representative government-第26部分

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is　would；　so　far；　give　reality　to　the　electoral　rights　of　the　otherwise　virtually　disfranchised　minority。　But　it　is　important　that　not　those　alone　who　refuse　to　vote　for　any　of　the　local　candidates；　but　those　also　who　vote　for　one　of　them　and　are　defeated；　should　be　enabled　to　find　elsewhere　the　representation　which　they　have　not　succeeded　in　obtaining　in　their　own　district。　It　is　therefore　provided　that　an　elector　may　deliver　a　voting　paper；　containing　other　names　in　addition　to　the　one　which　stands　foremost　in　his　preference。　His　vote　would　only　be　counted　for　one　candidate；　but　if　the　object　of　his　first　choice　failed　to　be　returned；　from　not　having　obtained　the　quota；　his　second　perhaps　might　be　more　fortunate。　He　may　extend　his　list　to　a　greater　number；　in　the　order　of　his　preference；　so　that　if　the　names　which　stand　near　the　top　of　the　list　either　cannot　make　up　the　quota；　or　are　able　to　make　it　up　without　his　vote；　the　vote　may　still　be　used　for　some　one　whom　it　may　assist　in　returning。　To　obtain　the　full　number　of　members　required　to　complete　the　House；　as　well　as　to　prevent　very　popular　candidates　from　engrossing　nearly　all　the　suffrages；　it　is　necessary；　however　many　votes　a　candidate　may　obtain；　that　no　more　of　them　than　the　quota　should　be　counted　for　his　return：　the　remainder　of　those　who　voted　for　him　would　have　their　votes　counted　for　the　next　person　on　their　respective　lists　who　needed　them；　and　could　by　their　aid　complete　the　quota。　To　determine　which　of　a　candidate's　votes　should　be　used　for　his　return；　and　which　set　free　for　others；　several　methods　are　proposed；　into　which　we　shall　not　here　enter。　He　would　of　course　retain　the　votes　of　all　those　who　would　not　otherwise　be　represented；　and　for　the　remainder；　drawing　lots；　in　default　of　better；　would　be　an　unobjectionable　expedient。　The　voting　papers　would　be　conveyed　to　a　central　office；　where　the　votes　would　be　counted；　the　number　of　first；　second；　third；　and　other　votes　given　for　each　candidate　ascertained；　and　the　quota　would　be　allotted　to　every　one　who　could　make　it　up；　until　the　number　of　the　House　was　complete：　first　votes　being　preferred　to　second；　second　to　third；　and　so　forth。　The　voting　papers；　and　all　the　elements　of　the　calculation；　would　be　placed　in　public　repositories；　accessible　to　all　whom　they　concerned；　and　if　any　one　who　had　obtained　the　quota　was　not　duly　returned　it　would　be　in　his　power　easily　to　prove　it。　　　These　are　the　main　provisions　of　the　scheme。　For　a　more　minute　knowledge　of　its　very　simple　machinery；　I　must　refer　to　Mr。　Hare's　Treatise　on　the　Election　of　Representatives　（a　small　volume　Published　in　1859）；*　and　to　a　pamphlet　by　Mr。　Henry　Fawcett　（now　Professor　of　Political　Economy　in　the　University；　of　Cambridge）；　published　in　1860；　and　entitled　Mr。　Hare's　Reform　Bill　simplified　and　explained。　This　last　is　a　very　clear　and　concise　exposition　of　the　plan；　reduced　to　its　simplest　elements；　by　the　omission　of　some　of　Mr。　Hare's　original　provisions；　which；　though　in　themselves　beneficial；　we're　thought　to　take　more　from　the　simplicity　of　the　scheme　than　they　added　to　its　practical　usefulness。　The　more　these　works　are　studied　the　stronger；　I　venture　to　predict；　will　be　the　impression　of　the　perfect　feasibility　of　the　scheme；　and　its　transcendant　advantages。　Such　and　so　numerous　are　these；　that；　in　my　conviction；　they　place　Mr。　Hare's　plan　among　the　very　greatest　improvements　yet　made　in　the　theory　and　practice　of　government。

　　*　In　a　second　edition；　published　recently；　Mr。　Hare　has　made　important　improvements　in　some　of　the　detailed　provisions。

　　In　the　first　place；　it　secures　a　representation；　in　proportion　to　numbers；　of　every　division　of　the　electoral　body：　not　two　great　parties　alone；　with　perhaps　a　few　large　sectional　minorities　in　particular　places；　but　every　minority　in　the　whole　nation；　consisting　of　a　sufficiently　large　number　to　be；　on　principles　of　equal　justice；　entitled　to　a　representative。　Secondly；　no　elector

