　government　the　benefits　of　superior　intellect；　trained　by　long　meditation　and　practical　discipline　to　that　special　task。　If　this　second　purpose　is　worth　attaining；　it　is　worth　the　necessary　price。　Superior　powers　of　mind　and　profound　study　are　of　no　use　if　they　do　not　sometimes　lead　a　person　to　different　conclusions　from　those　which　are　formed　by　ordinary　powers　of　mind　without　study：　and　if　it　be　an　object　to　possess　representatives　in　any　intellectual　respect　superior　to　average　electors；　it　must　be　counted　upon　that　the　representative　will　sometimes　differ　in　opinion　from　the　majority　of　his　constituents；　and　that　when　he　does；　his　opinion　will　be　the　oftenest　right　of　the　two。　It　follows　that　the　electors　will　not　do　wisely　if　they　insist　on　absolute　conformity　to　their　opinions　as　the　condition　of　his　retaining　his　seat。　　　The　principle　is；　thus　far；　obvious；　but　there　are　real　difficulties　in　its　application：　and　we　will　begin　by　stating　them　in　their　greatest　force。　If　it　is　important　that　the　electors　should　choose　a　representative　more　highly　instructed　than　themselves；　it　is　no　less　necessary　that　this　wiser　man　should　be　responsible　to　them；　in　other　words；　they　are　the　judges　of　the　manner　in　which　he　fulfils　his　trust：　and　how　are　they　to　judge；　except　by　the　standard　of　their　own　opinions？　How　are　they　even　to　select　him　in　the　first　instance　but　by　the　same　standard？　It　will　not　do　to　choose　by　mere　brilliancy…　by　superiority　of　showy　talent。　The　tests　by　which　an　ordinary　man　can　judge　beforehand　of　mere　ability　are　very　imperfect：　such　as　they　are；　they　have　almost　exclusive　reference　to　the　arts　of　expression；　and　little　or　none　to　the　worth　of　what　is　expressed。　The　latter　cannot　be　inferred　from　the　former；　and　if　the　electors　are　to　put　their　own　opinions　in　abeyance；　what　criterion　remains　to　them　of　the　ability　to　govern　well？　Neither；　if　they　could　ascertain；　even　infallibly；　the　ablest　man；　ought　they　to　allow　him　altogether　to　judge　for　them；　without　any　reference　to　their　own　opinions。　The　ablest　candidate　may　be　a　Tory　and　the　electors　Liberals；　or　a　Liberal　and　they　may　be　Tories。　The　political　questions　of　the　day　may　be　Church　questions；　and　he　may　be　a　High　Churchman　or　a　Rationalist；　while　they　may　be　Dissenters　or　Evangelicals；　and　vice　versa。　His　abilities；　in　these　cases；　might　only　enable　him　to　go　greater　lengths；　and　act　with　greater　effect；　in　what　they　may　conscientiously　believe　to　be　a　wrong　course；　and　they　may　be　bound；　by　their　sincere　convictions；　to　think　it　more　important　that　their　representative　should　be　kept；　on　these　points；　to　what　they　deem　the　dictate　of　duty；　than　that　they　should　be　represented　by　a　person　of　more　than　average　abilities。　They　may　also　have　to　consider；　not　solely　how　they　can　be　most　ably　represented；　but　how　their　particular　moral　position　and　mental　point　of　view　shall　be　represented　at　all。　　　The　influence　of　every　mode　of　thinking　which　is　shared　by　numbers　ought　to　be　felt　in　the　legislature：　and　the　constitution　being　supposed　to　have　made　due　provision　that　other　and　conflicting　modes　of　thinking　shall　be　represented　likewise；　to　secure　the　proper　representation　for　their　own　mode　may　be　the　most　important　matter　which　the　electors　on　the　particular　occasion　have　to　attend　to。　In　some　cases；　too；　it　may　be　necessary　that　the　representative　should　have　his　hands　tied；　to　keep　him　true　to　their　interest；　or　rather　to　the　public　interest　as　they　conceive　it。　This　would　not　be　needful　under　a　political　system　which　assured　them　an　indefinite　choice　of　honest　and　unprejudiced　candidates；　but　under　the　existing　system；　in　which　the　electors　are　almost　always　obliged；　by　the　expenses　of　election　and　the　general　circumstances　of　society；　to　select　their　representative　from　persons　of　a　station　in　life　widely　different　from　theirs；　and　having　a　different　class…interest；　who　will　affirm　that　they　ought　to　abandon　themselves　to　his　discretion？　