笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第13部分

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without　ever　being　indifferent。
　　　　　From　all　this　I　recognise　that　the　power　of　will　which　I
have　received　from　God　is　not　of　itself　the　source　of　my
errors￥for　it　is　very　ample　and　very　perfect　of　its　kind￥any
more　than　is　the　power　of　understanding；　for　since　I
understand　nothing　but　by　the　power　which　God　has　given　me　for
understanding；　there　is　no　doubt　that　all　that　I　understand；　I
understand　as　I　ought；　and　it　is　not　possible　that　I　err　in
this。　　Whence　then　e　my　errors？　　They　e　from　the　sole
fact　that　since　the　will　is　much　wider　in　its　range　and
pass　than　the　understanding；　I　do　not　restrain　it　within
the　same　bounds；　but　extend　it　also　to　things　which　I　do　not
understand：　　and　as　the　will　is　of　itself　indifferent　to
these；　it　easily　falls　into　error　and　sin；　and　chooses　the
evil　for　the　good；　or　the　false　for　the　true。
　　　　　For　example；　when　I　lately　examined　whether　anything
existed　in　the　world；　and　found　that　from　the　very　fact　that　I
considered　this　question　it　followed　very　clearly　that　I
myself　existed；　I　could　not　prevent　myself　from　believing　that
a　thing　I　so　clearly　conceived　was　true：　　not　that　I　found
myself　pelled　to　do　so　by　some　external　cause；　but　simply
because　from　great　clearness　in　my　mind　there　followed　a　great
inclination　of　my　will；　and　I　believed　this　with　so　much　the
greater　freedom　or　spontaneity　as　I　possessed　the　less
indifference　towards　it。　　Now；　on　the　contrary；　I　not　only
know　that　I　exist；　inasmuch　as　I　am　a　thinking　thing；　but　a
certain　representation　of　corporeal　nature　is　also　presented
to　my　mind；　and　it　es　to　pass　that　I　doubt　whether　this
thinking　nature　which　is　in　me；　or　rather　by　which　I　am　what　I
am；　differs　from　this　corporeal　nature；　or　whether　both　are
not　simply　the　same　thing；　and　I　here　suppose　that　I　do　not
yet　know　any　reason　to　persuade　me　to　adopt　the　one　belief
rather　than　the　other。　　From　this　it　follows　that　I　am
entirely　indifferent　as　to　which　of　the　two　I　affirm　or　deny；
or　even　whether　I　abstain　from　forming　any　judgment　in　the
matter。
　　　　　And　this　indifference　does　not　only　extend　to　matters　as
to　which　the　understanding　has　no　knowledge；　but　also　in
general　to　all　those　which　are　not　apprehended　with　perfect
clearness　at　the　moment　when　the　will　is　deliberating　upon
them：　　for；　however　probable　are　the　conjectures　which　render
me　disposed　to　form　a　judgment　respecting　anything；　the　simple
knowledge　that　I　have　that　those　are　conjectures　alone　and　not
certain　and　indubitable　reasons；　suffices　to　occasion　me　to
judge　the　contrary。　　Of　this　I　have　had　great　experience　of
late　when　I　set　aside　as　false　all　that　I　had　formerly　held　to
be　absolutely　true；　for　the　sole　reason　that　I　remarked　that
it　might　in　some　measure　be　doubted。
　　　　　But　if　I　abstain　from　giving　my　judgment　on　any　thing
when　I　do　not　perceive　it　with　sufficient　clearness　and
distinctness；　it　is　plain　that　I　act　rightly　and　am　not
deceived。　　But　if　I　determine　to　deny　or　affirm；　I　no　longer
make　use　as　I　should　of　my　free　will；　and　if　I　affirm　what　is
not　true；　it　is　evident　that　I　deceive　myself；　even　though　I
judge　according　to　truth；　this　es　about　only　by　chance；　and
I　do　not　escape　the　blame　of　misusing　my　freedom；　for　the
light　of　nature　teaches　us　that　the　knowledge　of　the
understanding　should　always　precede　the　determination　of　the
will。　　And　it　is　in　the　misuse　of　the　free　will　that　the
privation　which　constitutes　the　characteristic　nature　of　error
is　met　with。　　Privation；　I　say；　is　found　in　the　act；　in　so　far
as　it　proceeds　from　me；　but　it　is　not　found　in　the　faculty
which　I　have　received　from　God；　nor　even　in　the　act　in　so　far
as　it　depends　on　Him。
　　　　　For　I　have　certainly　no　cause　to　plain　that　God　has
not　given　me　an　intelligence　which　is　more　powerful；　or　a
natural　light　which　is　stronger　than　that　which　I　have
received　from　Him；　since　it　is　proper　to　the　finite
understanding　not　to　prehend　a　multitude　of　things；　and　it
is　proper　to　a　created　understanding　to　be　finite；　on　the
contrary；　I　have　every　reason　to　render　thanks　to　God　who　owes
me　nothing　and　who　has　given　me　all　the　perfections　I　possess；
and　I　should　be　far　from　charging　Him　with　injustice；　and　with
having　deprived　me　of；　or　wrongfully　withheld　from　me；　these
perfections　which　He　has　not　bestowed　upon　me。
　　　　　I　have　further　no　reason　to　plain　that　He　has　given　me
a　will　more　ample　than　my　understanding；　for　since　the　will
consists　only　of　one　single　element；　and　is　so　to　speak
indivisible；　it　appears　that　its　nature　is　such　that　nothing
