representative government-第13部分

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l　these　deficiencies。　If　circumstances　allow　the　amount　of　public　duty　assigned　him　to　be　considerable；　it　makes　him　an　educated　man。　Notwithstanding　the　defects　of　the　social　system　and　moral　ideas　of　antiquity；　the　practice　of　the　dicastery　and　the　ecclesia　raised　the　intellectual　standard　of　an　average　Athenian　citizen　far　beyond　anything　of　which　there　is　yet　an　example　in　any　other　mass　of　men；　ancient　or　modern。　The　proofs　of　this　are　apparent　in　every　page　of　our　great　historian　of　Greece；　but　we　need　scarcely　look　further　than　to　the　high　quality　of　the　addresses　which　their　great　orators　deemed　best　calculated　to　act　with　effect　on　their　understanding　and　will。　A　benefit　of　the　same　kind；　though　far　less　in　degree；　is　produced　on　Englishmen　of　the　lower　middle　class　by　their　liability　to　be　placed　on　juries　and　to　serve　parish　offices；　which；　though　it　does　not　occur　to　so　many；　nor　is　so　continuous；　nor　introduces　them　to　so　great　a　variety　of　elevated　considerations；　as　to　admit　of　comparison　with　the　public　education　which　every　citizen　of　Athens　obtained　from　her　democratic　institutions；　must　make　them　nevertheless　very　different　beings；　in　range　of　ideas　and　development　of　faculties；　from　those　who　have　done　nothing　in　their　lives　but　drive　a　quill；　or　sell　goods　over　a　counter。　　　Still　more　salutary　is　the　moral　part　of　the　instruction　afforded　by　the　participation　of　the　private　citizen；　if　even　rarely；　in　public　functions。　He　is　called　upon；　while　so　engaged；　to　weigh　interests　not　his　own；　to　be　guided；　in　case　of　conflicting　claims；　by　another　rule　than　his　private　partialities；　to　apply；　at　every　turn；　principles　and　maxims　which　have　for　their　reason　of　existence　the　common　good：　and　he　usually　finds　associated　with　him　in　the　same　work　minds　more　familiarised　than　his　own　with　these　ideas　and　operations；　whose　study　it　will　be　to　supply　reasons　to　his　understanding；　and　stimulation　to　his　feeling　for　the　general　interest。　He　is　made　to　feel　himself　one　of　the　public；　and　whatever　is　for　their　benefit　to　be　for　his　benefit。　Where　this　school　of　public　spirit　does　not　exist；　scarcely　any　sense　is　entertained　that　private　persons；　in　no　eminent　social　situation；　owe　any　duties　to　society；　except　to　obey　the　laws　and　submit　to　the　government。　There　is　no　unselfish　sentiment　of　identification　with　the　public。　Every　thought　or　feeling；　either　of　interest　or　of　duty；　is　absorbed　in　the　individual　and　in　the　family。　The　man　never　thinks　of　any　collective　interest；　of　any　objects　to　be　pursued　jointly　with　others；　but　only　in　competition　with　them；　and　in　some　measure　at　their　expense。　A　neighbour；　not　being　an　ally　or　an　associate；　since　he　is　never　engaged　in　any　common　undertaking　for　joint　benefit；　is　therefore　only　a　rival。　Thus　even　private　morality　suffers；　while　public　is　actually　extinct。　Were　this　the　universal　and　only　possible　state　of　things；　the　utmost　aspirations　of　the　lawgiver　or　the　moralist　could　only　stretch　to　make　the　bulk　of　the　community　a　flock　of　sheep　innocently　nibbling　the　grass　side　by　side。　　　From　these　accumulated　considerations　it　is　evident　that　the　only　government　which　can　fully　satisfy　all　the　exigencies　of　the　social　state　is　one　in　which　the　whole　people　participate；　that　any　participation；　even　in　the　smallest　public　function；　is　useful；　that　the　participation　should　everywhere　be　as　great　as　the　general　degree　of　improvement　of　the　community　will　allow；　and　that　nothing　less　can　be　ultimately　desirable　than　the　admission　of　all　to　a　share　in　the　sovereign　power　of　the　state。　But　since　all　cannot；　in　a　community　exceeding　a　single　small　town；　participate　personally　in　any　but　some　very　minor　portions　of　the　public　business；　it　follows　that　the　ideal　type　of　a　perfect　government　must　be　representative。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　4　　　Under　what　Social　Conditions　Representative　Government　is　Inapplicable。

