战争与和平(上)-第206部分

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his　war　become　intelligible　to　us。
Providence　compelled　all　those　men　in　striving　for　the　attainment　of　their　personal　aims　to　combine　in　accomplishing　one　immense　result；　of　which　no　one　individual　man　（not　Napoleon；　not　Alexander；　still　less　any　one　taking　practical　part　in　the　campaign）　had　the　slightest　inkling。
Now　it　is　clear　to　us　what　was　the　cause　of　the　destruction　of　the　French　army　in　1812。　No　one　disputes　that　the　cause　of　the　loss　of　Napoleon’s　French　forces　was；　on　one　hand；　their　entering　at　too　late　a　season　upon　a　winter　march　in　the　heart　of　Russia　without　sufficient　preparation；　and　on　the　other；　the　character　the　war　had　assumed　from　the　burning　of　Russian　towns　and　the　hatred　the　enemy　aroused　in　the　peasantry。　But　obvious　as　it　seems　now；　no　one　at　the　time　foresaw　that　this　was　the　only　means　by　which　the　best　army　in　the　world；　eight　hundred　thousand　strong；　led　by　the　best　of　generals；　could　be　defeated　in　a　conflict　with　the　inexperienced　Russian　army　of　half　the　strength；　led　by　inexperienced　generals。　Not　only　was　this　utterly　unforeseen；　but　every　effort　indeed　was　being　continually　made　on　the　Russian　side　to　hinder　the　one　means　that　could　save　Russia；　and　in　spite　of　the　experience　and　so…called　military　genius　of　Napoleon；　every　effort　was　made　on　the　French　side　to　push　on　to　Moscow　at　the　end　of　the　summer；　that　is　to　do　the　very　thing　bound　to　bring　about　their　ruin。
In　historical　works　on　the　year　1812；　the　French　writers　are　very　fond　of　saying　that　Napoleon　was　aware　of　the　danger　of　lengthening　out　his　line；　that　he　sought　a　decisive　engagement；　that　his　marshals　advised　him　to　stay　at　Smolensk；　and　similar　statements　to　show　that　even　at　the　time　the　real　danger　of　the　campaign　was　seen。　The　Russian　historians　are　still　fonder　of　declaring　that　from　the　beginning　of　the　campaign　there　existed　a　plan　of　Scythian　warfare　by　leading　Napoleon　on　into　the　heart　of　Russia。　And　this　plan　is　ascribed　by　some　writers　to　Pfuhl；　by　others　to　some　Frenchman；　and　by　others　to　Barclay　de　Tolly；　while　other　writers　give　the　credit　of　this　supposed　scheme　to　the　Emperor　Alexander　himself；　supporting　their　view　by　documents；　proclamations；　and　letters；　in　which　such　a　course　of　action　certainly　is　hinted　at。　But　all　these　hints　at　foreseeing　what　actually　did　happen　on　the　French　as　well　as　on　the　Russian　side　are　only　conspicuous　now　because　the　event　justified　them。　If　the　event　had　not　come　to　pass；　these　hints　would　have　been　forgotten；　as　thousands　and　millions　of　suggestions　and　suppositions　are　now　forgotten　that　were　current　at　the　period；　but　have　been　shown　by　time　to　be　unfounded　and　so　have　been　consigned　to　oblivion。　There　are　always　so　many　presuppositions　as　to　the　cause　of　every　event　that；　however　the　matter　ends；　there　are　always　people　who　will　say：　“I　said　at　the　time　that　it　would　be　so”：　quite　oblivious　of　the　fact　that　among　the　numerous　suppositions　they　made　there　were　others　too　suggesting　just　the　opposite　course　of　events。
The　notion　that　Napoleon　was　aware　of　the　danger　of　extending　his　line；　and　that　the　Russians　had　a　scheme　for　drawing　the　enemy　into　the　heart　of　Russia；　obviously　belong　to　the　same　category；　and　only　historians　with　a　great　bias　can　ascribe　such　reflections　to　Napoleon　and　his　marshals；　or　such　plans　to　the　Russian　generals。　All　the　facts　are　directly　opposed　to　such　a　view。　Far　from　desiring　to　lure　the　French　into　the　heart　of　Russia；　the　Russians　did　their　utmost　to　arrest　their　progress　throughout　the　war　from　the　time　they　crossed　the　frontier。　And　far　from　dreading　the　extension　of　his　line　of　communications；　Napoleon　rejoiced　at　every　step　forward　as　a　triumph；　and　did　not　seek　pitched　battles　as　eagerly　as　he　had　done　in　his　previous　campaigns。
At　the　very　beginning　of　the　campaign；　our　armies　were　divided　up；　and　the　sole　aim　for　which　we　strove　was　to　unite　them；　though　there　was　no　benefit　to　be　derived　from　uniting　them　if　our　object　was　to　retreat　and　draw　the　enemy　into　the　heart　of　the　country。　The　Emperor　was　with　the　army　to　inspire　it　not　to　yield　an　inch　of　Russian　soil　and　on　no　account　to　retreat。　An　immense　camp　was　fortified　at　Drissa　in　accordance　with　Pfuhl’s　plan；　and　it　was　not　proposed　to　retreat　further。　The　Tsar　reprimanded　the　commander…in…chief　for　every　retreat。　The　Tsar　can　never　have　anticipated　the　burning　of　Moscow；　or　even　the　enemy’s　presence　at　Smolensk；　and　when　the　armies　had　been　reunited；　the　Tsar　was　indignant　at　the　taking　and　burning　of　Smolensk　without　a　general　engagement　having　been　fought　before　its　walls。　Such　was　the　Tsar’s　feeling；　but　the　Russian　generals；　and　the　whole　Russian　people；　were　even　more　indignant　at　the　idea　of　our　men　retreating。