would；　as　at　present；　be　nominally　represented　by　some　one　whom　he　had　not　chosen。　Every　member　of　the　House　would　be　the　representative　of　a　unanimous　constituency。　He　would　represent　a　thousand　electors；　or　two　thousand；　or　five　thousand；　or　ten　thousand；　as　the　quota　might　be；　every　one　of　whom　would　have　not　only　voted　for　him；　but　selected　him　from　the　whole　country；　not　merely　from　the　assortment　of　two　or　three　perhaps　rotten　oranges；　which　may　be　the　only　choice　offered　to　him　in　his　local　market。　Under　this　relation　the　tie　between　the　elector　and　the　representative　would　be　of　a　strength；　and　a　value；　of　which　at　present　we　have　no　experience。　Every　one　of　the　electors　would　be　personally　identified　with　his　representative；　and　the　representative　with　his　constituents。　Every　elector　who　voted　for　him　would　have　done　so　either　because；　among　all　the　candidates　for　Parliament　who　are　favourably　known　to　a　certain　number　of　electors；　he　is　the　one　who　best　expresses　the　voter's　own　opinions；　because　he　is　one　of　those　whose　abilities　and　character　the　voter　most　respects；　and　whom　he　most　willingly　trusts　to　think　for　him。　The　member　would　represent　persons；　not　the　mere　bricks　and　mortar　of　the　town…　the　voters　themselves；　not　a　few　vestrymen　or　parish　notabilities　merely。　All　however；　that　is　worth　preserving　in　the　representation　of　places　would　be　preserved。　Though　the　Parliament　of　the　nation　ought　to　have　as　little　as　possible　to　do　with　purely　local　affairs；　yet；　while　it　has　to　do　with　them；　there　ought　to　be　members　specially　commissioned　to　look　after　the　interests　of　every　important　locality：　and　these　there　would　still　be。　In　every　locality　which　could　make　up　the　quota　within　itself；　the　majority　would　generally　prefer　to　be　represented　by　one　of　themselves；　by　a　person　of　local　knowledge；　and　residing　in　the　locality；　if　there　is　any　such　person　to　be　found　among　the　candidates；　who　is　otherwise　well　qualified　to　be　their　representative。　It　would　be　the　minorities　chiefly；　who　being　unable　to　return　the　local　member；　would　look　out　elsewhere　for　a　candidate　likely　to　obtain　other　votes　in　addition　to　their　own。　　　Of　all　modes　in　which　a　national　representation　can　possibly　be　constituted；　this　one　affords　the　best；　security　for　the　intellectual　qualifications　desirable　in　the　representatives。　At　present；　by　universal　admission；　it　is　becoming　more　and　more　difficult　for　any　one　who　has　only　talents　and　character　to　gain　admission　into　the　House　of　Commons。　The　only　persons　who　can　get　elected　are　those　who　possess　local　influence；　or　make　their　way　by　lavish　expenditure；　or　who；　on　the　invitation　of　three　or　four　tradesmen　or　attorneys；　are　sent　down　by　one　of　the　two　great　parties　from　their　London　clubs；　as　men　whose　votes　the　party　can　depend　on　under　all　circumstances。　On　Mr。　Hare's　system；　those　who　did　not　like　the　local　candidates；　or　who　could　not　succeed　in　carrying　the　local　candidate　they　preferred；　would　have　the　power　to　fill　up　their　voting　papers　by　a　selection　from　all　the　persons　of　national　reputation；　on　the　list　of　candidates；　with　whose　general　political　principles　they　were　in　sympathy。　Almost　every　person；　therefore；　who　had　made　himself　in　any　way　honourably　distinguished；　though　devoid　of　local　influence；　and　having　sworn　allegiance　to　no　political　party；　would　have　a　fair　chance　of　making　up　the　quota；　and　with　this　encouragement　such　persons　might　be　expected　to　offer　themselves；　in　numbers　hitherto　undreamt　of。　Hundreds　of　able　men　of　independent　thought；　who　would　have　no　chance　whatever　of　being　chosen　by　the　majority　of　any　existing　constituency；　have　by　their　writings；　or　their　exertions　in　some　field　of　public　usefulness；　made　themselves　known　and　approved　by　a　few　persons　in　almost　every　district　of　the　kingdom；　and　if　every　vote　that　would　be　given　for　them　in　every　place　could　be　counted　for　their　election；　they　might　be　able　to　complete　the　number　of　the　quota。　In　no　other　way　which　it　seems　possible　to　suggest　would　Parliament　be　so　certain　of　containing　the　very　elite　of　the　country。　　　And　it　is　not　solely　through　the　votes　of　minorities　that　this　system　of　election　would　raise　the　intellectual　standard　of　the　House　of　Commons。　Majorities　would　be　compelled　to　look　out　for　members　of　a　much　higher　calibre。　When　the　individuals　composing　the　majority　would　no　longer　be　reduced　to　Hobson's　choice；　of　either　voting　for　the　person　brought　forward　by　their　local　leaders　or　not　voting　at　all；　when　the　nominee　of　the　leaders　would　have　to　encounter　the　competition　not　solely　of　the　candidate　of　the　minority；　but　of　all　the　men　of　established　reputation　in　the　country　who　were　willing　to　serve；　it　would　be　impossible　any　longer　to　foist　upon　the　electors　the　first　person　who　presents　himself　with　the　catchwords　of　the　party　in　his　mouth　and　three　or　four　thousand　pounds　in　his　pocket。　The　majority　would　insist　on　having　a　candidate　worthy　of　their　choice；　or　they　would　carry　their　votes　somewhere　else；　and　the　minority　would　prevail。　The　slavery　of　the　majority　to　the　least　estimable　portion　of　their　number　would　be　at　an　end：　the　very　best　and　most　capable　of　the　local　notabilities　would　be　put　forward　by　preference；　if　possible；　such　as　were　known　in　some　advanta