representative government-第32部分

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　able；　to　fulfil　if　they　choose。　They　leave　the　suffrage　accessible　to　all　who　are　in　the　normal　condition　of　a　human　being：　and　if　any　one　has　to　forego　it；　he　either　does　not　care　sufficiently　for　it　to　do　for　its　sake　what　he　is　already　bound　to　do；　or　he　is　in　a　general　condition　of　depression　and　degradation　in　which　this　slight　addition；　necessary　for　security　of　others；　would　be　unfelt；　and　on　emerging　from　which；　this　mark　of　inferiority　would　disappear　with　the　rest。　　　In　the　long　run；　therefore　（supposing　no　restrictions　to　exist　but　those　of　which　we　have　now　treated）；　we　might　expect　that　all；　except　that　（it　is　to　be　hoped）　progressively　diminishing　class；　the　recipients　of　parish　relief；　would　be　in　possession　of　votes；　so　that　the　suffrage　would　be；　with　that　slight　abatement；　universal。　That　it　should　be　thus　widely　expanded　is；　as　we　have　seen；　absolutely　necessary　to　an　enlarged　and　elevated　conception　of　good　government。　Yet　in　this　state　of　things；　the　great　majority　of　voters；　in　most　countries；　and　emphatically　in　this；　would　be　manual　labourers；　and　the　twofold　danger；　that　of　too　low　a　standard　of　political　intelligence；　and　that　of　class　legislation；　would　still　exist　in　a　very　perilous　degree。　It　remains　to　be　seen　whether　any　means　exist　by　which　these　evils　can　be　obviated。　　　They　are　capable　of　being　obviated；　if　men　sincerely　wish　it；　not　by　any　artificial　contrivance；　but　by　carrying　out　the　natural　order　of　human　life；　which　recommends　itself　to　every　one　in　things　in　which　he　has　no　interest　or　traditional　opinion　running　counter　to　it。　In　all　human　affairs；　every　person　directly　interested；　and　not　under　positive　tutelage；　has　an　admitted　claim　to　a　voice；　and　when　his　exercise　of　it　is　not　inconsistent　with　the　safety　of　the　whole；　cannot　justly　be　excluded　from　it。　But　though　every　one　ought　to　have　a　voice…　that　every　one　should　have　an　equal　voice　is　a　totally　different　proposition。　When　two　persons　who　have　a　joint　interest　in　any　business　differ　in　opinion；　does　justice　require　that　both　opinions　should　be　held　of　exactly　equal　value？　If；　with　equal　virtue；　one　is　superior　to　the　other　in　knowledge　and　intelligence…　or　if；　with　equal　intelligence；　one　excels　the　other　in　virtue…　the　opinion；　the　judgment；　of　the　higher　moral　or　intellectual　being　is　worth　more　than　that　of　the　inferior：　and　if　the　institutions　of　the　country　virtually　assert　that　they　are　of　the　same　value；　they　assert　a　thing　which　is　not。　One　of　the　two；　as　the　wiser　or　better　man；　has　a　claim　to　superior　weight：　the　difficulty　is　in　ascertaining　which　of　the　two　it　is；　a　thing　impossible　as　between　individuals；　but；　taking　men　in　bodies　and　in　numbers；　it　can　be　done　with　a　certain　approach　to　accuracy。　There　would　be　no　pretence　for　applying　this　doctrine　to　any　case　which　could　with　reason　be　considered　as　one　of　individual　and　private　right。　In　an　affair　which　concerns　only　one　of　two　persons；　that　one　is　entitled　to　follow　his　own　opinion；　however　much　wiser　the　other　may　be　than　himself。　But　we　are　speaking　of　things　which　equally　concern　them　both；　where；　if　the　more　ignorant　does　not　yield　his　share　of　the　matter　to　the　guidance　of　the　wiser　man；　the　wiser　man　must　resign　his　to　that　of　the　more　ignorant。　Which　of　these　modes　of　getting　over　the　difficulty　is　most　for　the　interest　of　both；　and　most　conformable　to　the　general　fitness　of　things？　If　it　be　deemed　unjust　that　either　should　have　to　give　way；　which　injustice　is　greatest？　that　the　better　judgment　should　give　way　to　the　worse；　or　the　worse　to　the　better？　　　Now；　national　affairs　are　exactly　such　a　joint　concern；　with　the　difference；　that　no　one　needs　ever　be　called　upon　for　a　complete　sacrifice　of　his　own　opinion。　It　can　always　be　taken　into　the　calculation；　and　counted　at　a　certain　figure；　a　higher　figure　being　assigned　to　the　suffrages　of　those　whose　opinion　is　entitled　to　greater　weight。　There　is　not；　in　this　arrangement；　anything　necessarily　invidious　to　those　to　whom　it　assigns　the　lower　degrees　of　influence。　Entire　exclusion　from　a　voice　in　the　common　concerns　is　one　thing：　the　concession　to　others　of　a　more　potential　voice；　on　the　ground　of　greater　capacity　for　the　management　of　the　joint　interests；　is　another。　The　two　things　are　not　merely　different；　they　are　incommensurable。　Every　one　has　a　right　to　feel　insulted　by　being　made　a　nobody；　and　stamped　as　of　no　account　at　all。　No　one　but　a　fool；　and　only　a　fool　of　a　peculiar　description；　feels　offended　by　the　acknowledgment　that　there　are　others　whose　opinion；　and　even　whose　wish；　is　entitled　to　a　greater　amount　of　consideration　than　his。　