representative government-第24部分

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proportion　of　petty　tradesmen。　In　a　state　of　society　thus　composed；　if　the　representative　system　could　be　made　ideally　perfect；　and　if　it　were　possible　to　maintain　it　in　that　state；　its　organisation　must　be　such　that　these　two　classes；　manual　labourers　and　their　affinities　on　one　side；　employers　of　labour　and　their　affinities　on　the　other；　should　be；　in　the　arrangement　of　the　representative　system；　equally　balanced；　each　influencing　about　an　equal　number　of　votes　in　Parliament：　since；　assuming　that　the　majority　of　each　class；　in　any　difference　between　them；　would　be　mainly　governed　by　their　class　interests；　there　would　be　a　minority　of　each　in　whom　that　consideration　would　be　subordinate　to　reason；　justice；　and　the　good　of　the　whole；　and　this　minority　of　either；　joining　with　the　whole　of　the　other；　would　turn　the　scale　against　any　demands　of　their　own　majority　which　were　not　such　as　ought　to　prevail。　　　The　reason　why；　in　any　tolerable　constituted　society；　justice　and　the　general　interest　mostly　in　the　end　carry　their　point；　is　that　the　separate　and　selfish　interests　of　mankind　are　almost　always　divided；　some　are　interested　in　what　is　wrong；　but　some；　also；　have　their　private　interest　on　the　side　of　what　is　right：　and　those　who　are　governed　by　higher　considerations；　though　too　few　and　weak　to　prevail　against　the　whole　of　the　others；　usually　after　sufficient　discussion　and　agitation　become　strong　enough　to　turn　the　balance　in　favour　of　the　body　of　private　interests　which　is　on　the　same　side　with　them。　The　representative　system　ought　to　be　so　constituted　as　to　maintain　this　state　of　things：　it　ought　not　to　allow　any　of　the　various　sectional　interests　to　be　so　powerful　as　to　be　capable　of　prevailing　against　truth　and　justice　and　the　other　sectional　interests　combined。　There　ought　always　to　be　such　a　balance　preserved　among　personal　interests　as　may　render　any　one　of　them　dependent　for　its　successes　on　carrying　with　it　at　least　a　large　proportion　of　those　who　act　on　higher　motives　and　more　comprehensive　and　distant　views。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　7　　　　　　Of　True　and　False　Democracy；　Representation　of　All；　and　Representation　of　the　Majority　only。

　　IT　HAS　been　seen　that　the　dangers　incident　to　a　representative　democracy　are　of　two　kinds：　danger　of　a　low　grade　of　intelligence　in　the　representative　body；　and　in　the　popular　opinion　which　controls　it；　and　danger　of　class　legislation　on　the　part　of　the　numerical　majority；　these　being　all　composed　of　the　same　class。　We　have　next　to　consider　how　far　it　is　possible　so　to　organise　the　democracy　as；　without　interfering　materially　with　the　characteristic　benefits　of　democratic　government；　to　do　away　with　these　two　great　evils；　or　at　least　to　abate　them；　in　the　utmost　degree　attainable　by　human　contrivance。　　　The　common　mode　of　attempting　this　is　by　limiting　the　democratic　character　of　the　representation；　through　a　more　or　less　restricted　suffrage。　But　there　is　a　previous　consideration　which；　duly　kept　in　view；　considerably　modifies　the　circumstances　which　are　supposed　to　render　such　a　restriction　necessary。　A　completely　equal　democracy；　in　a　nation　in　which　a　single　class　composes　the　numerical　majority；　cannot　be　divested　of　certain　evils；　but　those　evils　are　greatly　aggravated　by　the　fact　that　the　democracies　which　at　present　exist　are　not　equal；　but　systematically　unequal　in　favour　of　the　predominant　class。　Two　very　different　ideas　are　usually　confounded　under　the　name　democracy。　The　pure　idea　of　democracy；　according　to　its　definition；　is　the　government　of　the　whole　people　by　the　whole　people；　equally　represented。　Democracy　as　commonly　conceived　and　hitherto　practised　is　the　government　of　the　whole　people　by　a　mere　majority　of　the　people；　exclusively　represented。　The　former　is　synonymous　with　the　equality　of　all　citizens；　the　latter；　strangely　confounded　with　it；　is　a　government　of　privilege；　in　favour　of　the　numerical　majority；　who　alone　possess　practically　any　voice　in　the　State。　This　is　the　inevitable　consequence　of　the　manner　in　which　the　votes　are　now　taken；　to　the　complete　disfranchisement　of　minorities。　　　The　confusion　of　ideas　here　is　great；　but　it　is　so　easily　cleared　up　that　one　would　suppose　the　slightest　indication　would　be　sufficient　to　place　the　matter　in　its　true　light　before　any　mind　of　average　intelligence。　It　would　be　so；　but　for　the　power　of　habit；　owing　to　which　the　simplest　idea；　if　unfamiliar；　has　as　great　difficulty　in　making　its　way　to　the　mind　as　a　far　more　complicated　one。　