笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第7部分

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that　sound；　but　simply　a　body　which　a　little　while　before
appeared　tome　as　perceptible　under　these　forms；　and　which　is
now　perceptible　under　others。　　But　what；　precisely；　is　it　that
I　imagine　when　I　form　such　conceptions？　　Let　us　attentively
consider　this；　and；　abstracting　from　all　that　does　not　belong
to　the　wax；　let　us　see　what　remains。　　Certainly　nothing
remains　excepting　a　certain　extended　thing　which　is　flexible
and　movable。　　But　what　is　the　meaning　of　flexible　and　movable？
Is　it　not　that　I　imagine　that　this　piece　of　wax　being　round　is
capable　of　being　square　and　of　passing　from　a　square　to　a
triangular　figure？　　No；　certainly　it　is　not　that；　since　I
imagine　it　admits　of　an　infinitude　of　similar　changes；　and　I
nevertheless　do　not　know　how　to　pass　the　infinitude　by　my
imagination；　and　consequently　this　conception　which　I　have　of
the　wax　is　not　brought　about　by　the　faculty　of　imagination。
What　now　is　this　extension？　　Is　it　not　also　unknown？　　For　it
bees　greater　when　the　wax　is　melted；　greater　when　it　is
boiled；　and　greater　still　when　the　heat　increases；　and　I
should　not　conceive　＇clearly＇　according　to　truth　what　wax　is；
if　I　did　not　think　that　even　this　piece　that　we　are
considering　is　capable　of　receiving　more　variations　in
extension　than　I　have　ever　imagined。　　We　must　then　grant　that
I　could　not　even　understand　through　the　imagination　what　this
piece　of　wax　is；　and　that　it　is　my　mind12　alone　which
perceives　it。　　I　say　this　piece　of　wax　in　particular；　for　as
to　wax　in　general　it　is　yet　clearer。　　But　what　is　this　piece
of　wax　which　cannot　be　understood　excepting　by　the
＇understanding　or＇　mind？　　It　is　certainly　the　same　that　I　see；
touch；　imagine；　and　finally　it　is　the　same　which　I　have　always
believed　it　to　be　from　the　beginning。　　But　what　must
particularly　be　observed　is　that　its　perception　is　neither　an
act　of　vision；　nor　of　touch；　nor　of　imagination；　and　has　never
been　such　although　it　may　have　appeared　formerly　to　be　so；　but
only　an　intuition13　of　the　mind；　which　may　be　imperfect　and
confused　as　it　was　formerly；　or　clear　and　distinct　as　it　is　at
present；　according　as　my　attention　is　more　or　less　directed　to
the　elements　which　are　found　in　it；　and　of　which　it　is
posed。
　　　　　Yet　in　the　meantime　I　am　greatly　astonished　when　I
consider　＇the　great　feebleness　of　mind＇　and　its　proneness　to
fall　＇insensibly＇　into　error；　for　although　without　giving
expression　to　my　thought　I　consider　all　this　in　my　own　mind；
words　often　impede　me　and　I　am　almost　deceived　by　the　terms　of
ordinary　language。　　For　we　say　that　we　see　the　same　wax；　if　it
is　present；　and　not　that　we　simply　judge　that　it　is　the　same
from　its　having　the　same　colour　and　figure。　　From　this　I
should　conclude　that　I　knew　the　wax　by　means　of　vision　and　not
simply　by　the　intuition　of　the　mind；　unless　by　chance　I
remember　that；　when　looking　from　a　window　and　saying　I　see　men
who　pass　in　the　street；　I　really　do　not　see　them；　but　infer
that　what　I　see　is　men；　just　as　I　say　that　I　see　wax。　　And　yet
what　do　I　see　from　the　window　but　hats　and　coats　which　may
cover　automatic　machines？　　Yet　I　judge　these　to　be　men。　　And
similarly　solely　by　the　faculty　of　judgment　which　rests　in　my
mind；　I　prehend　that　which　I　believed　I　saw　with　my　eyes。
　　　　　A　man　who　makes　it　his　aim　to　raise　his　knowledge　above
the　mon　should　be　ashamed　to　derive　the　occasion　for
doubting　from　the　forms　of　speech　invented　by　the　vulgar；　I
prefer　to　pass　on　and　consider　whether　I　had　a　more　evident
and　perfect　conception　of　what　the　wax　was　when　I　first
perceived　it；　and　when　I　believed　I　knew　it　by　means　of　the
external　senses　or　at　least　by　the　mon　sense14　as　it　is
called；　that　is　to　say　by　the　imaginative　faculty；　or　whether
my　present　conception　is　clearer　now　that　I　have　most
carefully　examined　what　it　is；　and　in　what　way　it　can　be
known。　　It　would　certainly　be　absurd　to　doubt　as　to　this。　　For
what　was　there　in　this　first　perception　which　was　distinct？
What　was　there　which　might　not　as　well　have　been　perceived　by
any　of　the　animals？　　But　when　I　distinguish　the　wax　from　its
external　forms；　and　when；　just　as　if　I　had　taken　from　it　its
vestments；　I　consider　it　quite　naked；　it　is　certain　that
although　some　error　may　still　be　found　in　my　judgment；　I　can
nevertheless　not　perceive　it　thus　without　a　human　mind。
　　　　　But　finally　what　shall　I　say　of　this　mind；　that　is；　of
myself；　for　up　to　this　point　I　do　not　admit　in　myself　anything
but　mind？　　What　then；　I　who　seem　to　perceive　this　piece　of　wax
so　distinctly；　do　I　not　know　myself；　not　only　with　much　more