To　have　no　voice　in　what　are　partly　his　own　concerns　is　a　thing　which　nobody　willingly　submits　to；　but　when　what　is　partly　his　concern　is　also　partly　another's；　and　he　feels　the　other　to　understand　the　subject　better　than　himself；　that　the　other's　opinion　should　be　counted　for　more　than　his　own　accords　with　his　expectations；　and　with　the　course　of　things　which　in　all　other　affairs　of　life　he　is　accustomed　to　acquiese　in。　It　is　only　necessary　that　this　superior　influence　should　be　assigned　on　grounds　which　he　can　comprehend；　and　of　which　he　is　able　to　perceive　the　justice。　　　I　hasten　to　say　that　I　consider　it　entirely　inadmissible；　unless　as　a　temporary　makeshift；　that　the　superiority　of　influence　should　be　conferred　in　consideration　of　property。　I　do　not　deny　that　property　is　a　kind　of　test；　education　in　most　countries；　though　anything　but　proportional　to　riches；　is　on　the　average　better　in　the　richer　half　of　society　than　in　the　poorer。　But　the　criterion　is　so　imperfect；　accident　has　so　much　more　to　do　than　merit　with　enabling　men　to　rise　in　the　world；　and　it　is　so　impossible　for　any　one；　by　acquiring　any　amount　of　instruction；　to　make　sure　of　the　corresponding　rise　in　station；　that　this　foundation　of　electoral　privilege　is　always；　and　will　continue　to　be；　supremely　odious。　To　connect　plurality　of　votes　with　any　pecuniary　qualification　would　be　not　only　objectionable　in　itself；　but　a　sure　mode　of　discrediting　the　principle；　and　making　its　permanent　maintenance　impracticable。　The　Democracy；　at　least　of　this　country；　are　not　at　present　jealous　of　personal　superiority；　but　they　are　naturally　and　must　justly　so　of　that　which　is　grounded　on　mere　pecuniary　circumstances。　The　only　thing　which　can　justify　reckoning　one　person's　opinion　as　equivalent　to　more　than　one　is　individual　mental　superiority；　and　what　is　wanted　is　some　approximate　means　of　ascertaining　that。　If　there　existed　such　a　thing　as　a　really　national　education　or　a　trustworthy　system　of　general　examination；　education　might　be　tested　directly。　In　the　absence　of　these；　the　nature　of　a　person's　occupation　is　some　test。　An　employer　of　labour　is　on　the　average　more　intelligent　than　a　labourer；　for　he　must　labour　with　his　head；　and　not　solely　with　his　hands。　A　foreman　is　generally　more　intelligent　than　an　ordinary　labourer；　and　a　labourer　in　the　skilled　trades　than　in　the　unskilled。　A　banker；　merchant；　or　manufacturer　is　likely　to　be　more　intelligent　than　a　tradesman；　because　he　has　larger　and　more　complicated　interests　to　manage。　　　In　all　these　cases　it　is　not　the　having　merely　undertaken　the　superior　function；　but　the　successful　performance　of　it；　that　tests　the　qualifications；　for　which　reason；　as　well　as　to　prevent　persons　from　engaging　nominally　in　an　occupation　for　the　sake　of　the　vote；　it　would　be　proper　to　require　that　the　occupation　should　have　been　persevered　in　for　some　length　of　time　（say　three　years）。　Subject　to　some　such　condition；　two　or　more　votes　might　be　allowed　to　every　person　who　exercises　any　of　these　superior　functions。　The　liberal　professions；　when　really　and　not　nominally　practised；　imply；　of　course；　a　still　higher　degree　of　instruction；　and　wherever　a　sufficient　examination；　or　any　serious　conditions　of　education；　are　required　before　entering　on　a　profession；　its　members　could　be　admitted　at　once　to　a　plurality　of　votes。　The　same　rule　might　be　applied　to　graduates　of　universities；　and　even　to　those　who　bring　satisfactory　certificates　of　having　passed　through　the　course　of　study　required　by　any　school　at　which　the　higher　branches　of　knowledge　are　taught；　under　proper　securities　that　the　teaching　is　real；　and　not　a　mere　pretence。　The　〃local〃　or　〃middle　class〃　examination　for　the　degree　of　Associate；　so　laudably　and　public…spiritedly　established　by　the　Universities　of　Oxford　and　Cambridge；　and　any　similar　ones　which　may　be　instituted　by　other　competent　bodies　（provided　they　are　fairly　open　to　all　comers）；　afford　a　ground　on　which　plurality　of　votes　might　with　great　advantage　be　accorded　to　those　who　have　passed　the　test。　All　these　suggestions　are　open　to　much　discussion　in　the　detail；　and　to　objections　which　it　is　of　no　use　to　anticipate。　The　time　is　not　come　for　giving　to　such　plans　a　practical　shape；　nor　should　I　wish　to　be　bound　by　the　particular　proposals　which　I　have　made。　But　it　is　to　me　evident；　that　in　this　direction　lies　the　true　ideal　of　representative　government；　and　that　to　work　towards　it；　by　the　best　practical　contrivances　which　can　be　found；　is　the　path　of　real　political　improvement。　　　If　it　be　asked　to　what　length　the　principle　admits　of　being　carried；　or　how　many　votes　might　be　accorded