representative government-第20部分

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eally　conduct　the　public　business；　or　who　appoint　those　by　whom　it　is　conducted。　Nothing　but　the　restriction　of　the　function　of　representative　bodies　within　these　rational　limits　will　enable　the　benefits　of　popular　control　to　be　enjoyed　in　conjunction　with　the　no　less　important　requisites　（growing　ever　more　important　as　human　affairs　increase　in　scale　and　in　complexity）　of　skilled　legislation　and　administration。　There　are　no　means　of　combining　these　benefits　except　by　separating　the　functions　which　guarantee　the　one　from　those　which　essentially　require　the　other；　by　disjoining　the　office　of　control　and　criticism　from　the　actual　conduct　of　affairs；　and　devolving　the　former　on　the　representatives　of　the　Many；　while　securing　for　the　latter；　under　strict　responsibility　to　the　nation；　the　acquired　knowledge　and　practised　intelligence　of　a　specially　trained　and　experienced　Few。　　　The　preceding　discussion　of　the　functions　which　ought　to　devolve　on　the　sovereign　representative　assembly　of　the　nation　would　require　to　be　followed　by　an　inquiry　into　those　properly　vested　in　the　minor　representative　bodies；　which　ought　to　exist　for　purposes　that　regard　only　localities。　And　such　an　inquiry　forms　an　essential　part　of　the　present　treatise；　but　many　reasons　require　its　postponement；　until　we　have　considered　the　most　proper　composition　of　the　great　representative　body；　destined　to　control　as　sovereign　the　enactment　of　laws　and　the　administration　of　the　general　affairs　of　the　nation。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　6　　　Of　the　Infirmities　and　Dangers　to　which　Representative　Government　is　Liable。

　　THE　DEFECTS　of　any　form　of　government　may　be　either　negative　or　positive。　It　is　negatively　defective　if　it　does　not　concentrate　in　the　hands　of　the　authorities　power　sufficient　to　fulfil　the　necessary　offices　of　a　government；　or　if　it　does　not　sufficiently　develop　by　exercise　the　active　capacities　and　social　feelings　of　the　individual　citizens。　On　neither　of　these　points　is　it　necessary　that　much　should　be　said　at　this　stage　of　our　inquiry。　　　The　want　of　an　amount　power　in　the　government；　adequate　to　preserve　order　and　allow　of　progress　in　the　people；　is　incident　rather　to　a　wild　and　rude　state　of　society　generally；　than　to　any　particular　form　of　political　union。　When　the　people　are　too　much　attached　to　savage　independence　to　be　tolerant　of　the　amount　of　power　to　which　it　is　for　their　good　that　they　should　be　subject；　the　state　of　society　（as　already　observed）　is　not　yet　ripe　for　representative　government。　When　the　time　for　that　government　has　arrived；　sufficient　power　for　all　needful　purposes　is　sure　to　reside　in　the　sovereign　assembly；　and　if　enough　of　it　is　not　entrusted　to　the　executive；　this　can　only　arise　from　a　jealous　feeling　on　the　part　of　the　assembly　towards　the　administration；　never　likely　to　exist　but　where　the　constitutional　power　of　the　assembly　to　turn　them　out　of　office　has　not　yet　sufficiently　established　itself。　Wherever　that　constitutional　right　is　admitted　in　principle；　and　fully　operative　in　practice；　there　is　no　fear　that　the　assembly　will　not　be　willing　to　trust　its　own　ministers　with　any　amount　of　power　really　desirable；　the　danger　is；　on　the　contrary；　lest　they　should　grant　it　too　ungrudgingly；　and　too　indefinite　in　extent；　since　the　power　of　the　minister　is　the　power　of　the　body　who　make　and　who　keep　him　so。　It　is；　however；　very　likely；　and　is　one　of　the　dangers　of　a　controlling　assembly；　that　it　may　be　lavish　of　powers；　but　afterwards　interfere　with　their　exercise；　may　give　power　by　wholesale；　and　take　it　back　in　detail；　by　multiplied　single　acts　of　interference　in　the　business　of　administration。　The　evils　arising　from　this　assumption　of　the　actual　function　of　governing；　in　lieu　of　that　of　criticising　and　checking　those　who　govern；　have　been　sufficiently　dwelt　upon　in　the　preceding　chapter。　No　safeguard　can　in　the　nature　of　things　be　provided　against　this　improper　meddling；　except　a　strong　and　general　conviction　of　its　injurious　character。　　　The　other　negative　defect　which　may　reside　in　a　government；　that　of　not　bringing　into　sufficient　exercise　the　individual　faculties；　moral；　intellectual；　and　active；　of　the　people；　has　been　exhibited　generally　in　setting　forth　the　distinctive　mischiefs　of　despotism。　