　　WE　HAVE　recognised　in　representative　government　the　ideal　type　of　the　most　perfect　polity；　for　which；　in　consequence；　any　portion　of　mankind　are　better　adapted　in　proportion　to　their　degree　of　general　improvement。　As　they　range　lower　and　lower　in　development；　that　form　of　government　will　be；　generally　speaking；　less　suitable　to　them；　though　this　is　not　true　universally：　for　the　adaptation　of　a　people　to　representative　government　does　not　depend　so　much　upon　the　place　they　occupy　in　the　general　scale　of　humanity　as　upon　the　degree　in　which　they　possess　certain　special　requisites；　requisites；　however；　so　closely　connected　with　their　degree　of　general　advancement；　that　any　variation　between　the　two　is　rather　the　exception　than　the　rule。　Let　us　examine　at　what　point　in　the　descending　series　representative　government　ceases　altogether　to　be　admissible；　either　through　its　own　unfitness；　or　the　superior　fitness　of　some　other　regimen。　　　First；　then；　representative；　like　any　other　government；　must　be　unsuitable　in　any　case　in　which　it　cannot　permanently　subsist…　i。e。　in　which　it　does　not　fulfil　the　three　fundamental　conditions　enumerated　in　the　first　chapter。　These　were…　1。　That　the　people　should　be　willing　to　receive　it。　2。　That　they　should　be　willing　and　able　to　do　what　is　necessary　for　its　preservation。　3。　That　they　should　be　willing　and　able　to　fulfil　the　duties　and　discharge　the　functions　which　it　imposes　on　them。　　　The　willingness　of　the　people　to　accept　representative　government　only　becomes　a　practical　question　when　an　enlightened　ruler；　or　a　foreign　nation　or　nations　who　have　gained　power　over　the　country；　are　disposed　to　offer　it　the　boon。　To　individual　reformers　the　question　is　almost　irrelevant；　since；　if　no　other　objection　can　be　made　to　their　enterprise　than　that　the　opinion　of　the　nation　is　not　yet　on　their　side；　they　have　the　ready　and　proper　answer；　that　to　bring　it　over　to　their　side　is　the　very　end　they　aim　at。　When　opinion　is　really　adverse；　its　hostility　is　usually　to　the　fact　of　change；　rather　than　to　representative　government　in　itself。　The　contrary　case　is　not　indeed　unexampled；　there　has　sometimes　been　a　religious　repugnance　to　any　limitation　of　the　power　of　a　particular　line　of　rulers；　but；　in　general；　the　doctrine　of　passive　obedience　meant　only　submission　to　the　will　of　the　powers　that　be；　whether　monarchical　or　popular。　In　any　case　in　which　the　attempt　to　introduce　representative　government　is　at　all　likely　to　be　made；　indifference　to　it；　and　inability　to　understand　its　processes　and　requirements；　rather　than　positive　opposition；　are　the　obstacles　to　be　expected。　These；　however；　are　as　fatal；　and　may　be　as　hard　to　be　got　rid　of；　as　actual　aversion；　it　being　easier；　in　most　cases；　to　change　the　direction　of　an　active　feeling；　than　to　create　one　in　a　state　previously　passive。　When　a　people　have　no　sufficient　value　for；　and　attachment　to；　a　representative　constitution；　they　have　next　to　no　chance　of　retaining　it。　In　every　country；　the　executive　is　the　branch　of　the　government　which　wields　the　immediate　power；　and　is　in　direct　contact　with　the　public；　to　it；　principally；　the　hopes　and　fears　of　individuals　are　directed；　and　by　it　both　the　benefits；　and　the　terrors　and　prestige；　of　government　are　mainly　represented　to　the　public　eye。　Unless；　therefore；　the　authorities　whose　office　it　is　to　check　the　executive　are　backed　by　an　effective　opinion　and　feeling　in　the　country；　the　executive　has　always　the　means　of　setting　them　aside；　or　compelling　them　to　subservience；　and　is　sure　to　be　well　supported　in　doing　so。　Representative　institutions　necessarily　depend　for　permanence　upon　the　readiness　of　the　people　to　fight　for　them　in　case　of　their　being　endangered。　If　too　little　valued　for　this；　they　seldom　obtain　a　footing　at　all；　and　if　they　do；　are　almost　sure　to　be　overthrown；　as　soon　as　the　head　of　the　government；　or　any　party　leader　who　can　muster　force　for　a　coup　de　main；　is　willing　to　run　some　small　risk　for　absolute　power。　　　These　considerations　relate　to　the　first　two　causes　of　failure　in　a　representative　government。　The　third　is；　when　the　people　want　either　the　will　or　the　capacity　to　fulfil　the　part　which　belongs　to　them　in　a　representative　constitution。　When　nobody；　or　only　some　small　fraction；　feels　the　degree　of　interest　in　the　general　affairs　of　the　State　necessary　to　the　formation　of　a　public　opinion；　the　electors　will　seldom　make　any　use　of　the　right　of　suffrage　but　to　serve　their　private　interest；　or　the　interest　of　their　locality；　or　of　some　one　with　whom　they　are　connected　as　adherents　or　dependents。　The　small　class　who；　in　this　state　of　public　feeling；　gain　the　command　of　the　representative　body；　for　the　most　part　use　it　solely　as　a　means　of　seeking　their　fortune。　if　the　executive　is　weak；　the　country　is　distracted　by　mere　struggles　for　place；　if　strong；　it　makes　itself　despotic；　at　the　cheap　price　of　appeasing　the　representatives；　or　such　of　them　as　are　capable　of　giving　trouble；　by　a　share　of　the　spoil；　and　the　only　fruit　produced　by　national　representation　is；　that　in　addition　to　those　who　really　govern；　there　is　an　assembly　quartered　on　the　public；　and　no　abuse　in　which　a　portion　of　the　assembly　are　interested　is　at　all　likely　to　be　removed。　When；　however；　the　evil　stops　here；　the　price　may　be　worth　paying；　for　the　publicity　and　discussion　wh