That　the　minority　must　yield　to　the　majority；　the　smaller　number　to　the　greater；　is　a　familiar　idea；　and　accordingly　men　think　there　is　no　necessity　for　using　their　minds　any　further；　and　it　does　not　occur　to　them　that　there　is　any　medium　between　allowing　the　smaller　number　to　be　equally　powerful　with　the　greater；　and　blotting　out　the　smaller　number　altogether。　In　a　representative　body　actually　deliberating；　the　minority　must　of　course　be　overruled；　and　in　an　equal　democracy　（since　the　opinions　of　the　constituents；　when　they　insist　on　them；　determine　those　of　the　representative　body）　the　majority　of　the　people；　through　their　representatives；　will　outvote　and　prevail　over　the　minority　and　their　representatives。　But　does　it　follow　that　the　minority　should　have　no　representatives　at　all？　Because　the　majority　ought　to　prevail　over　the　minority；　must　the　majority　have　all　the　votes；　the　minority　none？　Is　it　necessary　that　the　minority　should　not　even　be　heard？　Nothing　but　habit　and　old　association　can　reconcile　any　reasonable　being　to　the　needless　injustice。　In　a　really　equal　democracy；　every　or　any　section　would　be　represented；　not　disproportionately；　but　proportionately。　A　majority　of　the　electors　would　always　have　a　majority　of　the　representatives；　but　a　minority　of　the　electors　would　always　have　a　minority　of　the　representatives。　Man　for　man　they　would　be　as　fully　represented　as　the　majority。　Unless　they　are；　there　is　not　equal　government；　but　a　government　of　inequality　and　privilege：　one　part　of　the　people　rule　over　the　rest：　there　is　a　part　whose　fair　and　equal　share　of　influence　in　the　representation　is　withheld　from　them；　contrary　to　all　just　government；　but；　above　all；　contrary　to　the　principle　of　democracy；　which　professes　equality　as　its　very　root　and　foundation。　　　The　injustice　and　violation　of　principle　are　not　less　flagrant　because　those　who　suffer　by　them　are　a　minority；　for　there　is　not　equal　suffrage　where　every　single　individual　does　not　count　for　as　much　as　any　other　single　individual　in　the　community。　But　it　is　not　only　a　minority　who　suffer。　Democracy；　thus　constituted；　does　not　even　attain　its　ostensible　object；　that　of　giving　the　powers　of　government　in　all　cases　to　the　numerical　majority。　It　does　something　very　different：　it　gives　them　to　a　majority　of　the　majority；　who　may　be；　and　often　are；　but　a　minority　of　the　whole。　All　principles　are　most　effectually　tested　by　extreme　cases。　Suppose　then；　that；　in　a　country　governed　by　equal　and　universal　suffrage；　there　is　a　contested　election　in　every　constituency；　and　every　election　is　carried　by　a　small　majority。　The　Parliament　thus　brought　together　represents　little　more　than　a　bare　majority　of　the　people。　This　Parliament　proceeds　to　legislate；　and　adopts　important　measures　by　a　bare　majority　of　itself。　What　guarantee　is　there　that　these　measures　accord　with　the　wishes　of　a　majority　of　the　people？　Nearly　half　the　electors；　having　been　outvoted　at　the　hustings；　have　had　no　influence　at　all　in　the　decision；　and　the　whole　of　these　may　be；　a　majority　of　them　probably　are；　hostile　to　the　measures；　having　voted　against　those　by　whom　they　have　been　carried。　Of　the　remaining　electors；　nearly　half　have　chosen　representatives　who；　by　supposition；　have　voted　against　the　measures。　It　is　possible；　therefore；　and　not　at　all　improbable；　that　the　opinion　which　has　prevailed　was　agreeable　only　to　a　minority　of　the　nation；　though　a　majority　of　that　portion　of　it　whom　the　institutions　of　the　country　have　erected　into　a　ruling　class。　If　democracy　means　the　certain　ascendancy　of　the　majority；　there　are　no　means　of　insuring　that　but　by　allowing　every　individual　figure　to　tell　equally　in　the　summing　up。　Any　minority　left　out；　either　purposely　or　by　the　play　of　the　machinery；　gives　the　power　not　to　the　majority；　but　to　a　minority　in　some　other　part　of　the　scale。　　　The　only　answer　which　can　possibly　be　made　to　this　reasoning　is；　that　as　different　opinions　predominate　in　different　localities；　the　opinion　which　is　in　a　minority　in　some　places　has　a　majority　in　others；　and　on　the　whole　every　opinion　which　exists　in　the　constituencies　obtains　its　fair　share　of　voices　in　the　representation。　And　this　is　roughly　true　in　the　present　state　of　the　constituency；　if　it　were　not；　the　discordance　of　the　House　with　the　general　sentiment　of　the　country　would　soon　become　evident。　But　it　would　be　no　longer　true　if　the　present　constituency　were　much　enlarged；　still　less；　if　made　co…extensive　with　the　whole　population；　for　in　that　case　the　majority　in　every　locality　would　consist　of　manual　labourers；　and　when　there　was　any　question　pending；　on　which　these　classes　were　at　issue　with　the　rest　of　the　community；　no　other　class　could　succeed　in　getting　represented　anywhere。　Even　n