Can　we　blame　an　elector　of　the　poorer　classes；　who　has　only　the　choice　among　two　or　three　rich　men；　for　requiring　from　the　one　he　votes　for　a　pledge　to　those　measures　which　he　considers　as　a　test　of　emancipation　from　the　class…interests　of　the　rich？　It　moreover　always　happens　to　some　members　of　the　electoral　body　to　be　obliged　to　accept　the　representative　selected　by　a　majority　of　their　own　side。　But　though　a　candidate　of　their　own　choosing　would　have　no　chance；　their　votes　may　be　necessary　to　the　success　of　the　one　chosen　for　them；　and　their　only　means　of　exerting　their　share　of　influence　on　his　subsequent　conduct；　may　be　to　make　their　support　of　him　dependent　on　his　pledging　himself　to　certain　conditions。　　　These　considerations　and　counter…considerations　are　so　intimately　interwoven　with　one　another；　it　is　so　important　that　the　electors　should　choose　as　their　representatives　wiser　men　than　themselves；　and　should　consent　to　be　governed　according　to　that　superior　wisdom；　while　it　is　impossible　that　conformity　to　their　own　opinions；　when　they　have　opinions；　should　not　enter　largely　into；　their　judgment　as　to　who　possesses　the　wisdom；　and　how　far　its　presumed　possessor　has　verified　the　presumption　by　his　conduct；　that　it　seems　quite　impracticable　to　lay　down　for　the　elector　any　positive　rule　of　duty：　and　the　result　will　depend；　less　on　any　exact　prescription；　or　authoritative　doctrine　of　political　morality；　than　on　the　general　tone　of　mind　of　the　electoral　body；　in　respect　to　the　important　requisite　of　deference　to　mental　superiority。　Individuals；　and　peoples；　who　are　acutely　sensible　of　the　value　of　superior　wisdom；　are　likely　to　recognise　it；　where　it　exists；　by　other　signs　than　thinking　exactly　as　they　do；　and　even　in　spite　of　considerable　differences　of　opinion：　and　when　they　have　recognised　it　they　will　be　far　too　desirous　to　secure　it；　at　any　admissible　cost；　to　be　prone　to　impose　their　own　opinion　as　a　law　upon　persons　whom　they　look　up　to　as　wiser　than　themselves。　On　the　other　hand；　there　is　a　character　of　mind　which　does　not　look　up　to　any　one；　which　thinks　no　other　person's　opinion　much　better　than　its　own；　or　nearly　so　good　as　that　of　a　hundred　or　a　thousand　persons　like　itself。　Where　this　is　the　turn　of　mind　of　the　electors；　they　will　elect　no　one　who　is　not　or　at　least　who　does　not　profess　to　be；　the　image　of　their　own　sentiments；　and　will　continue　him　no　longer　than　while　he　reflects　those　sentiments　in　his　conduct：　and　all　aspirants　to　political　honours　will　endeavour；　as　Plato　says　in　the　〃Gorgias；〃　to　fashion　themselves　after　the　model　of　the　Demos；　and　make　themselves　as　like　to　it　as　possible。　It　cannot　be　denied　that　a　complete　democracy　has　a　strong　tendency　to　cast　the　sentiments　of　the　electors　in　this　mould。　Democracy　is　not　favourable　to　the　reverential　spirit。　That　it　destroys　reverence　for　mere　social　position　must　be　counted　among　the　good；　not　the　bad　part　of　its　influences；　though　by　doing　this　it　closes　the　principal　school　of　reverence　（as　to　merely　human　relations）　which　exists　in　society。　But　also　democracy；　in　its　very　essence；　insists　so　much　more　forcibly　on　the　things　in　which　all　are　entitled　to　be　considered　equally；　than　on　those　in　which　one　person　is　entitled　to　more　consideration　than　another；　that　respect　for　even　personal　superiority　is　likely　to　be　below　the　mark。　It　is　for　this；　among　other　reasons；　I　hold　it　of　so　much　importance　that　the　institutions　of　the　country　should　stamp　the　opinions　of　persons　of　a　more　educated　class　as　entitled　to　greater　weight　than　those　of　the　less　educated：　and　I　should　still　contend　for　assigning　plurality　of　votes　to　authenticated　superiority　of　education；　were　it　only　to　give　the　tone　to　public　feeling；　irrespective　of　any