can　be　abstracted　from　it　＇without　destroying　it＇；　and
certainly　the　more　prehensive　it　is　found　to　be；　the　more
reason　I　have　to　render　gratitude　to　the　giver。
　　　　　And；　finally；　I　must　also　not　plain　that　God　concurs
with　me　in　forming　the　acts　of　the　will；　that　is　the　judgment
in　which　I　go　astray；　because　these　acts　are　entirely　true　and
good；　inasmuch　as　they　depend　on　God；　and　in　a　certain　sense
more　perfection　accrues　to　my　nature　from　the　fact　that　I　can
form　them；　than　if　I　could　not　do　so。　　As　to　the　privation　in
which　alone　the　formal　reason　of　error　or　sin　consists；　it　has
no　need　of　any　concurrence　from　God；　since　it　is　not　a　thing
＇or　an　existence＇；　and　since　it　is　not　related　to　God　as　to　a
cause；　but　should　be　termed　merely　a　negation　＇according　to
the　significance　given　to　these　words　in　the　Schools＇。　　For　in
fact　it　is　not　an　imperfection　in　God　that　He　has　given　me　the
liberty　to　give　or　withhold　my　assent　from　certain　things　as
to　which　He　has　not　placed　a　clear　and　distinct　knowledge　in
my　understanding；　but　it　is　without　doubt　an　imperfection　in
me　not　to　make　a　good　use　of　my　freedom；　and　to　give　my
judgment　readily　on　matters　which　I　only　understand　obscurely。
I　nevertheless　perceive　that　God　could　easily　have　created　me
so　that　I　never　should　err；　although　I　still　remained　free；
and　endowed　with　a　limited　knowledge；　viz。　by　giving　to　my
understanding　a　clear　and　distinct　intelligence　of　all　things
as　to　which　I　should　ever　have　to　deliberate；　or　simply　by　His
engraving　deeply　in　my　memory　the　resolution　never　to　form　a
judgment　on　anything　without　having　a　clear　and　distinct
understanding　of　it；　so　that　I　could　never　forget　it。　　And　it
is　easy　for　me　to　understand　that；　in　so　far　as　I　consider
myself　alone；　and　as　if　there　were　only　myself　in　the　world；　I
should　have　been　much　more　perfect　than　I　am；　if　God　had
created　me　so　that　I　could　never　err。　　Nevertheless　I　cannot
deny　that　in　some　sense　it　is　a　greater　perfection　in　the
whole　universe　that　certain　parts　should　not　be　exempt　from
error　as　others　are　than　that　all　parts　should　be　exactly
similar。　　And　I　have　no　right　to　plain　if　God；　having
placed　me　in　the　world；　has　not　called　upon　me　to　play　a　part
that　excels　all　others　in　distinction　and　perfection。
　　　　　And　further　I　have　reason　to　be　glad　on　the　ground　that
if　He　has　not　given　me　the　power　of　never　going　astray　by　the
first　means　pointed　out　above；　which　depends　on　a　clear　and
evident　knowledge　of　all　the　things　regarding　which　I　can
deliberate；　He　has　at　least　left　within　my　power　the　other
means；　which　is　firmly　to　adhere　to　the　resolution　never　to
give　judgment　on　matters　whose　truth　is　not　clearly　known　to
me；　for　although　I　notice　a　certain　weakness　in　my　nature　in
that　I　cannot　continually　concentrate　my　mind　on　one　single
thought；　I　can　yet；　by　attentive　and　frequently　repeated
meditation；　impress　it　so　forcibly　on　my　memory　that　I　shall
never　fail　to　recollect　it　whenever　I　have　need　of　it；　and
thus　acquire　the　habit　of　never　going　astray。
　　　　　And　inasmuch　as　it　is　in　this　that　the　greatest　and
principal　perfection　of　man　consists；　it　seems　to　me　that　I
have　not　gained　little　by　this　day's　Meditation；　since　I　have
discovered　the　source　of　falsity　and　error。　　And　certainly
there　can　be　no　other　source　than　that　which　I　have　explained；
for　as　often　as　I　so　restrain　my　will　within　the　limits　of　my
knowledge　that　it　forms　no　judgment　except　on　matters　which
are　clearly　and　distinctly　represented　to　it　by　the
understanding；　I　can　never　be　deceived；　for　every　clear　and
distinct　conception20　is　without　doubt　something；　and　hence
cannot　derive　its　origin　from　what　is　nought；　but　must　of
necessity　have　God　as　its　author￥God；　I　say；　who　being
supremely　perfect；　cannot　be　the　cause　of　any　error；　and
consequently　we　must　conclude　that　such　a　conception　＇or　such
a　judgment＇　is　true。　　Nor　have　I　only　learned　to…day　what　I
should　avoid　in　order　that　I　may　not　err；　but　also　how　I
should　act　in　order　to　arrive　at　a　knowledge　of　the　truth；　for
without　doubt　I　shall　arrive　at　this　end　if　I　devote　my
attention　sufficiently　to　those　things　which　I　perfectly
understand；　and　if　I　separate　from　these　that　which　I　only
understand　confusedly　and　with　obscurity。　　To　these　I　shall
henceforth　diligently　give　heed。
　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Meditation　V。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
Of　the　essence　of　material　things；　and；　again；　of　God；　that　He
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　exists。

　　　　　Many　other　matters　respecting　the　attributes　of　God　and
my　own　nature　or　mind　remain　for　consideration；　but　I　shall
possibly　o