As　between　one　form　of　popular　government　and　another；　the　advantage　in　this　respect　lies　with　that　which　most　widely　diffuses　the　exercise　of　public　functions；　on　the　one　hand；　by　excluding　fewest　from　the　suffrage；　on　the　other；　by　opening　to　all　classes　of　private　citizens；　so　far　as　is　consistent　with　other　equally　important　objects；　the　widest　participation　in　the　details　of　judicial　and　administrative　business；　as　by　jury　trial；　admission　to　municipal　offices；　and　above　all　by　the　utmost　possible　publicity　and　liberty　of　discussion；　whereby　not　merely　a　few　individuals　in　succession；　but　the　whole　public；　are　made；　to　a　certain　extent；　participants　in　the　government；　and　sharers　in　the　instruction　and　mental　exercise　derivable　from　it。　The　further　illustration　of　these　benefits；　as　well　as　of　the　limitations　under　which　they　must　be　aimed　at；　will　be　better　deferred　until　we　come　to　speak　of　the　details　of　administration。　　　The　positive　evils　and　dangers　of　the　representative；　as　of　every　other　form　of　government；　may　be　reduced　to　two　heads：　first；　general　ignorance　and　incapacity；　or；　to　speak　more　moderately；　insufficient　mental　qualifications；　in　the　controlling　body；　secondly；　the　danger　of　its　being　under　the　influence　of　interests　not　identical　with　the　general　welfare　of　the　community。　　　The　former　of　these　evils；　deficiency　in　high　mental　qualifications；　is　one　to　which　it　is　generally　supposed　that　popular　government　is　liable　in　a　greater　degree　than　any　other。　The　energy　of　a　monarch；　the　steadiness　and　prudence　of　an　aristocracy；　are　thought　to　contrast　most　favourably　with　the　vacillation　and　shortsightedness　of　even　a　qualified　democracy。　These　propositions；　however；　are　not　by　any　means　so　well　founded　as　they　at　first　sight　appear。　　　Compared　with　simple　monarchy；　representative　government　is　in　these　respects　at　no　disadvantage。　Except　in　a　rude　age；　hereditary　monarchy；　when　it　is　really　such；　and　not　aristocracy　in　disguise；　far　surpasses　democracy　in　all　the　forms　of　incapacity　supposed　to　be　characteristic　of　the　last。　I　say；　except　in　a　rude　age；　because　in　a　really　rude　state　of　society　there　is　a　considerable　guarantee　for　the　intellectual　and　active　capacities　of　the　sovereign。　His　personal　will　is　constantly　encountering　obstacles　from　the　wilfulness　of　his　subjects；　and　of　powerful　individuals　among　their　number。　The　circumstances　of　society　do　not　afford　him　much　temptation　to　mere　luxurious　self…indulgence；　mental　and　bodily　activity；　especially　political　and　military；　are　his　principal　excitements；　and　among　turbulent　chiefs　and　lawless　followers　he　has　little　authority；　and　is　seldom　long　secure　even　of　his　throne；　unless　he　possesses　a　considerable　amount　of　personal　daring；　dexterity；　and　energy。　The　reason　why　the　average　of　talent　is　so　high　among　the　Henries　and　Edwards　of　our　history　may　be　read　in　the　tragical　fate　of　the　second　Edward　and　the　second　Richard；　and　the　civil　wars　and　disturbances　of　the　reigns　of　John　and　his　incapable　successor。　The　troubled　period　of　the　Reformation　also　produced　several　eminent　hereditary　monarchs；　Elizabeth；　Henri　Quatre；　Gustavus　Adolphus；　but　they　were　mostly　bred　up　in　adversity；　succeeded　to　the　throne　by　the　unexpected　failure　of　nearer　heirs；　or　had　to　contend　with　great　difficulties　in　the　commencement　of　their　reign。　Since　European　life　assumed　a　settled　aspect；　anything　above　mediocrity　in　an　hereditary　king　has　become　extremely　rare；　while　the　general　average　has　been　even　below　mediocrity；　both　in　talent　and　in　vigour　of　character。　A　monarchy　constitutionally　absolute　now　only　maintains　itself　in　existence　（except　temporarily　in　the　hands　of　some　active…minded　usurper）　through　the　mental　qualifications　of　a　permanent　bureaucracy。　The　Russian　and　Austrian　Governments；　and　even　the　French　Government　in　its　normal　condition；　are　oligarchies　of　officials；　of　whom　the　head　of　the　State　does　little　more　than　select　the　chiefs。　I　am　speaking　of　the　regular　course　of　their　administration；　for　the　will　of　the　master　of　course　determines　many　of　their　particular　acts。　　　The　governments　which　have　been　remarkable　in　history　for　sustained　mental　ability　and　vigour　in　the　conduct　of　affairs　have　generally　been　aristocracies。　But　they　have　been；　without　any　exception；　aristocracies　of　public　functionaries。　The　ruling　bodies　have　been　so　narrow；　that　each　member；　or　at　least　each　influential　member；　of　the　body；　was　able　to　make　and　did　make；　public　business　an　active　profession；　and　the　principal　occupation　of　his　life。　The　only　aristocracies　which　have　manifested　high　governing　capacities；　and　acted　on　steady　maxims　of　policy；　through　many　generations；　are　those　of　Rome　and　Venice。　But；　at　Venice；　though　the　privileged　order　was　numerous；　the　actual　management　of　affairs　was　rigidly　concentrated　in　a　small　oligarchy　within　the　oligarchy；　whose　whole　lives　were　devoted　to　the　study　and　conduct　of　the　affairs　of　the　state。　The　Roman　government　partook　mor