truth　and　certainty；　but　also　with　much　more　distinctness　and
clearness？　　For　if　I　judge　that　the　wax　is　or　exists　from　the
fact　that　I　see　it；　it　certainly　follows　much　more　clearly
that　I　am　or　that　I　exist　myself　from　the　fact　that　I　see　it。
For　it　may　be　that　what　I　see　is　not　really　wax；　it　may　also
be　that　I　do　not　possess　eyes　with　which　to　see　anything；　but
it　cannot　be　that　when　I　see；　or　（for　I　no　longer　take　account
of　the　distinction）　when　I　think　I　see；　that　I　myself　who
think　am　nought。　　So　if　I　judge　that　the　wax　exists　from　the
fact　that　I　touch　it；　the　same　thing　will　follow；　to　wit；　that
I　am；　and　if　I　judge　that　my　imagination；　or　some　other　cause；
whatever　it　is；　persuades　me　that　the　wax　exists；　I　shall
still　conclude　the　same。　　And　what　I　have　here　remarked　of　wax
may　be　applied　to　all　other　things　which　are　external　to　me
＇and　which　are　met　with　outside　of　me＇。　　And　further；　if　the
＇notion　or＇　perception　of　wax　has　seemed　to　me　clearer　and
more　distinct；　not　only　after　the　sight　or　the　touch；　but　also
after　many　other　causes　have　rendered　it　quite　manifest　to　me；
with　how　much　more　＇evidence＇　and　distinctness　must　it　be　said
that　I　now　know　myself；　since　all　the　reasons　which　contribute
to　the　knowledge　of　wax；　or　any　other　body　whatever；　are　yet
better　proofs　of　the　nature　of　my　mind！　　And　there　are　so　many
other　things　in　the　mind　itself　which　may　contribute　to　the
elucidation　of　its　nature；　that　those　which　depend　on　body
such　as　these　just　mentioned；　hardly　merit　being　taken　into
account。
　　　　　But　finally　here　I　am；　having　insensibly　reverted　to　the
point　I　desired；　for；　since　it　is　now　manifest　to　me　that　even
bodies　are　not　properly　speaking　known　by　the　senses　or　by　the
faculty　of　imagination；　but　by　the　understanding　only；　and
since　they　are　not　known　from　the　fact　that　they　are　seen　or
touched；　but　only　because　they　are　understood；　I　see　clearly
that　there　is　nothing　which　is　easier　for　me　to　know　than　my
mind。　　But　because　it　is　difficult　to　rid　oneself　so　promptly
of　an　opinion　to　which　one　was　accustomed　for　so　long；　it　will
be　well　that　I　should　halt　a　little　at　this　point；　so　that　by
the　length　of　my　meditation　I　may　more　deeply　imprint　on　my
memory　this　new　knowledge。
　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Meditation　III。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　God：　　that　He　exists。
　　　　　
　　　　　I　shall　now　close　my　eyes；　I　shall　stop　my　ears；　I　shall
call　away　all　my　senses；　I　shall　efface　even　from　my　thoughts
all　the　images　of　corporeal　things；　or　at　least　（for　that　is
hardly　possible）　I　shall　esteem　them　as　vain　and　false；　and
thus　holding　converse　only　with　myself　and　considering　my　own
nature；　I　shall　try　little　by　little　to　reach　a　better
knowledge　of　and　a　more　familiar　acquaintanceship　with　myself。
I　am　a　thing　that　thinks；　that　is　to　say；　that　doubts；
affirms；　denies；　that　knows　a　few　things；　that　is　ignorant　of
many　＇that　loves；　that　hates＇；　that　wills；　that　desires；　that
also　imagines　and　perceives；　for　as　I　remarked　before；
although　the　things　which　I　perceive　and　imagine　are　perhaps
nothing　at　all　apart　from　me　and　in　themselves；　I　am
nevertheless　assured　that　these　modes　of　thought　that　I　call
perceptions　and　imaginations；　inasmuch　only　as　they　are　modes
of　thought；　certainly　reside　＇and　are　met　with＇　in　me。
　　　　　And　in　the　little　that　I　have　just　said；　I　think　I　have
summed　up　all　that　I　really　know；　or　at　least　all　that
hitherto　I　was　aware　that　I　knew。　　In　order　to　try　to　extend
my　knowledge　further；　I　shall　now　look　around　more　carefully
and　see　whether　I　cannot　still　discover　in　myself　some　other
things　which　I　have　not　hitherto　perceived。　　I　am　certain　that
I　am　a　thing　which　thinks；　but　do　I　not　then　likewise　know
what　is　requisite　to　render　me　certain　of　a　truth？　　Certainly
in　this　first　knowledge　there　is　nothing　that　assures　me　of
its　truth；　excepting　the　clear　and　distinct　perception　of　that
which　I　state；　which　would　not　indeed　suffice　to　assure　me
that　what　I　say　is　true；　if　it　could　ever　happen　that　a　thing
which　I　conceived　so　clearly　and　distinctly　could　be　false；
and　accordingly　it　seems　to　me　that　already　I　can　establish　as
a　general　rule　that　all　things　which　I　perceive15　very　clearly
and　very　distinctly　are　true。
　　　　　At　the　same　time　I　have　before　received　and　admitted　many
things　to　be　very　certain　and　manifest；　which　yet　I　afterwards
recognised　as　being　dubious。　　What　then　were　these　things？
They　were　the　earth；　sky；　stars　and　all　other　objects　which　I
apprehended　by　means　of　the　senses。　　But　what　did　I　clearly
＇and　distinctly＇　perceive　in　them？　　Not