Napoleon；　after　dividing　up　the　army；　moved　on　into　the　heart　of　the　country；　letting　slip　several　opportunities　of　an　engagement。　In　August　he　was　in　Smolensk　and　thinking　of　nothing　but　advancing　further；　though；　as　we　see　now；　that　advance　meant　inevitable　ruin。
The　fact　shows　perfectly　clearly　that　Napoleon　foresaw　no　danger　in　the　advance　on　Moscow；　and　that　Alexander　and　the　Russian　generals　did　not　dream　at　the　time　of　luring　Napoleon　on；　but　aimed　at　the　very　opposite。　Napoleon　was　drawn　on　into　Russia；　not　through　any　plans—no　one　dreamed　of　the　possibility　of　it—but　simply　through　the　complex　play　of　intrigues　and　desires　and　motives　of　the　actors　in　the　war；　who　had　no　conception　of　what　was　to　come　and　of　what　was　the　sole　means　of　saving　Russia。　Everything　came　to　pass　by　chance。　The　army　was　split　up　early　in　the　campaign。　We　tried　to　effect　a　junction　between　the　parts　with　the　obvious　intention　of　fighting　a　battle　and　checking　the　enemy’s　advance；　and　in　this　effort　to　effect　a　junction；　avoiding　a　battle　with　a　far　stronger　enemy；　we　were　forced　to　retreat　at　an　acute　angle；　and　so　drew　the　French　after　us　to　Smolensk。　But　it　is　not　enough　to　say　that　both　parts　of　the　army　retreated　on　lines　inclined　at　an　acute　angle；　because　the　French　were　advancing　between　the　two　armies。　The　angle　was　made　the　more　acute　and　we　retreated　further　because　Barclay　de　Tolly；　an　unpopular　German；　was　detested　by　Bagration；　and　the　latter；　in　command　of　the　second　half　of　the　army；　did　his　utmost　to　delay　a　junction　with　Barclay　de　Tolly　in　order　to　avoid　being　under　his　command。　Bagration　delayed　the　junction　of　the　armies；　though　this　was　the　chief　aim　of　all　the　authorities；　because　he　believed　that　he　would　expose　his　army　to　danger　on　the　march；　and　that　it　would　be　more　advantageous　for　him　to　retreat　more　to　the　left　and　the　south；　annoying　the　enemy　on　the　flank　and　rear；　and　reinforcing　his　army　in　Ukraine。　And　he　believed　this；　because　he　did　not　want　to　put　himself　under　the　command　of　the　German　Barclay；　who　was　his　junior　in　the　service；　and　personally　disliked　by　him。
The　Emperor　accompanied　the　army　in　order　to　excite　its　patriotic　ardour；　but　his　presence　and　inability　to　decide　on　any　course　of　action　and　the　immense　number　of　counsellors　and　plans　that　swarmed　about　him；　nullified　all　action　on　the　part　of　the　first　army；　and　that　army　too　had　to　retreat。
At　the　camp　at　Drissa　it　was　proposed　to　take　a　stand。　But　the　energy　of　Paulucci；　scheming　to　become　a　leading　general；　affected　Alexander；　and　Pfuhl’s　whole　plan　was　abandoned；　and　the　scheme　of　campaign　intrusted　to　Barclay。　But　as　the　latter　did　not　inspire　complete　confidence；　his　power　too　was　limited。　The　armies　were　split　up；　there　was　no　unity；　no　supreme　command：　Barclay　was　unpopular。　But　on　one　side　the　confusion　and　division　and　unpopularity　of　the　German　commander…in…chief　led　to　vacillation　and　to　avoiding　a　battle；　which　would　have　been　inevitable　had　the　armies　been　united　and　any　one　but　Barclay　in　command　of　them。　And　on　the　other　hand；　it　all　led　to　a　growing　indignation　with　the　Germans　and　a　growing　fervour　of　patriotism。
At　last　the　Tsar　left　the　army；　and；　as　the　only　suitable　excuse　to　get　rid　of　him；　the　happy　suggestion　was　made　that　he　must　rouse　up　the　people　in　the　capitals　to　wage　the　war　on　a　truly　national　scale。　And　the　Tsar’s　visit　to　Moscow　did　in　fact　treble　the　forces　of　the　Russian　army。　The　Tsar　left　the　army　in　the　hope　that　the　commander…in…chief　would　be　able　to　act　alone；　and　that　more　decisive　measures　would　be　taken。　But　the　commander’s　position　became　weaker　and　even　more　difficult。　Bennigsen；　the　Grand　Duke；　and　a　swarm　of　adjutant　generals；　remained　with　the　army　to　watch　over　the　actions　of　the　commander…in…chief；　and　to　urge　him　to　greater　activity；　and　Barclay；　feeling　less　than　ever　free　to　act　under　the　watchful　gaze　of　all　these　“eyes　of　the　Tsar；”　became　still　more　cautious　and　anxious　to　avoid　a　pitched　battle；　and　clung　to　a　prudent　inaction。　The　Grand　Duke　hinted　at　treachery；　and　demanded　a　general　engagement。　Lubomirsky；　Bronnitsky；　Vlotsky；　and　others　of　the　same　sort；　helped　to　swell　the　clamour　to　such　a　point　that　Barclay；　on　the　pretext　of　sending　papers　to　the　Tsar　in　Petersburg；　got　rid　of　the　Polish　generals；　and　entered　into　open　conflict　with　Bennigsen　and　the　Grand　Duke。
In　Smolensk；　in　spite　of　Bagration’s　wishes　to　the　contrary；　the　armies　were　at　last　united。
Bagration　drove　up　in　his　carriage　to　the